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CHAPTER I - PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. By its Notification and Statement of Claim dated 24 February 2004, Guyana initiated 
arbitration proceedings concerning the delimitation of its maritime boundary with 
Suriname, and concerning alleged breaches of international law by Suriname in disputed 
maritime territory.  Guyana has brought these proceedings pursuant to Articles 286 and 
287 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “Convention”) 
and in accordance with Annex VII to the Convention.  Guyana and Suriname (the 
“Parties”) ratified the Convention on 16 November 1993 and 9 July 1998, respectively. 
2. In its Notification and Statement of Claim, Guyana stated that the Parties are deemed to 
have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention by operation 
of Article 287(3) of the Convention.  Guyana noted that neither Party had made a 
declaration pursuant to Article 287(1) of the Convention regarding their choice of 
compulsory procedures, and that neither Party had made a declaration pursuant to 
Article 298 regarding optional exceptions to the applicability of the compulsory 
procedures provided for in Section 2.  
3. In its Notification and Statement of Claim, Guyana appointed Professor Thomas Franck 
as a member of the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with Article 3(b) of Annex VII.  In 
its 23 March 2004 “Notification under Annex VII, Article 3(c) of UNCLOS Regarding 
Appointment to the Arbitral Tribunal with Reservation”, Suriname appointed Professor 
Hans Smit in accordance with Article 3(c) of Annex VII, but reserved its right “to 
present its views with regard to jurisdiction and any other preliminary matters to the full 
Arbitral Tribunal when it is constituted”.   
4. By joint letter to the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) 
dated 15 June 2004, the Parties noted that they had agreed to the appointment of the 
remaining three members of the Tribunal in accordance with Article 3(d) of Annex VII, 
being: 
H.E. Judge L. Dolliver M. Nelson (President); 
Dr. Allan Philip; and 
Dr. Kamal Hossain. 
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5. In their 15 June 2004 joint letter to the Secretary-General of the PCA, the Parties also 
requested that the PCA serve as Registry to the Tribunal. 
6. On 16 June 2004, the Secretary-General of the PCA responded that the PCA was 
willing to serve as Registry for the proceedings.  Ms. Bette Shifman was appointed to 
serve as Registrar with Mr. Dane Ratliff acting as assistant.  Ms. Shifman was 
subsequently replaced by Ms. Anne Joyce, who was in turn replaced by Mr. Brooks W. 
Daly. 
7. On 30 June 2004, the Parties sent draft Rules of Procedure for the conduct of the 
proceedings to the Tribunal for consideration at a procedural meeting to be held on 
30 July 2004 in London. 
8. At a procedural meeting held on 30 July 2004 in London, the Tribunal adopted its Rules 
of Procedure and Terms of Appointment with the Parties’ consent.  The Rules of 
Procedure specified that Guyana should submit its Memorial on or before 15 February 
2005, Suriname should submit its Counter-Memorial on or before 1 October 2005, 
Guyana could submit a Reply on or before 1 March 2006, and that Suriname could 
submit a Rejoinder on or before 1 August 2006.  
9. On 3 September 2004, Dr. Allan Philip tendered his resignation.  Dr. Philip died later 
that same month.  The Tribunal regrets the loss of his commendable service. 
10. In a letter dated 3 September 2004, the President of the Tribunal asked the Parties to 
attempt to agree on a replacement for Dr. Philip in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) of 
the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Article 3(d) of Annex VII to the Convention. 
11. In a joint letter dated 29 September 2004, the Parties informed the Tribunal that they 
had agreed that hearings should be held in Washington, D.C., at the headquarters of the 
Organization of the American States (“OAS”). 
12. In a further joint letter dated 30 September 2004, the Parties informed the Tribunal that 
they had not been able to agree on a substitute arbitrator for Dr. Philip and requested the 
Arbitral Tribunal to select the substitute arbitrator in accordance with Article 6(b) of the 
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. 
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13. In its letter to the President dated 1 October 2004, Guyana set out its views on the 
replacement procedure for Dr. Philip, and, in its letter to the President dated 6 October 
2004, Suriname did the same. 
14. In a letter to the Parties dated 27 October 2004, the President of the Tribunal 
communicated the Tribunal’s selection of Professor Ivan Shearer as substitute arbitrator 
for Dr. Philip in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) of its Rules of Procedure. 
15. Guyana, in its letter to the President dated 28 October 2004, and Suriname, in its letter 
to the President dated 29 October 2004, indicated their acceptance of Professor Shearer 
as substitute arbitrator for Dr. Philip. 
16. In a letter to the President dated 4 November 2004, Guyana stated that Suriname had 
objected to Guyana’s access to specific files located in the archives of The Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and reserved its right to petition the Tribunal to require 
Suriname to withdraw its objection to Guyana having access to those files. 
17. In a letter to the President dated 22 December 2004, Guyana set out its views on 
Suriname’s refusal of access to certain files in the archives of The Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and requested the Tribunal to “require Suriname to take all steps 
necessary to enable the parties to have access to historical materials on an equal basis 
and immediately to advise The Netherlands that it withdraws its objection of 
7 December [2004]”. 
18. In its letter to the President dated 27 December 2004, Suriname responded to Guyana’s 
22 December 2004 letter, stating that “this is not a case of ‘equal access’ to public 
records.  The records in question are not public”, and, “[t]hey cover many sensitive 
subjects including national security matters and matters pertaining to Suriname’s other 
territorial disputes with Guyana”.  Further, Suriname stated that access to the files was 
restricted under a general policy of The Netherlands regarding records relevant to 
ongoing international boundary disputes. 
19. Guyana responded by letter to the President dated 4 January 2005 and requested that the 
Tribunal “adopt an Order requiring both parties to cooperate and to refrain from 
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interference with each other’s attempts to obtain documents or other information from 
non-parties; and, in the case of any interference already consummated, to take all 
necessary action to undo the effects of such interference”. 
20. In a letter to the Parties dated 17 January 2005, the President solicited Suriname’s 
comments on Guyana’s letter dated 4 January 2005 and emphasized to both Parties the 
importance of equality of arms and good faith cooperation in international legal 
proceedings, recalling that these principles are laid down in the instruments governing 
the arbitration, including Articles 5 and 6 of Annex VII to the Convention, and 
Articles 7(1) and (2) of the Tribunal’s own Rules of Procedure. 
21. In its letter to the President dated 18 January 2005, Suriname requested an extension to 
the deadline set for its response to the President’s 17 January 2005 letter, from 
21 January 2005 to 24 January 2005. This request was granted. 
22. In its letter to the President dated 24 January 2005, Guyana requested an extension of 
two weeks for the submission of its Memorial, from 15 February 2005 until 1 March 
2005, which the Tribunal granted. 
23. In its letter to the President dated 26 January 2005, Suriname assented to Guyana’s 
request for an extension noting a reciprocal offer made by Guyana to agree to an 
extension of two weeks to the deadline for submission of the Counter-Memorial to 
1 November 2005.  The Tribunal consented to the extension. 
24. On 27 January 2005, Suriname responded to the Tribunal by providing comments on 
Guyana’s letter dated 4 January 2005, observing, inter alia, that some of the files in 
question are “unrelated to the maritime boundary dispute” and involve third party 
States. 
25. In a letter to the President dated 1 February 2005, Guyana reiterated its request for an 
Order in the terms set out in its letter of 4 January 2005. 
26. On 7 February 2005, the President invited Guyana to submit a “list of the specific 
documents and information in the archives of The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs it is seeking to access, indicating in general terms the relevance of each item 
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solely as it pertains to the maritime boundary dispute before this Arbitral Tribunal”, and 
invited Suriname to “communicate ... Suriname’s position as to whether the specific 
items sought by Guyana in that list should be released to Guyana, and if not, on what 
basis they should be withheld” following receipt of the list. 
27. In a letter to the President dated 14 February 2005, Guyana responded to the Tribunal’s 
letter dated 7 February 2005 by providing a list of documents to which it sought access 
at The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a list of subjects those documents 
“consist of, discuss or relate to, ... all of which self-evidently pertain directly to the 
maritime boundary dispute presently before the [T]ribunal”. 
28. In a letter to the President dated 21 February 2005, Suriname stated that “Guyana has 
not identified a single specific document that it needs nor has it even attempted to 
explain why it needs the documents in question”, and that “Suriname’s position is that 
none of the items on Guyana’s list ... is a file or document that Suriname has an 
obligation under international law to make available to Guyana”. 
29. On 22 February 2005, Guyana submitted its Memorial. 
30. In a letter to the President dated 2 March 2005, Guyana stated that “since access to [the] 
files was denied, Guyana [was] not in a position to identify the documents with any 
greater precision”, and suggested modalities by which the Tribunal might examine the 
documents in question. 
31. In a letter to the President dated 9 March 2005, Suriname stated that Guyana had not 
complied with the Tribunal’s 7 February 2005 request, and that Guyana’s request 
should “be denied or at least held in abeyance until after Suriname’s Counter-Memorial 
is submitted”. 
32. In a letter to the President dated 28 March 2005, Guyana argued that it required “access 
to the documents at the earliest possible time, so as to allow sufficient time for their 
precise translation from Dutch to English, careful review of their contents, and their 
potential use in connection with the submission of Guyana’s Reply”, adding that “[d]ue 
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to the shortness of time ... Guyana requires access to the documents before Suriname’s 
Counter-Memorial is filed”. 
33. In a letter to the President dated 30 March 2005, Suriname noted that Guyana’s letter 
was “highly inappropriate” and that “[t]his matter has been fully discussed”. 
34. In a letter to the Parties dated 2 May 2005, the President invited the Parties to set out 
their positions in full concerning Guyana’s request for an Order and the Tribunal’s 
power to make such an Order, and established 6 and 7 July 2005 as dates for a hearing 
on the matter in The Hague. 
35. On 4 May 2005, Suriname wrote to the President, to note that it would be likely to file 
Preliminary Objections, to request an oral hearing on any such Preliminary Objections 
should they be filed, and to request that the deadline for submissions on access to 
documents be extended from 23 May 2005 to 13 June 2005. 
36. By letter dated 6 May 2005, the President extended the deadline for submissions on 
access to documents from 23 May 2005 to 13 June 2005. 
37. In a letter dated 6 May 2005, Guyana set out its views on the proposed hearing dates 
and noted that it would oppose any proposal to bifurcate the proceedings to hold a 
separate hearing on Suriname’s Preliminary Objections. 
38. On 13 May 2005, Suriname indicated that it would file Preliminary Objections on 
jurisdiction and admissibility pursuant to Article 10(2)(a) of the Tribunal’s Rules of 
Procedure, and requested suspension of proceedings on the merits and an oral hearing 
on its Preliminary Objections. 
39. In a letter to the President dated 17 May 2005, Guyana opposed Suriname’s proposals 
as to a separate pleading schedule and an oral hearing to decide the issues raised in 
Suriname’s Preliminary Objections. 
40. On 20 May 2005, Suriname filed Preliminary Objections on jurisdiction and 
admissibility. 
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41. In a letter to the Parties dated 24 May 2005, the President invited submissions by 
10 June 2005 on “whether or not the preliminary objections should be dealt with as a 
preliminary matter and the proceedings suspended until these objections have been 
ruled on” and noted that the Tribunal would on the basis of those views determine 
whether to reserve time at the hearing on 7 and 8 July 2005 to discuss the procedure for 
dealing with Suriname’s Preliminary Objections. 
42. Suriname, in its letter to the President dated 26 May 2005, submitted its views in 
response to the President’s letter to the Parties dated 24 May 2005, and, inter alia, 
requested that its Preliminary Objections “be dealt with as a preliminary matter and that 
the proceedings on the merits remain suspended until there has been a decision on those 
Preliminary Objections”. 
43. In a letter to the President dated 10 June 2005, Guyana responded to the President’s 
24 May 2005 request, submitting, inter alia, that none of Suriname’s Preliminary 
Objections could “be said to be preliminary (or exclusively preliminary) in character, 
and none [could] properly be said to go exclusively to the question of the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction”. Guyana submitted that the proceedings should not be suspended, and that 
consideration of Suriname’s Preliminary Objections should be joined to the merits. 
44. On 13 June 2005, the Parties submitted further views on Guyana’s application for an 
Order requesting access to documents in the archives of The Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
45. By letter dated 23 June 2005, the President of the Tribunal invited the Parties to a 
meeting in The Hague on 7 and 8 July 2005, at which each Party would 1) “be given 
[the opportunity] to present its case on access to documents held in [The Netherlands’ 
National Archives]”, and 2) be given an opportunity to present its arguments on whether 
Suriname’s Preliminary Objections should be “ruled on as a preliminary issue, or 
whether a ruling on these Objections should be made in the Tribunal’s final [a]ward”.  
The President informed the Parties of the Tribunal’s intention to issue an Order 
disposing of these matters subsequent to the meeting. 
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46. The Tribunal met with the Parties in The Hague on 7 and 8 July 2005 and heard the 
Parties’ arguments on the issues identified in the President’s 23 June 2005 letter. 
47. On 18 July 2005, the Tribunal issued Order No. 1 entitled “Access to Documents”, 
which sets out in operative part:  
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY DECIDES AND ORDERS:  
1. the Tribunal shall not consider any document taken from a file in the 
archives of The Netherlands to which Guyana has been denied access; 
2. Suriname shall take all measures within its power to ensure that Guyana 
have timely access to the entire file from which any such document already 
introduced or to be introduced into evidence was taken, either by withdrawing its 
objections made to The Netherlands government, or, if this proves unsuccessful, by 
providing such file directly to Guyana; 
3. each Party may request the other Party, through the Tribunal, to disclose 
relevant files or documents, identified with reasonable specificity, that are in the 
possession or under the control of the other Party; 
4. the Tribunal shall appoint, pursuant to article 11(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules 
of Procedure and in consultation with the Parties, an independent expert competent 
in both the Dutch and English languages; 
5. the expert shall, at the request of the Party producing the file or document, 
review any proposal by that Party to remove or redact parts of that file or document 
[as each Party may have a legitimate interest in the non-disclosure of information 
that does not relate to the present dispute, or which, for other valid reasons, should 
be regarded as privileged or confidential]. 
6. any disputes between the Parties concerning a Party’s failure or refusal to 
produce, in whole or in part, any document or file referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, 
shall be resolved in a timely manner by the expert referred to in paragraph 4 of this 
Order; 
7. as provided in article 11(4) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Parties 
shall cooperate fully with the expert appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this 
Order. 
48. On 18 July 2005, the Tribunal also issued Order No. 2 entitled “Preliminary 
Objections”, which sets out in operative part:  
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THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY DECIDES AND ORDERS: 
1. under article 10 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the submission of 
Suriname’s Preliminary Objections did not have the effect of suspending these 
proceedings; 
2. because the facts and arguments in support of Suriname’s submissions in its 
Preliminary Objections are in significant measure the same as the facts and 
arguments on which the merits of the case depend, and the objections are not of an 
exclusively preliminary character, the Tribunal does not consider it appropriate to 
rule on the Preliminary Objections at this stage; 
3. having ascertained the views of the parties, the Tribunal shall, in accordance 
with article 10(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, rule on Suriname’s 
Preliminary Objections to jurisdiction and admissibility in its final award; 
4. after the Parties’ written submissions have been completed, the Tribunal 
shall, in consultation with the Parties, determine the further procedural modalities 
for hearing the Parties’ arguments on Suriname’s Preliminary Objections in 
conjunction with the hearing on the merits provided for in article 12 of the 
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. 
49. By letter to the President dated 20 July 2005, Guyana requested certain “relevant files” 
in the possession or under the control of Suriname, pursuant to the Tribunal’s Order 
No. 1. 
50. On 25 July 2005, Suriname asked the Tribunal to reject Guyana’s request for access to 
documents made on 20 July 2005, but stated that it would comply with its obligations 
under paragraph 2 of Order No. 1. 
51. Suriname wrote to the President again on 29 July 2005, setting out the manner in which 
it intended to implement paragraph 2 of Order No. 1, and agreed to give Guyana access 
to certain files and documents, provided they did not exclusively concern the maritime 
boundary between Suriname and French Guiana or exclusively concern the land 
boundary dispute between British Guiana and Suriname. 
52. On 2 August 2005, Guyana renewed its request, by letter to the President, for disclosure 
of the files it had identified on 20 July 2005 pursuant to paragraph 3 of Order No. 1 and 
set out its reasons why Suriname’s proposal for the handling of File 169A would violate 
paragraph 2 of Order No. 1. 
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53. On 8 August 2005, Suriname clarified by letter to the President that it interpreted 
paragraph 3 of Order No. 1 to mean that “if Suriname chooses not to present any 
documents from The Netherlands files, the paragraph 2 procedure does not apply and 
Guyana will have no right of access to those files unless it can make a showing of 
specific need for specific documents, beyond a general claim of ‘relevance’”, and asked 
the Tribunal to confirm that Suriname’s reading was correct.  Suriname also stated that 
documents concerning the boundary between French Guiana and Suriname “have 
nothing to do with the case before the Tribunal”, and that, if the independent expert was 
expected to make determinations of relevance on his own, it would be appropriate for 
the Parties to ask the Tribunal to review those determinations. Suriname agreed 
nonetheless to arrange for Files 161 and 169A to be submitted to the independent 
expert. 
54. In its letter dated 12 August 2005, Guyana explained its view that the role of the 
independent expert was “to review any proposal by a Party to remove or redact a file or 
document, and to resolve in a timely manner any dispute between the Parties over the 
failure or refusal of a Party to produce, in whole or in part, any such file or document”. 
Guyana stated that it was “ready and willing” to disclose documents to Suriname in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of Order No. 1. 
55. By an e-mail dated 23 August 2005, the President circulated draft terms of reference for 
the independent expert, inviting the Parties’ comments. 
56. On 25 August 2005, Guyana set out its comments by letter to the President on the role 
of the independent expert and on the draft terms of reference. 
57. In a letter to the President dated 30 August 2005, Suriname commented on the role of 
the independent expert and on the draft terms of reference, reiterating its request for 
interpretation of Order No. 1.  
58. By letter to the President dated 31 August 2005, Guyana expressed its concern that the 
expert should act expeditiously regarding Guyana’s request for access to documents. 
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59. In his e-mail to the Parties dated 13 September 2005, the President proposed to appoint 
Professor Hans van Houtte as the independent expert pursuant to paragraph 4 of Order 
No. 1. 
60. On 16 September 2005, both Parties wrote to the President endorsing the appointment 
of Professor van Houtte as the independent expert pursuant to paragraph 4 of Order 
No. 1. 
61. Suriname notified the Tribunal, by letter to the President dated 4 October 2005, that it 
would be represented by a new Agent, the Honourable L.I. Kraag-Keteldijk, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Suriname, who replaced the Honourable Maria E. 
Levens. 
62. On 12 October 2005, the Tribunal issued Order No. 3, the operative part of which 
provides as follows: 
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY ORDERS: 
1. Prof. Hans van Houtte is appointed to serve the Arbitral Tribunal as the 
independent expert pursuant to paragraph 4 of Order No. 1; 
2. the attached terms of reference for the independent expert appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of Order No. 1 are adopted; and 
3. the Arbitral Tribunal shall finally resolve any disputes that the independent 
expert cannot resolve pursuant to paragraph 2.12 of the terms of reference. 
*** 
INDEPENDENT EXPERT’S TERMS OF REFERENCE 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH TRIBUNAL ORDER NO. 1 
1. BACKGROUND 
1.0. In the context of the arbitration before the Arbitral Tribunal concerning the 
delimitation of the maritime boundary between Suriname and Guyana (“the 
Parties”), the Parties are in dispute concerning access to certain documents in the 
archives of The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Tribunal’s “Order 
No. 1 of 18 July 2005, Access to Documents” (“the Order”) summarizes the 
arguments of the Parties regarding “Guyana’s application for an Order requesting 
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access to documents in The Netherlands’ archives, and is attached hereto as 
“Annex 1”. 
1.1. Paragraph 4 of the Order provides: 
the Tribunal shall appoint, pursuant to article 11(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules of 
Procedure and in consultation with the Parties, an independent expert competent 
in both the Dutch and English languages. 
1.2. The Expert has signed a confidentiality undertaking and declared that he 
“will, as directed by the Arbitral Tribunal, perform his duties honourably and 
faithfully, impartially and conscientiously, and will refrain from divulging or using, 
outside the context of the tasks to be performed by him in this arbitration, any 
documents, files and information which may come to his knowledge in the course 
of the performance of his task.” 
1.3. The Parties are to cooperate with the Expert pursuant to paragraph 7 of the 
Order, which reads: 
as provided in article 11(4) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Parties shall 
cooperate fully with the expert referred to in paragraph 4 of this Order. 
1.4. The Expert or the Tribunal may terminate this agreement at any time by 
providing notice of intent to terminate one month before the termination should 
become effective. 
1.5. The Tribunal reserves the right to modify these Terms of Reference from 
time to time as it determines necessary. 
2. SCOPE 
General 
2.0. The Expert shall consult the Tribunal when in doubt regarding questions of 
procedure. The Expert shall follow such guidelines for determining relevance as 
may be communicated to him by the Tribunal, including attempting to distinguish 
between files and documents that relate exclusively to the land boundary between 
the Parties, other disputes or boundaries with third Parties, and those that relate to 
the maritime boundary between the Parties to this dispute. In light of the Parties’ 
arguments, and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), and the 
relevant Tribunal Orders, the Expert shall not, in carrying out any tasks associated 
with this section 2, be bound by strict rules of evidence and may evaluate 
documents or files in any form permitted by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal, in 
its final award, will decide on the relevance, cogency and weight to be given to any 
files or documents, or parts thereof, ultimately disclosed and relied upon by the 
Parties in their pleadings. 
Procedure to be followed pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Order 
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2.1. Paragraph 5 of the Order provides: 
the expert shall, at the request of the Party producing the file or document, review 
any proposal by that Party to remove or redact parts of that file or document for 
the reasons set forth under (c) in the last preambular paragraph of this Order. 
2.2. Sub-paragraph (c) of the last preambular paragraph of the Order provides: 
each Party may nevertheless have a legitimate interest in the non-disclosure of 
information that does not relate to the present dispute, or which, for other valid 
reasons, should be regarded as privileged and confidential. 
2.3. In accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Order, where a Party has 
invoked paragraph 5 of the Order, and produced a file or document, but proposed 
removal or redaction of it for the reasons set forth in sub-paragraph (c) of the last 
preambular paragraph of the Order, the Party proposing removal or redaction shall 
produce the entire un-redacted file or document for the Expert’s inspection. After 
having satisfied himself that the file or document before him is complete, the 
Expert may invite the Party seeking to redact or remove the files or documents, to 
set out, and/or elaborate on reasons already given, why those documents or files (or 
parts thereof) should be removed or redacted. Where the Expert so invites the Party 
seeking to redact or remove files or documents, he shall thereafter invite the Party 
seeking access to the documents or files, to comment on the reasons given by the 
Party seeking to withhold the documents or files. 
2.4. The Expert shall produce a report on his findings, preserving to the fullest 
extent possible the confidential nature of the files or documents at issue, and setting 
out the reasons for his conclusions. The report shall be communicated to the Parties 
and the Tribunal. The Tribunal will consider the report and determine whether 
redaction or removal is appropriate. 
Procedure to be followed pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Order 
2.5. Paragraph 3 of the Order provides: 
each Party may request the other Party, through the Tribunal, to disclose relevant 
files or documents, identified with reasonable specificity, that are in the possession 
or under the control of the other Party. 
2.6. The Tribunal may engage the Expert to review a request made pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of the Order, in order to aid the Tribunal in its determination of 
whether the files or documents which are the subject of the request, are indeed 
prima facie relevant, and have been identified with reasonable specificity. To that 
end, the Tribunal may ask the Party in possession or control of the files or 
documents to produce them to the Expert for his inspection. 
2.7. The Expert shall produce a report on his findings, preserving to the fullest 
extent possible the confidential nature of the files or documents at issue, and setting 
out the reasons for his conclusions. The report shall be communicated to the Parties 
and the Tribunal. The Tribunal will consider the report and determine whether 
access is to be granted or denied. 
14 
Procedure to be followed pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Order 
2.8. Paragraph 6 of the Order provides: 
any disputes between the Parties concerning a Party’s failure or refusal to 
produce, in whole or in part, any document or file referred to in paragraphs 1 and 
2, shall be resolved in a timely manner by the expert referred to in paragraph 4 of 
this Order. 
2.9. The Expert shall be free to propose his own solution to resolve a dispute 
between the Parties pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Order. The Expert shall at every 
stage afford both Parties an opportunity to set out their position, and shall fully take 
into account the arguments of the Parties. 
2.10. The Expert shall keep the Tribunal apprised of his progress in resolving a 
dispute pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Order. The Expert shall consult the Tribunal 
regarding his proposed solution to such a dispute, before such solution is 
communicated to the Parties. 
2.11. Once the Tribunal has acted upon the Expert’s proposed solution, it shall be 
communicated to the Parties. 
2.12. Where the Expert determines that a dispute cannot be resolved in a timely 
manner by him, he shall refer it to the Tribunal. 
63. On 12 October 2005, the Tribunal also issued Order No. 4, the operative part of which 
provides:  
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY ORDERS: 
1. (a)  Suriname shall cooperate fully with the independent expert appointed 
pursuant to The Tribunal’s Order No. 3, and facilitate his immediate access 
to the entire File 169A and entire File 161 in The Netherlands’ Foreign 
Ministry archives ensuring that such access is granted within two weeks 
from the date of this Order, indicating which documents, and on what basis, 
it wishes to remove or redact from those files before they are to be given to 
Guyana; and 
(b)  the independent expert shall, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Order 
No. 1 and the Terms of Reference, review Suriname’s proposal(s) for 
removal or redaction of documents mentioned above. 
2. (a)  The independent expert shall review Guyana’s request in its letter dated 
20 July 2005 for access to documents pursuant to paragraph 3 of Order No. 
1, in order to determine whether those files have been identified with 
reasonable specificity and appear relevant; and 
(b)  Suriname shall facilitate the independent expert’s timely access to the 
files identified in Guyana’s letter dated 20 July 2005, to the extent the expert 
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may deem such access necessary to determine reasonable specificity and 
relevance in accordance with paragraph 3 of Order No. 1. 
3. The independent expert shall endeavour to report on his findings as soon as 
possible. 
64. In a letter dated 14 October 2005, Suriname informed the President that it had requested 
The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide the independent expert access to 
Files 161 and 169A, pursuant to Order No. 4. 
65. On 24 October 2005, Suriname sent a Memorandum to the President proposing which 
documents in Files 161 and 169A Guyana could be given access to, and which should 
be withheld, but it did not disclose that Memorandum to Guyana on grounds that its 
contents were confidential. 
66. By letter dated 27 October 2005, Guyana objected to Suriname not disclosing its 
24 October 2005 Memorandum to Guyana and proposed a method of disclosure to 
preserve the confidentiality of the documents. 
67. On 28 October 2005, Guyana sent a letter to the independent expert providing its views 
“in connection with paragraph 2 (a)” of Order No. 4, as to which documents and files 
the independent expert should review and why. 
68. On 31 October 2005, Suriname filed its Counter-Memorial, dated 1 November 2005, 
with the PCA Registry. 
69. By letter to the President dated 2 November 2005, Suriname responded to Guyana’s 
letter of 27 October 2005, asking that the Tribunal disregard Guyana’s objection and 
requesting that the independent expert review all the documents being withheld from 
Guyana in The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. 
70. By letter to the President dated 4 November 2005, Guyana responded to Suriname’s 
letter dated 2 November 2005, submitting that the Terms of Reference allow for 
disclosure of Suriname’s Memorandum to Guyana. 
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71. On 8 November 2005, Suriname wrote to the President in response to Guyana’s 
4 November 2005 letter and reiterated its objections to disclosure to Guyana of 
Suriname’s Memorandum or the files in The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
archives before the independent expert had made his determination in respect of them. 
72. On 10 November 2005, Guyana wrote to Suriname agreeing to disclose to Suriname, in 
accordance with Order No. 1, documents that Suriname had requested in a letter to 
Guyana dated 8 November 2005, which had not been copied to the Tribunal. 
73. On 10 November 2005, Guyana wrote to the President in response to Suriname’s letter 
of 8 November 2005 addressed to the President and reaffirmed the views it had set out 
in its letters dated 4 November 2005 and 28 October 2005. 
74. In a letter to the Parties dated 28 November 2005, the President rejected Guyana’s 
request for disclosure of Suriname’s 24 October 2005 Memorandum, but allowed 
Guyana’s request made in its letter dated 28 October 2005 that the independent expert 
inspect certain files in The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. 
75. On 12 December 2005, Guyana wrote to Professor van Houtte asking to “be afforded a 
timely opportunity to present its comments pursuant to paragraph 2.3 [of the Terms of 
Reference] before any decisions relating to disclosure or withholding of documents are 
made”. 
76. On 18 January 2006, following an examination of the files in question, the independent 
expert submitted a report of his findings and recommendations to the Tribunal. 
77. Guyana set out its views in a letter to Suriname dated 18 January 2006 on documents it 
had been requested to disclose to Suriname and requested certain further documents 
from Suriname. On 24 January 2006, Suriname requested further documents from 
Guyana by letter. 
78. At the President’s request, the Registrar provided the Parties with a copy of the 
independent expert’s report on 26 January 2006, and invited comments on it by 
31 January 2006. 
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79. On 31 January 2006, Suriname sent two letters to the President concurring with several 
of the independent expert’s findings and recommendations but objecting to the 
disclosure of a specific document in File 161. Suriname disagreed with the independent 
expert’s finding that its position and practice with regard to its eastern maritime 
boundary “might be relevant” to the present dispute concerning Suriname’s western 
maritime boundary. 
80. In a letter to the President dated 31 January 2006, Guyana concurred with the 
independent expert’s findings and requested that the Tribunal immediately adopt his 
recommendation “to the effect that this material should be disclosed to the Tribunal and 
Guyana”. 
81. Suriname and Guyana wrote to the President on 1 February 2006 and 2 February 2006, 
respectively, further elaborating their views as to the relevance of documents 
concerning Suriname’s eastern maritime boundary. 
82. The Parties each wrote to the President on 3 February 2006, setting out their proposals 
for the scheduling of the oral hearing. 
83. In a letter to Suriname dated 10 February 2006, Guyana responded to Suriname’s 
requests for documents made on 8 November 2005 and 24 January 2006 and reiterated 
its own requests for documents from Suriname. 
84. On 16 February 2006, the Tribunal issued Order No. 5, the operative part of which 
provides:  
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY ORDERS: 
1. The recommendations of the independent expert in Sections 5 and 6 of his 
report (concerning documents in Files 161 and 169A) are hereby adopted, and 
Suriname is hereby requested to grant Guyana immediate access to the files in 
accordance with those recommendations;  
2. The documents compiled from Files 162, 311, 2022, and 2949 and referred 
to by the independent expert, in Section 7 of his report, shall be sent immediately 
to Suriname for comment and possible redaction; 
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3. Suriname, on an expedited basis and in any case no later than 22 February 
2006, shall transmit directly to Guyana any documents that it does not propose to 
redact or withhold, and shall indicate to the independent expert any proposals for 
redaction or withholding and the reasons therefor. 
85. Suriname wrote to Guyana on 17 February 2006, responding to Guyana’s letter dated 
18 January 2006 and disclosing some of the requested documents. Suriname produced 
further requested documents on 21 February 2006. 
86. Suriname produced certain documents pursuant to the Tribunal’s Order No. 5 under 
cover of two letters to Guyana dated 22 February 2006, and noted that it would submit 
others to the independent expert for possible redaction “in accordance with paragraph 3 
of the Tribunal’s Order No. 5”. 
87. On 22 February 2006, Suriname provided the Registrar with documents that it wished to 
have redacted by the independent expert, which were in turn forwarded to the 
independent expert on 24 February 2006. 
88. In a letter to the President dated 24 February 2006, Guyana noted that, according to its 
understanding of the schedule of pleadings, Guyana’s Reply would be due on 1 April 
2006 and Suriname’s Rejoinder on 1 September 2006, and requested confirmation from 
the Tribunal as to these dates. 
89. On 27 February 2006, Suriname provided a “Memorandum for the independent expert 
setting forth Suriname’s reasons for the proposed redactions in the documents that were 
sent to you by letter dated 22 February 2006” under cover of a letter to the Registrar.  
This Memorandum was not sent to the Co-Agent for Guyana in accordance with the 
Tribunal’s decision in its letter dated 28 November 2005. 
90. In a letter to the President dated 27 February 2006, Suriname stated that it had no 
objection to Guyana’s understanding of the pleading schedule and noted that, “except 
for the eighteen pages containing Suriname’s proposed redactions that were sent to you 
on 22 February 2006, all of the remaining documents that Suriname had been ordered to 
produce to Guyana have now been produced”. 
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91. The independent expert set out his recommendations on Suriname’s 22 February 2006 
proposals for redaction in a letter to the President dated 28 February 2006. 
92. On instruction of the President, the Parties were informed by the Registry on 1 March 
2006 that their understanding of the pleading schedule was correct, thereby confirming 
the due date for Guyana’s Reply as 1 April 2006 and for Suriname’s Rejoinder as 
1 September 2006. 
93. In a letter to Guyana dated 2 March 2006, Suriname requested production of any further 
documents that might pertain to Suriname’s 8 November 2005 request for documents. 
94. On 6 March 2006, Guyana confirmed by letter that it had produced all documents 
requested of it. 
95. The President wrote to the Parties on 6 March 2006, noting his full agreement with the 
independent expert’s recommendations, and instructing Suriname to implement those 
recommendations “without delay”. 
96. On 6 March 2006, Suriname requested by e-mail certain clarifications from the 
independent expert regarding his recommendations. 
97. Suriname disclosed documents, under cover of a letter to Guyana dated 7 March 2006, 
in accordance with the decision of the Tribunal of 6 March 2006, but withheld others 
pending clarification from the independent expert. 
98. Suriname disclosed further documents, under cover of a letter to Guyana dated 
10 March 2006, in accordance with clarifications received from the independent expert. 
99. Suriname provided the independent expert with the full set of documents it had 
disclosed to Guyana from Files 161 and 169A under cover of a letter to the independent 
expert dated 22 March 2006. 
100. Guyana filed its Reply dated 1 April 2006 with the Registry on 31 March 2006. 
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101. The Registrar wrote to the Parties on 4 April 2006, to communicate the Tribunal’s 
proposal that the oral hearings be held in Washington, D.C. from 7 to 20 December 
2006 and asking the Parties to confirm their availability on those dates. 
102. On 4 April 2006, the Registrar forwarded a letter to Suriname from the independent 
expert dated 30 March 2006 requesting Suriname to “indicate the references for the 
enclosed documents, which [the independent expert] was unable to find in the bundle 
[he] received from [Suriname] of documents submitted to Guyana”. 
103. In a letter to the Parties dated 6 April 2006, the Registrar confirmed that the oral 
hearings would be held at the headquarters of the OAS from 7 to 20 December 2006. 
104. Suriname wrote to Guyana on 14 April 2006 proposing a schedule for the oral hearings, 
and Guyana proposed a different schedule in a letter to Suriname dated 28 April 2006. 
105. Suriname noted its disagreement with Guyana’s proposed schedule in a letter to Guyana 
dated 28 April 2006. 
106. On 2 May 2006, Guyana wrote to Suriname modifying its proposed schedule in 
response to Suriname’s letter of 28 April 2006. 
107. Suriname filed its Rejoinder dated 1 September 2006 with the Registry on 
30 August 2006. 
108. On 27 November 2006, after consultation with the Parties, the Tribunal issued Order 
No. 6 appointing a hydrographer, Mr. David Gray (the “Hydrographer”), as an expert to 
assist the Tribunal pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. The 
operative part of Order No. 6 provides as follows:  
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY ORDERS: 
1. Mr. David H. Gray is appointed to serve the Arbitral Tribunal as a 
hydrographic expert pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure; 
2. the attached terms of reference for the hydrographic expert are adopted. 
*** 
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HYDROGRAPHER’S TERMS OF REFERENCE  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11(3) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE 
1.  Background 
1.1.  As set out in Guyana’s “Statement of the Claim and the Grounds on Which it 
is Based,” dated 24 February 2004, Guyana has initiated an arbitration pursuant to 
Articles 286 and 287 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(the “Convention”) and Article 1 of Annex VII to the Convention with regard to a 
dispute concerning the delimitation of its maritime boundary with Suriname.   
1.2.  The Parties to the Arbitration are: 
(a) Guyana, represented by H.E. Samuel Rudolph Insanally, as Agent, 
and Sir Shridath Ramphal and Mr. Paul S. Reichler, as Co-Agents. 
(b) Suriname, represented by the H.E. Lygia L.I. Kraag-Keteldijk, as 
Agent, and Mr. Paul C. Saunders and Mr. Hans Lim A Po, as Co-Agents. 
1.3.  Addresses for the Agents and Co-Agents are on file with the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), which is serving as Registry for the Arbitration.   
1.4. The Arbitral Tribunal, which has been validly constituted in accordance with 
Article 3 of Annex VII to the Convention, is composed of: 
H.E. Judge L. Dolliver M. Nelson (President)  
Dr. Kamal Hossain 
Professor Thomas M. Franck  
Professor Ivan Shearer  
Professor Hans Smit 
1.5.   Rules of Procedure for the Arbitration were adopted on 30 July 2004. 
Written pleadings have been submitted by the Parties in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure, as amended. Oral hearings are to be held from 7 December 2006 to 
20 December 2006 in Washington D.C. 
1.6. The Expert or the Tribunal may terminate this agreement at any time by 
providing written notice of intent to terminate one month before the termination 
should become effective. 
1.7. The Tribunal reserves the right to modify these Terms of Reference from 
time to time as it determines necessary. 
2.  The Expert 
Pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. David H. Gray (the 
“Expert”), hydrographer, shall serve as an expert to assist the Arbitral Tribunal in 
accordance with these Terms of Reference. 
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2.2. The Expert hereby declares that he will, as directed by the Arbitral Tribunal, 
perform his duties honourably and faithfully, impartially and conscientiously, and 
will refrain from divulging or using, outside the context of the tasks to be 
performed by him in this arbitration, any documents, files and information, 
including all written or oral pleadings, evidence submitted in the Arbitration, 
verbatim transcripts of meetings and hearings, or the deliberations of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, which may come to his knowledge in the course of the performance of 
his task. 
3. Scope 
3.1.  The Expert shall assist the Arbitral Tribunal, should it determine that it has 
jurisdiction to do so, in the drawing and explanation of the maritime boundary line 
or lines in a technically precise manner.   
3.2. The Expert will make himself available to assist the Arbitral Tribunal as 
required by it in the preparation of the Award. 
3.3 The Expert shall perform his duties according to international hydrographic 
and geodetic standards. 
109. Oral hearings were held in Washington, D.C., at the headquarters of the OAS, from 7 to 
20 December 2006. 
110. The Hydrographer, on 20 December 2006, requested the following in writing: 
[T]hat the Parties provide the position of Marker “B”, and other points in this 1960 
survey within the geographic area of the mouth of the Corentyne River, their 
geodetic datum, and the WGS-84 datum position of these points if they have been 
determined by re-computation of the 1960 survey. 
111. Guyana, in a letter dated 28 December 2006, provided World Geodetic System 1984 
(“WGS-84”) coordinates for Marker “B” obtained from a 2004 GPS Survey conducted 
at the site of what Guyana claimed to be Marker “B”. 
112. The Hydrographer, in a communication from the Registrar to the Parties dated 
7 January 2007, requested clarification of Guyana’s response to his 20 December 2006 
request as it appeared that Guyana had provided the WGS-84 coordinates of Marker 
“A” and not those of Marker “B” and that the coordinates given did not exactly 
correspond to those of Marker “A” as stated in Guyana’s Memorial, paragraph 2.10. 
113. Guyana, in a communication dated 10 January 2007, confirmed that it had mistakenly 
provided coordinates for Marker “A” in its letter dated 28 December 2007 and that 
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those coordinates had been rounded off for the sake of simplicity, and provided WGS-
84 coordinates for Marker “B” obtained from a 2004 GPS Survey conducted at the site 
of what Guyana claimed to be Marker “B”. 
114. Suriname, in a letter dated 12 January 2007, informed the Tribunal that it had been 
unable to find any information in response to the Hydrographer’s request of 
20 December 2006, contested the use of the WGS-84 coordinates for Marker “A” 
provided in Guyana’s Memorial, paragraph 2.10, claiming that it “does not have the 
ability to verify those coordinates” as Guyana could not provide any evidence as to the 
discovery or location of Marker “B”, and urged the Tribunal to use the astronomical 
coordinates previously used by both Parties as the WGS-84 coordinate values. 
115. Guyana, in a letter dated 19 January 2007, argued that the Tribunal should reject 
Suriname’s proposal to use astronomical coordinates for Marker “A”, as these 
coordinates were inaccurate and represented a difference of more than 411 metres with 
the WGS-84 coordinates, and claimed that there was no ground to assume that Marker 
“B” was no longer in its original location and that there was no need for any data in 
support of its determination of the coordinates of Marker “A”. 
116. Suriname, in a letter dated 29 January 2007, argued that there was no evidence that what 
Guyana alleged was Marker “B” was indeed Marker “B” or that what Guyana alleged 
was Marker “B” was in the location where the 1936 Mixed Boundary Commission 
(“Mixed Boundary Commission”)1 placed Marker “B”, and contended further that a site 
visit would have no value as it “would not provide any enlightenment on the question of 
whether the current location of Marker “B” is the same as its original location”. 
117. Guyana, in a letter dated 13 February 2007, offered further arguments regarding the 
discovery and location of Marker “B” and evidence in the form of two affidavits. 
118. Suriname, in a letter dated 16 February 2007, requested that the Tribunal disregard 
Guyana’s letter dated 13 February 2007 on the grounds that the Parties “have no right to 
introduce any new material”. 
                                                 
1  See paras. 137 and 138. 
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119. Guyana, in a letter dated 21 February 2007, argued that “all correspondence concerning 
the coordinates of Marker ‘B’ has been proper” as it was submitted in response to a 
request made by the Hydrographer. 
120. The Tribunal, on 12 March 2007, issued Order No. 7, which provided in operative part: 
1. The correspondence and materials submitted to date by the Parties regarding the 
discovery and location of Marker “B” were submitted in response to the 
Hydrographer’s inquiry of 20 December 2006 and form part of the record in this 
matter; 
2. The Parties shall not make further communications to the Tribunal or Registrar 
relating to the location of Markers “A” and “B” except after first seeking leave of 
the Tribunal or upon request of the Tribunal; 
3. The Hydrographer shall, after inviting the Parties’ representatives to be present, 
conduct a site visit in Guyana.  The modalities for the Hydrographer’s site visit 
shall be established through one or more orders in coming days  
121. The Tribunal issued Order No. 8 on 21 May 2007, which provided in operative part: 
1. The Hydrographer’s terms of reference for the site visit are to inspect what 
Guyana alleges to be Marker “B” and the surrounding area, as he deems 
appropriate, and to gather data relevant to the issues that have arisen as a result of 
his question to the Parties of 20 December 2006 and the Parties’ subsequent 
correspondence;  
2. Unless otherwise agreed with the Hydrographer, the Parties, the Hydrographer, 
and the Registrar shall travel to the site from Georgetown on the mornings of 
31 May and 1 June 2007, returning to Georgetown in the afternoon or evening of 
each day;  
3. As soon as possible, Guyana shall propose a time and place for participants in 
the site visit to meet in Georgetown on the mornings of 31 May and 1 June for 
transportation to the site; 
4. The Parties’ representatives shall cooperate fully with the Hydrographer;  
5. Following the site visit, the Hydrographer shall submit a written report to the 
Tribunal, which shall be shared with the Parties.  The Tribunal shall provide the 
Parties an opportunity to comment on the Hydrographer’s report. 
122. On 31 May 2007, the Hydrographer conducted a site visit in Guyana, accompanied by 
the Registrar and the representatives of the Parties.  
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123. On 4 July 2007, the Hydrographer’s “Report on Site Visit” was sent to the Parties, who 
were invited to provide comments on it.   
124. On 24 July 2007, Suriname submitted its comments on the Hydrographer’s Report 
accepting the Hydrographer’s conclusions and suggesting the correction of certain 
typographical errors and the addition of one clarification.  
125. On 25 July 2007, Guyana submitted its comments on the Hydrographer’s Report, 
accepting the Hydrographer’s conclusions and stating no objection to the changes 
suggested by Suriname. 
126. On 30 July 2007, the Hydrographer submitted a “Corrected Report on Site Visit” 
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CHAPTER II - INTRODUCTION 
A. GEOGRAPHY 
127. Guyana and Suriname are situated on the northeast coast of the South American 
continent and are separated by the Corentyne (in Dutch, Corantijn) River, which flows 
northwards into the Atlantic Ocean.  
128. The territory of Guyana spans approximately 214,970 square kilometres and its 
approximate population is 769,000.  Guyana’s land boundaries, which in part follow the 
course of rivers, are shared with Venezuela to the west and south, Brazil to the south 
and east, and Suriname to the east.  To the north, it faces the Atlantic Ocean.  Guyana 
became an independent State in 1966, after more than 160 years of British colonial rule. 
129. The territory of Suriname is approximately 163,270 square kilometres and its 
approximate population is 438,000.  Suriname shares borders with Guyana to the west, 
Brazil to the south, and French Guiana to the east.  To the north, it also faces the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Suriname gained independence from The Netherlands in 1975, after 
more than 170 years of Dutch colonial rule. 
130. The coastlines of Guyana and Suriname are adjacent.  They meet at or near to the mouth 
of the Corentyne River and together form a wide and irregular concavity. There are no 
islands in Guyana and Suriname’s territorial seas. 
131. Neither Guyana nor Suriname has signed international maritime boundary agreements 
with their neighbouring States. 
132. The length of the straight-line coastal frontage of Guyana as calculated from the 
approximate coordinates of the land boundary terminus with Venezuela to the 
approximate coordinates of the mouth of the Corentyne River is 223 nautical miles 
(“nm”), and the length of the straight-line coastal frontage of Suriname as calculated 
from the approximate coordinates of the land boundary terminus with French Guiana to 
the approximate coordinates of the mouth of the Corentyne River is 191 nm. 
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133. The seafloor off the coasts of Guyana and Suriname consists of soft mud out to the 20 
metre depth contour and is constantly subjected to erosion and accretion.  The 
horizontal distance between the high water line and the low water line, i.e. the area of 
tidal flats, low tide elevations and drying areas, is as much as 3 nm in several places 
along both coasts.  The seafloor does not attain a 50-metre depth contour (25 fathoms) 
until about 50 nm offshore, and does not attain a 200-metre depth contour (often 
considered the geological continental shelf break) until 80 nm offshore. 
134. The Corentyne River is navigable inland for about 50 miles and is also tidal for many 
miles inland.  At Bluff Punt, Suriname, where the river is about 4 nm wide, the river 
begins to widen out considerably so that just 5 nm farther seaward, the low water lines 
are 12 nm apart.  In that trapezoidal area, the river exhibits large tidal flats, drying areas 
and shoals such that most marine traffic follows a channel along the east side of the 
river estuary; there is a shallower navigation channel in the western half. 
135. Navigation into the Corentyne River from seaward is normally in the deeper channel, 
which is closer to the east bank of the river.  However, there were, at least in 1940, 
navigational aids to assist passage through the shallower channel that is closer to the 
west bank of the river.  For example, prior to 1928 and ending prior to 1940 there was a 
leading line of 190½° through this channel using the chimneys at Skeldon and 
Springlands as a set of range markers.2  From sometime after 1928 until sometime prior 
to 1949, there were also buoys along the west side of this channel.3  Additionally, there 
was a 10-metre high beacon built in 1938 as part of the 1936 boundary survey and it is 
still shown on both the British and Dutch charts, although the beacon ceased to exist 
prior to 2004.4 
136. The vertical range of the tide between high water and low water is generally in the order 
of three metres along the coast.  In the Corentyne River, the effect of the tide is felt 
                                                 
2  The leading line was printed on the 1928 edition of NL chart 222, and was cancelled by a Notice to Mariners 
in 1940. 
3  The buoys were added by hand on the 1928 edition of NL chart 222 (unknown date), and the buoys were 
noted as “not present” in 1949. 
4  Guyana Memorial, Annex 11, para. 6. and Minutes of 3rd Conference of the Mixed Commission for the 
Definition of the Boundary between British Guiana and Surinam, 21 December 1938.  Suriname’s Judge’s 
binder Tab C-5.  The beacon was not there when Counsel for Guyana visited the site in 2004. 
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several miles inland.  In the mouth of the river, the in-going tidal stream sets southwest 
whilst the out-going stream sets north.  In the rainy season, the out-going stream attains 
rates of 3 to 3½ knots and its influence is felt 10 or 12 nm offshore; the edge of the 
stream is distinctly marked by discoloured water. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
137. The efforts to establish a border between Guyana and Suriname date back to colonial 
times.  In 1799, the border between Suriname and Berbice, a colony then situated in the 
eastern part of modern Guyana, was agreed by colonial authorities to run along the west 
bank of the Corentyne River.  A Mixed Boundary Commission including members from 
the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Brazil was formed in 1934 to establish the 
southern and northern points of the boundary with greater precision.  The southern 
point, being a tri-junction between the boundaries of British Guiana, Suriname, and 
Brazil, was established at the source of the Kutari River, a tributary of the Corentyne 
River.  In 1936, the Mixed Boundary Commission made its recommendation that the 
northern end of the border between British Guiana and Suriname should be fixed at a 
specific point on the west bank of the Corentyne River, near to the mouth of the river, a 
point then referred to as “Point 61” or the “1936 Point”.  The rationale for locating the 
border along the western bank of the Corentyne River rather than its thalweg and 
locating the border terminus on the western bank was to enable The Netherlands to 
exercise supervision of all traffic in the river. 
138. In 1936, the British and Dutch members of the Mixed Boundary Commission also 
concluded that the maritime boundary in the territorial sea should be fixed at an azimuth 
of N10°E from Point 61 (the “10º Line”) to the limit of the territorial sea. 
139. In 1939, the United Kingdom prepared a draft treaty on the delimitation of the boundary 
between British Guiana and Suriname, which provided that the boundary of the 
territorial sea would lie along the 10º Line; however, the Second World War intervened 
and the Dutch government did not respond to the United Kingdom’s draft treaty. 
140. In 1957, the United Kingdom Foreign Office decided that it would delimit the British 
Guiana-Suriname maritime boundary from that time onwards by means of an 
equidistance line, which it understood would follow the 10º Line up to the three mile 
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limit from the coast and then an azimuth of N33ºE to its intersection with the 25 fathom 
line.  In 1958, British Guiana granted exploration rights to the California Oil Company 
in an area up to a line following N32ºE from Point 61.  Later, in 1965, a concession in 
an almost identical geographical area was granted to Guyana Shell Limited, a subsidiary 
of Royal Dutch Shell.  Between that time and the year 2000, Guyana granted several 
other concessions allowing operations in the area disputed in these proceedings.5  For 
instance, in 1988, it granted a concession for oil exploration to a consortium of LASMO 
Oil (Guyana) Limited and BHP Petroleum (Guyana) Inc. (the “LASMO/BHP 
Consortium”). 
141. Suriname has also granted concessions for oil exploration in an area of competing 
claims in these proceedings.6  In 1957, a concession agreement was entered into with 
the Colmar Company and in 1964, the concession agreement was amended to clarify the 
western limit of the concession area as the 10º Line in respect of the territorial sea and, 
beyond that, in respect of the continental shelf. 
142. In 1961, the United Kingdom prepared a new draft delimiting the territorial seas along 
the 10º Line and the contiguous zones, as well as the continental shelf, by means of 
what it regarded as an equidistance line.  In 1962, The Netherlands responded to the 
United Kingdom draft treaty with a draft of its own, providing, without reference to 
specific maritime zones, that the maritime boundary was to follow the 10º Line. 
143. In 1965, the United Kingdom prepared a new draft treaty, providing this time that the 
entire maritime boundary, in the territorial sea as well as the continental shelf, would 
extend along an equidistance line, seaward from Point 61 to the outer limits of the 
continental shelf; however, it was not accepted by The Netherlands. 
                                                 
5  Between 1965 and 2000, Guyana issued nine concessions to various companies and consortiums: to Oxoco 
(1971), Major Crude (1980), Seagull-Denison (1979-81), Lasmo-BHP (1988), Petrel (Albary concession, 
1989), Petrel (Berbice concession, 1989), Maxus (1997), CGX (1998), and Esso (1999).  See Guyana 
Memorial, paras. 4.9, 4.21-4.43; Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 5.7-5.44. 
6  Suriname issued one concession directly to Colmar in 1957, and later entered into service contracts through 
Staatsolie with five other companies or consortia: Suriname Gulf Oil Company (1980), Pecten (1993), 
Burlington Resources (1999), Repsol (2003), and Maersk (2004).  See Suriname Counter-Memorial, 
paras. 5.7-5.44; Guyana Memorial, paras. 4.9, 4.21-4.43. 
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144. In 1966, shortly after Guyana achieved independence, the United Kingdom hosted 
direct talks between Guyana and Suriname referred to as the “Marlborough House 
talks”.  The negotiations failed due to the Parties’ inability to reach agreement on the 
location of the land boundary.  With regard to the maritime boundary, Guyana 
advocated use of the equidistance principle for delimitation resulting in a line of N33°E 
to N34°E, whereas Suriname’s position was that the demarcation of the boundary 
should be carried out in accordance with other geographic considerations. 
145. In 1971, Guyana prepared a draft boundary treaty providing for Guyanese sovereignty 
over an inland area in the region of the sources of the Corentyne River disputed by the 
Parties, and Surinamese sovereignty over the Corentyne River itself.  With regard to the 
maritime boundary, the draft treaty adopted the same approach as the United Kingdom’s 
draft treaty of 1965 as it relied on an equidistance line seaward from Point 61.  This 
proposal was rejected by Suriname. 
146. In 1977 and 1978, Guyana and Suriname each adopted domestic legislation relating to 
their maritime boundaries.  On 30 June 1977, Guyana enacted its Maritime Boundaries 
Act 1977, which defined Guyana’s maritime boundaries as those determined by 
agreement with adjacent States or, in the absence of agreement, by means of 
equidistance lines (Article 35(1) of the Act).  On 14 April 1978, Suriname enacted the 
Law Concerning the Extension of the Territorial Sea and the Establishment of a 
Contiguous Economic Zone, which did not define the lateral boundaries of the territorial 
sea or the exclusive economic zone. 
147. In 1980, Suriname established its national petroleum company, Staatsolie.  From that 
year to the present, Staatsolie has held the exclusive right to obtain concessions to all of 
Suriname’s open offshore area, limited to its west by the 10º Line.  During this period, 
three of Staatsolie’s concessions were granted in the area in dispute between the Parties. 
148. In 1989, the maritime boundary between Guyana and Suriname was discussed during 
the talks held in Paramaribo between President Hoyte of Guyana and President Shankar 
of Suriname.  They agreed that modalities for joint utilization of the border area should 
be established pending settlement of the border question and that concessions that had 
already been granted should remain in force.  Representatives of the Guyana Natural 
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Resources Agency and Staatsolie met in 1990 and 1991 pursuant to the agreement 
reached by Presidents Hoyte and Shankar, but no agreement was reached by them.  The 
Parties, however, signed a Memorandum of Understanding governing “Modalities for 
Treatment of the Offshore Area of Overlap Between Guyana and Suriname as it Relates 
to the Petroleum Agreement Signed Between the Government of Guyana and the 
LASMO/BHP Consortium on 26 August 1988”, which was a preliminary document 
stating that the rights granted to the LASMO/BHP consortium in the “area of overlap” 
were to be fully respected.  The Memorandum of Understanding provided that, within 
thirty days, representatives of both governments would meet to conclude discussions on 
modalities for joint utilization of the area, pending the conclusion of a final boundary 
agreement.  The Memorandum of Understanding, however, was never implemented by 
Suriname, and the negotiations on joint utilization did not progress any further.  
149. Both Parties submit that they have been issuing fishing licences and patrolling the 
waters belonging to the area of overlapping claims in these proceedings between 1977 
and 2004. 
150. Among the concessions issued by Guyana for oil exploration in the disputed area of the 
continental shelf was a concession granted in 1998 to CGX Resources Inc. (“CGX”), a 
Canadian company.  In 1999, CGX arranged for seismic testing to be performed over 
the entire concession area, the eastern border of which was a line following an azimuth 
of N34ºE.  On 11 and 31 May 2000, Suriname demanded through diplomatic channels 
that Guyana cease all oil exploration activities in the disputed area.  On 31 May 2000, 
Suriname ordered CGX to immediately cease all activities beyond the 10º Line.  On 2 
June 2000, Guyana responded to Suriname, stating that, according to its position, the 
maritime boundary between Guyana and Suriname lay along an equidistance line. 
151. On 3 June 2000, two patrol boats from the Surinamese navy approached CGX’s oil rig 
and drill ship, the C.E. Thornton, which was located at 7° 19′ 37″N, 56° 33′ 36″W, 
approximately 15.4 miles west of the eastern limit of the concession area.  The 
Surinamese patrol boats ordered the ship and its service vessels to leave the area within 
twelve hours.  The crew members aboard the C.E. Thornton detached the oil rig from 
the sea floor and withdrew from the concession area.  The Surinamese patrol boats 
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followed them throughout their departure.  CGX has not since returned to the 
concession area. 
152. Also operating in the disputed area under licences from Guyana were the oil companies 
Maxus Guyana Ltd. (“Maxus”) (concession granted in 1997) and Esso Exploration and 
Production (Guyana) Company (“Esso”) (concession granted in 1999).  On 8 June and 
18 August 2000, Staatsolie informed Esso that it was operating in Surinamese waters 
without a licence, and that this was unacceptable to Suriname.  In September 2000, Esso 
invoked the force majeure clause in its concession agreement with Guyana and ceased 
its operations in the concession area.  Citing the approach taken by Suriname, Maxus 
also refrained from carrying out exploration activities in its concession area. 
153. On 6 June 2000, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago offered and subsequently 
provided his good offices at a meeting between the Guyanese and Surinamese foreign 
ministers.  Both foreign ministers expressed a desire to resolve the dispute peacefully.  
Guyana’s draft Memorandum of Understanding, which would have allowed all existing 
exploration concessions and licences to be respected until a final agreement on the 
maritime boundary could be reached, was not accepted by Suriname.  The foreign 
ministers of Guyana and Suriname agreed that a Joint Technical Committee should 
begin working immediately and that they should reconvene the joint meetings of their 
respective national border commissions (“National Border Commissions”).  The Joint 
Technical Committee held several meetings in June 2000; however, no agreement was 
reached. 
154. At the Twenty-First Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community 
and Common Market (“CARICOM”), held at St. Vincent and the Grenadines from 2 to 
5 July 2000, the Presidents and Prime Ministers of CARICOM issued a statement 
affirming the importance of settling the dispute by peaceful means and offering the 
good offices of Prime Minister Patterson of Jamaica to that end.  Talks were held 
between Presidents Jagdeo of Guyana and Wijdenbosch of Suriname from 14 to 17 July 
2000 at Montego Bay and Kingston.  No agreement was reached during these 
negotiations. 
34 
155. In 2000 and 2002, President Jagdeo met with the new Surinamese President Venetiaan 
and the Parties agreed to reconstitute their respective National Border Commissions.  
The National Border Commissions held a joint meeting in 2002 and formed a joint 
Subcommittee on Hydrocarbons.  Having met several times in 2002, the Subcommittee 
on Hydrocarbons reported that it could not find common ground even in interpreting its 
mandate.  The National Border Commissions likewise held several more joint meetings 
in 2002 and 2003, but were not able to reach agreement.  
156. Eleven months after the last meeting of the National Border Commission and in view of 
the lack of progress in diplomatic negotiations, Guyana initiated the present proceedings 
on 24 February 2004. 
C. THE PARTIES’ CLAIMS 
157. Guyana sets forth its claims in its Notification and Statement of Claim dated 
24 February 2004, which were further specified in its Memorial and Reply.  Guyana, in 
its Reply, requests that the Arbitral Tribunal adjudge and declare that:  
(1) Suriname’s Preliminary Objections are rejected as being without foundation; 
(2) from the point known as Point 61 (5° 59’ 53.8” north and longitude 
57° 08’ 51.5” west), the single maritime boundary which divides the territorial seas 
and maritime jurisdictions of Guyana and Suriname follows a line of 34° east and 
true north for a distance of 200 nautical miles; 
(3) Suriname is internationally responsible for violating its obligations under the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Charter of the United 
Nations, and general international law to settle disputes by peaceful means because 
of its use of armed force against the territorial integrity of Guyana and/or against its 
nationals, agents, and others lawfully present in maritime areas within the 
sovereign territory of Guyana or other maritime areas over which Guyana exercises 
lawful jurisdiction; and that Suriname is under an obligation to provide reparation, 
in a form and in an amount to be determined, but in any event no less than U.S. 
$33,851,776, for the injury caused by its internationally wrongful acts; 
(4) Suriname is internationally responsible for violating its obligations under the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature pending agreement on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in Guyana and 
Suriname, and by jeopardising or hampering the reaching of the final agreement; 
and that Suriname is under an obligation to provide reparation, in a form and in an 
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amount to be determined, for the injury caused by its internationally wrongful 
acts.7 
158. In the course of its oral pleadings, Guyana reaffirmed its claims as set forth in its Reply, 
and modified its fourth submission as follows:  
in relation to submission 4, that is in relation to our allegation that Suriname was in 
breach of its obligations concerning provisional measures, Guyana … limits its 
claim which it advances with utmost strength, but limits its claim to one for 
declaratory relief.8 
159. In its Reply, Guyana described the course of its claim line as commencing “from the 
outer limit of the territorial sea boundary at a point located at 6° 13′ 46″N, 56°59′ 32″W, 
and should from there follow a line of N34°E up to the 200-mile limit to a point located 
at 8° 54′ 01.7″N, 55° 11′ 07.4″W.”9 
160. Suriname, in its Memorandum setting out Preliminary Objections of 23 May 2005, 
requested the Tribunal to adjudge and declare that:  
1. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine Guyana’s Claim;  
2. In the event the Tribunal does not uphold Suriname’s first submission, Guyana’s 
second and third submissions are inadmissible; [and]  
For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal should bring these proceedings to a close 
forthwith. 
161. Suriname, in its Counter-Memorial, further specified its claims, which it subsequently 
modified in its Rejoinder and reaffirmed during the oral proceedings:  
Suriname respectfully requests the Tribunal 
1.  To uphold Suriname’s Preliminary Objections, filed 23 May 2005, as 
reaffirmed in its Counter-Memorial, filed 1 November 2005, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure. 
Alternatively, Suriname respectfully requests the Tribunal  
                                                 
7  Guyana Reply, para. 10.1. 
8  Transcript, p. 1465. 
9  Guyana Reply, para. 7.59. 
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2. A.  To reject Guyana’s three submissions set forth at page 135 of its Memorial 
and Guyana’s four submissions set forth at page 153 of its Reply. 
2. B.  To determine that the single maritime boundary between Suriname and 
Guyana extends from the 1936 Point as a line of 10° east of true north to its 
intersection with the 200-nautical mile limit measured from the baseline 
from which the breadth of Suriname’s territorial sea is measured. 
2. C.  To find and declare that Guyana breached its legal obligations to Suriname 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, by 
authorizing its concession holder to drill an exploratory well in a known 
disputed maritime area thereby jeopardizing and hampering the reaching of 
a maritime boundary agreement. 
2. D.  To find and declare that Guyana breached its legal obligations to Suriname 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, by 
not making every effort to enter into a provisional arrangement of a 
practical nature. 
162. Suriname’s N10°E claim line (the “Suriname Claim Line”), contrasted with Guyana’s 
N34°E claim line (the “Guyana Claim Line”), is illustrated in Map 1 at the end of this 
Chapter. 
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CHAPTER III - ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
A. SUBMISSIONS ON JURISDICTION 
Guyana’s Position 
164. It is Guyana’s position that it has complied fully with all requirements for the 
submission of this dispute to resolution under Part XV of the Convention.  Guyana 
states that it brings the claim to uphold its rights under Articles 15, 74, 83 and 279 of 
the Convention and that the dispute concerns exclusively the maritime boundary 
between Guyana and Suriname.10   
165. Guyana sets out the attempts between the two States to resolve the maritime boundary 
dispute following June 2000, referring in particular to the establishment of a Joint 
Technical Committee and negotiations under the good offices of the Prime Minister of 
Jamaica.11  It submits that the Parties’ efforts to settle their maritime boundary dispute 
from 1975 to 2000 and the acceleration of these efforts after June 2000, discharge the 
requirement in Article 279 of the Convention to seek a solution by peaceful means in 
accordance with the UN Charter.12  Guyana maintains that there has been a full 
exchange of views between the two States13 and that Guyana has complied with the 
requirement of Article 283(1) of the Convention to proceed expeditiously with such an 
exchange.14  
166. In Guyana’s view, all possibility of settlement by direct negotiation or third party 
facilitation had been exhausted by February 2004, and there is no requirement for it to 
                                                 
10  For Guyana’s submissions on jurisdiction, see Guyana Memorial, Vol. I, Chapter 6. 
11  Guyana Memorial, paras. 6.5-6.6; for a general description of those negotiations, see Guyana Memorial, 
paras. 5.13-5.19. 
12  Guyana Memorial, para. 6.7. 
13  Guyana Memorial, paras. 5.13-5.19.   
14  Guyana Memorial, para. 6.8.  
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continue attempts to negotiate where it concludes that the possibilities of settlement are 
exhausted.15 
167. According to Guyana, it is entitled under Article 286 of the Convention to pursue 
recourse to binding decisions under Section 2 of Part XV, and as neither Guyana nor 
Suriname has made a written declaration pursuant to Article 287(1) of the Convention 
as to a choice of means for the settlement of disputes, arbitration under Annex VII is 
deemed to be accepted by both States by operation of Article 287(3).16  Guyana adds 
that neither Guyana nor Suriname has made a declaration pursuant to Article 298 of the 
Convention that it does not accept one or more of the possible procedures provided for 
in Section 2 of Part XV.17   
168. Guyana contends that the dispute concerns the interpretation and the application of 
Articles 15, 74, 83 and 279 of the Convention and does not concern any matter other 
than the delimitation of the maritime boundary, making it unnecessary for an Annex VII 
Tribunal to reach a finding of fact or law regarding land or riverine boundaries.18  
Guyana disputes Suriname’s assertion that the Tribunal would be required to determine 
the unresolved status of the land boundary terminus in delimiting the maritime 
boundary.19  Guyana’s position is that the Parties have always been in agreement as to 
the status of Point 61 as the land boundary terminus and the starting point of maritime 
boundary claims, as is evidenced by the conduct of the Parties and their colonial 
predecessors over 70 years.20  Guyana maintains that the purpose of the Mixed 
                                                 
15  Guyana Memorial, para. 6.9, citing the following cases: Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; 
Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280, at para. 60 (“Southern Bluefin 
Tuna”); MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS 
Reports 2001, p. 95 (“MOX Plant”); Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor 
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10, at 
para. 48 (“Land Reclamation”); see also Transcript, pp. 59-60. 
16  Guyana Memorial, paras. 6.10-6.12; Transcript, p. 60. 
17  Guyana Memorial, para. 6.14. 
18  Guyana Memorial, para. 6.15. 
19  Guyana Reply, paras. 1.19-1.21, Chapter 2. 
20  Guyana Reply, paras. 4.8-4.11. 
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Boundary Commission was to fix the boundary definitively and considers that Suriname 
has itself accepted, and relied upon, Point 61 as the land boundary terminus.21 
169. Guyana does not agree with Suriname that Point 61 and a territorial sea delimitation 
following N10°E from that point were identified by the Parties in combination.22  
Guyana argues instead that the Mixed Boundary Commission first identified Point 61 
and then adopted a territorial sea delimitation.  Guyana maintains that the N10°E line 
dividing the territorial seas was chosen despite previous instructions to continue the 
boundary in a N28°E direction and was considered to be a provisional arrangement 
solely to allow for the possibility that the western channel approach to the Corentyne 
River might be used for navigation,23 a purpose it states had disappeared by the early 
1960s.24 
170. Guyana argues that under Article 9 of the Convention: 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the location of the mouth of the 
Corentyne River, where the Parties agree that their land boundary terminus was 
established.  Guyana submits that a determination under Article 9 would lead the 
Tribunal to the same conclusion that the conduct of the Parties for 70 years 
establishes: that Point 61 is located at the mouth of the river.  However, even if, for 
the sake of argument, the Tribunal were to determine that the mouth of the river is 
at another point, it would have jurisdiction to start the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary at that point.25 
171. Guyana further contends that “even Suriname’s erroneous argument that the mouth of 
the Corentyne River should be determined under Article 10, rather than Article 9, 
confirms the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 288(1)”.26 
172. Guyana also submits that “the Tribunal can still interpret and apply Articles 74 and 83 
of the Convention, and at the very least affect a partial delimitation of the maritime 
boundary in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf without deciding on any 
                                                 
21  Guyana Reply, paras. 2.9-2.28. 
22  Guyana Reply, paras. 2.1-2.8, 2.29-2.36. 
23  Guyana Reply, paras. 1.20, 2.29-2.36. 
24  Guyana Reply, paras. 5.57-5.67. 
25  Guyana Reply, para. 2.37. 
26  Guyana Reply, para. 2.38. 
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dispute over the land boundary terminus”.27  In support of this argument, Guyana cites 
the Gulf of Maine case, in which a Chamber of the ICJ effected a partial maritime 
delimitation between Canada and the United States from a point at sea designated as 
Point A.28 
173. Regarding Suriname’s additional submission that Guyana’s second and third claims are 
inadmissible as Guyana acted in bad faith and lacks clean hands, Guyana argues that 
Suriname’s submission has no factual basis29 and is not supported by legal authority.30 
Suriname’s Position 
174. Suriname contends that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in respect of Guyana’s first 
claim regarding the maritime delimitation between Guyana and Suriname if there is no 
agreement on the 1936 Point,31 and that Guyana’s second and third claims are 
inadmissible.32  Suriname has however conceded that if there is an agreed maritime 
boundary in the territorial sea, the 1936 Point “provides a perfectly adequate starting 
point” and as a result, the Tribunal would have jurisdiction in respect of Guyana’s first 
claim.33 
175. Suriname agrees with Guyana that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is founded on Part XV of 
the Convention, but contends that Article 288(1) of the Convention, which provides that 
“a court or tribunal referred to in Article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention” precludes the Tribunal 
from having jurisdiction over Guyana’s first claim if there is no agreement on the 1936 
Point.34  Suriname maintains that the drafting history of the dispute resolution clauses of 
the Convention demonstrates that its dispute resolution provisions were never intended 
                                                 
27  Guyana Reply, para. 2.42. 
28  Guyana Reply, para. 2.46, citing Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246 (“Gulf of Maine”). 
29  Transcript, pp. 581-582. 
30  Guyana Reply, paras. 2.6, 2.47-2.48. 
31  Transcript, pp. 795-796. 
32  Suriname Preliminary Objections, para. 1.1. 
33  Transcript, pp. 795-796. 
34  Suriname Preliminary Objections, para. 4.1. 
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to give rise to jurisdiction to determine territorial issues.35  Moreover, Articles 15, 74 
and 83 of the Convention do not admit the determination of land boundary termini36 so 
the Tribunal should exercise caution when considering its jurisdiction in these 
circumstances.37 
176. Suriname’s position is that if there is no agreement on the maritime boundary in the 
territorial sea, there has been no agreement between the Parties or their colonial 
predecessors as to the location of the land boundary terminus, and that the Tribunal 
therefore lacks jurisdiction to resolve Guyana’s first claim.38  Suriname’s interpretation 
of the history of negotiations and other practices of the Parties and their colonial 
predecessors is that the 1936 Point has never been regarded as definitive,39 as evidenced 
by, inter alia, the British draft treaty proposal of 1939 and the opinion of the Prime 
Minister of The Netherlands on Surinamese independence in 1975 regarding the 
territorial extent of Suriname.40   
177. Suriname maintains that, in the absence of an agreement on the maritime boundary in 
the territorial sea, the 1936 Point amounted only to a recommendation in preparation for 
agreement by treaty and that the actual location of the land boundary terminus was open 
to doubt at the time of the Boundary Commission’s work.41  In Suriname’s view, the 
precise location of the land boundary terminus makes a substantial difference to the 
maritime entitlements in this case,42 referring in particular to an analysis using Point X 
(6° 08′ 32″N, 57° 11′ 22″W), the position Suriname considers to be the most northerly 
possible location for a land boundary terminus.  Suriname contends that the 1936 Point 
is not located where the western bank of the Corantijn River joins the sea, being the 
reference point established in the 1799 Agreement of Cession, and cites, inter alia, 
                                                 
35  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 4.2-4.7. 
36  Suriname Preliminary Objections, para. 4.11; Transcript, pp. 772-773. 
37  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.70-2.80; Transcript, pp. 767-768. 
38  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 1.8-1.11, 4.14; Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.6-2.9; Transcript, 
pp. 761-762, 778-779. 
39  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.15-2.29. 
40  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 2.1-2.12. 
41  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 2.1-2.10; Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.15-2.23. 
42  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 2.19-2.22. 
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instances where the land boundary terminus has been referred to without mention of the 
1936 Point.   
178. Suriname argues that, in the absence of an agreement on the maritime boundary in the 
territorial sea, the location of the 1936 Point inland from the low water mark means that 
it cannot, by definition, be the land boundary terminus in any event.43 According to 
Suriname, the Tribunal would need to select a land boundary terminus on the low water 
line, thereby prejudicing the position of the land boundary, as Suriname contends 
Guyana does by selecting base point G1 (6° 00′ 27.9″N, 57° 08′ 21.1″W) as its point of 
commencement of the maritime boundary at the low water line. 
179. It is Suriname’s position that the land boundary terminus and the disputed maritime and 
land claims have been part of a broader dispute between the Parties, which is supported 
by the historical record of the Parties’ negotiations and practice.44 Suriname maintains 
that the work of the Boundary Commission in the 1930s was to recommend a settlement 
of the land boundary as a whole and therefore rejects Guyana’s view that the location of 
the 1936 Point should be accepted as a land boundary terminus, given that other parts of 
the boundary remain in dispute.45   
180. Suriname maintains that, in the absence of an agreement on the maritime boundary in 
the territorial sea, the 1936 Point could only bind it by agreement, by acquiescence, or 
by Suriname’s actions and reliance on them estopping it from claiming an alternative 
location for the land boundary terminus.46  Suriname points to the absence of a treaty 
and argues that, to acquiesce, Suriname must have remained consistently silent in the 
face of Guyana’s assertion of a contrary position, which the historical record does not 
evidence.  Suriname argues that it cannot be estopped from questioning the status of the 
1936 Point, since representations regarding the 1936 Point were made only in the 
context of negotiations, and that Guyana’s awareness of Suriname’s overall claim 
                                                 
43  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.10-2.14. 
44  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 3.4-3.15. 
45  Suriname Rejoinder, para. 2.22. 
46  As to Suriname’s submissions on these points in general, see Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 5.1-
5.15. 
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necessarily precluded Guyana from relying on any statement, action or inaction to its 
detriment.47  
181. It is Suriname’s submission that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to delimit a boundary by 
determining a closing line across the mouth of the Corantijn River under Articles 9 and 
10 of the Convention.48  Suriname maintains that it is Article 10, relating to bays, which 
would apply in respect of the Corantijn mouth in any event.  It further argues that the 
drawing of any baseline or closing line is for the coastal State and not for a court or 
tribunal, although a court or tribunal can find that the manner in which those lines are 
drawn violates international law.49  Moreover, Suriname disputes Guyana’s argument 
that the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to make a partial delimitation from a point at 
15 nm from coastal baselines should it not have jurisdiction to make a full delimitation, 
submitting that Guyana wrongly relies upon the Gulf of Maine case and fails to establish 
that such partial delimitations are possible in the instant case in which a starting point 
has not been agreed upon.50   
182. Suriname contends that Guyana’s second and third claims are inadmissible, as Guyana 
did not act in good faith and lacks clean hands.51  Suriname maintains that the doctrine 
of clean hands has been recognized since the early jurisprudence of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and that recent International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
judgments and opinions leave it open to parties to invoke the doctrine.52  In Suriname’s 
view, even if these claims are found to be admissible, clean hands should be considered 
in determining the merits of Guyana’s claims.  According to Suriname, Guyana lacks 
clean hands as it authorized drilling in the disputed area, gave no notice to Suriname 
                                                 
47  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 5.10-5.15. 
48  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.55-2.61. 
49  Transcript, pp. 800-801. 
50  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.62-2.69, citing Gulf of Maine, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246. 
51  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 7.1-7.9; Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.81-2.120; Transcript, 
pp. 1100-1101. 
52  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.91-2.109. 
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(press reports being insufficient), and failed to withdraw support for the activity 
following Suriname’s first complaints.53 
183. Suriname maintains that Guyana’s second claim, that it engaged in a wrongful act by 
expelling the CGX vessel in June 2000, must fail as Suriname has not acquiesced in 
Guyana’s claim to maritime territory54 and Guyana cannot claim that it exercises lawful 
jurisdiction in the disputed area.  Suriname points out that the ICJ has never in the same 
judgment awarded reparations for violation of State sovereignty in a case in which it 
was requested to delimit a boundary determining such sovereignty.55  According to 
Guyana, such a claim would amount to an ex post facto application of Guyana’s first 
claim and would encourage States in the future to engage in activity designed to create 
facts on the ground in support of their claims.  Suriname asserts that based on the oil 
concession practice of the Parties, Guyana’s actions were in breach of the 1989 modus 
vivendi and signalled an aggressive posture by Guyana.56 
184. With respect to Guyana’s third claim, Suriname contends that Guyana lacks clean hands 
and that the record demonstrates Guyana’s failure to negotiate in good faith.57  
Suriname argues, with reference to the Parties’ negotiating history since the June 2000 
incident, that Guyana unreasonably demanded the reinstatement of the CGX operation 
while offering little in return, thereby jeopardizing resolution of the dispute and 
breaching Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention.  Suriname further argues that 
Guyana withheld information regarding its oil concessions in bad faith and maintains 
that Guyana’s core request, that exploration activities resume, amounted to a request 
that Suriname acquiesce in Guyana’s prejudicial activity.58 
                                                 
53  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.110-2.115. 
54  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 6.7-6.11. 
55  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.84-2.90. 
56  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 6.3-6.6. 
57  Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 6.39-6.44. 
58  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 2.116-2.120. 
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185. Accordingly, Suriname requests that the Tribunal find that it does not have jurisdiction 
to determine Guyana’s maritime delimitation claim and that Guyana’s second and third 
claims are inadmissible.59 
B. THE PARTIES’ INTERPRETATION OF THE FACTUAL RECORD 
Guyana’s Position 
186. Guyana bases its claims in part on an account of the record of the practices of Guyana 
and Suriname and their colonial predecessors.  Guyana refers to the work of the Mixed 
Boundary Commission, constituted by The Netherlands and the United Kingdom in 
1934, and argues that the historical record demonstrates that the northerly point of the 
boundary it established, Point 61, was treated as the northern land boundary terminus 
between the colonies until the independence of Guyana and Suriname.  It argues further 
that Point 61 has been recognized expressly by Guyana and Suriname since 
independence.60 
187. Guyana refers to the work of the Mixed Boundary Commission and to the positions 
taken by The Netherlands and the United Kingdom at the time, and submits that the de 
facto delimitation of the territorial sea recommended by the Commission along an 
azimuth of N10°E from Point 61 was reached to accommodate The Netherlands’ 
practical concern at the time that both navigable approaches to the mouth of the 
Corentyne River should remain under its authority to allow it to carry out its 
administration of shipping on the river.  Guyana emphasized that this delimitation did 
not purport to follow an equidistance line, and was provisional and liable to change, 
being “motivated solely by considerations of administrative and navigational 
efficiencies.”61 
188. Guyana maintains that the attempts in 1939 by the United Kingdom and The 
Netherlands to draft a treaty settling the entire length of the boundary, based on a 
delimitation of the territorial waters along an azimuth of N10°E from a beacon to be 
                                                 
59  Suriname Preliminary Objections, Chapter 8. 
60  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.10. 
61  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.16. 
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erected at the northern terminus of the land boundary,62 reflected a consensus between 
the two countries at that time.63 Guyana argues it was the outbreak of war in 1939 and 
the occupation of The Netherlands in 1940 that prevented signature of the treaty and 
that the English text proposed by the United Kingdom for a treaty settling the boundary 
in 1949 was identical to the 1939 draft treaty. 
189. Guyana refers to the United Kingdom’s own 1957-1958 delimitation, which was carried 
out in order to enable an oil concession to be granted to the California Oil Company in 
1958.  The United Kingdom delimited the territorial sea along a line following an 
azimuth of N10°E from Point 61 to a distance of three miles from the coast and then an 
azimuth of N33°E thereafter until intersection with the 25 fathom depth line 
(45.7 metres), which Guyana argues reflected a good faith attempt to establish a 
boundary based on the equidistance principle.64  Guyana states that this is demonstrated 
by the intention of the British to conduct this exercise in accordance with the principles 
embodied in the UN International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) 1956 Draft Articles on 
Maritime Delimitation65 (the “ILC Draft Articles”), which were subsequently adopted in 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (the “1958 
Territorial Sea Convention”) and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(the “1958 Continental Shelf Convention” and together, the “1958 Conventions”).66   
190. Guyana points to the British use of Dutch maps in support of its contention that the 
exercise was carried out in good faith and submits that The Netherlands did not object 
to the California Oil Company concession, having been informed of it and knowing that 
the grant of the concession was made in reliance on the equidistance principle.  Guyana 
also refers to Dutch willingness in 1958 to delimit the maritime boundary in conformity 
with Article 6(2) of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, the United Kingdom’s 
positive response to such a proposal, and Dutch charts illustrating a “median line” 
dating from 1959 as evidence for The Netherlands’ support for such an approach. 
                                                 
62  Guyana Memorial, paras. 3.17-3.19. 
63  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.19. 
64  Guyana Memorial, paras. 3.22-3.31. 
65  Report of The International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1956, Vol. II, Doc. A/3159 (“YBILC”). 
66  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.24. 
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191. Guyana submits that the segmented line adopted by the United Kingdom in its 1961 
draft treaty reflected an attempt to track the course of a true equidistance line more 
closely in proposing the prolongation of the territorial sea delimitation along an azimuth 
of N10°E to a distance of six miles from the coast and the continuation of the boundary 
along an azimuth of N33°E for 35 miles, N38°E for a further 28 miles, and along an 
azimuth of N28°E to the edge of the continental shelf as defined by international law.67   
192. Guyana argues that The Netherlands’ draft treaty proposed in 1962 did not reject the 
concept of using an equidistance line to delimit the continental shelf area, which it 
failed to address, as the true focus of the dispute rested on competing territorial claims 
inland.68  According to Guyana, the record relating to the exchange of draft treaties in 
1961-1962 reflects a common understanding that Point 61 represented the northern land 
boundary terminus and a commitment to delimitation of the continental shelf based on 
equidistance.69 
193. It is Guyana’s contention that the United Kingdom took an approach consistent with its 
position in the 1961-1962 exchange in delimiting British Guyana’s western maritime 
boundary, and that this approach was also embodied in the United Kingdom’s draft 
treaty of 1965, which dispensed with the earlier use of a N10°E azimuth to delimit the 
territorial sea, proposing an equidistance delimitation from Point 61 to the edge of the 
continental shelf.  Guyana submits that the United Kingdom considered the original 
rationale for delimiting the territorial sea in this way was no longer applicable as 
commercial ships could not use the western channel accessing the Corentyne River.  In 
Guyana’s view, the Dutch were in agreement that the old rationale was no longer valid, 
but did not sign the treaty due to disagreements over the competing inland claims,70 
objecting to the proposed change as a negotiating tactic.  Guyana points out that The 
Netherlands supported delimitation based on the principle of equidistance in other 
contexts, referring, inter alia, to the position taken by The Netherlands in its maritime 
                                                 
67  Guyana Memorial, paras. 3.37-3.39. 
68  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.42. 
69  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.43. 
70  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.46. 
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boundary dispute with Germany in 1965,71 and with respect to the treaty concerning the 
North Sea maritime boundary concluded with the United Kingdom in the same year.72  
194. For Guyana, the record of negotiations between the Parties in 1966 demonstrates its 
consistent assertion that delimitation should be according to the equidistance principle 
and reveals that Suriname’s approach was rooted in political considerations rather than 
the applicable law.  Guyana submits that Suriname’s proposal to adopt a boundary 
following a N10°E azimuth from Point 61 to the edge of the continental shelf, reflecting 
the direction of the thalweg of the Corentyne River’s western channel, was at odds with 
the position previously accepted by The Netherlands.73  Further, the Dutch Prime 
Minister’s advice to Suriname as to the extent of its territory on independence is cited 
by Guyana as consistent with the principle of equidistance in its description of 
Suriname’s eastern maritime boundary.   
195. Guyana argues that the practice of the Parties between 1966 and 2004 reflects a mutual 
recognition that the boundary should follow an equidistance line “to a very great extent 
the line of N34E”.  This is evidenced by the grant of oil concessions and the conduct of 
seismic testing74 based upon an equidistance line matching that developed by the United 
Kingdom in 1957-1958.  Guyana asserts that its practice from 1966 to the present day, 
and the United Kingdom’s practice from 1957-1958, has been largely unopposed by 
The Netherlands75 and that it has maintained a position based on delimitation by 
equidistance in negotiations with Suriname, in domestic legislation, in the grant of 
concessions for oil exploration, in the exercise of fisheries, and in law enforcement 
activities.76  For Guyana, Suriname has conducted itself since independence in a manner 
“generally respectful” of the line delimited by the United Kingdom in 1957-1958, as did 
its colonial predecessor over a greater historical period,77 largely refraining from 
                                                 
71  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v.  
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72  Guyana Memorial, paras. 3.45-3.48. 
73  Guyana Memorial, paras. 4.6-4.8. 
74  Guyana Memorial, Chapter 4. 
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granting oil concessions, sanctioning exploration, exercising fisheries jurisdiction or 
otherwise enforcing its laws in the continental shelf area to the west of an equidistance 
line.78 
196. Guyana refers to the Parties’ domestic legislation enacted in 1977-1978 and argues that 
territorial definitions used in the legislation reflect Guyanese acceptance of a boundary 
following an azimuth of N34°E.  While Surinamese legislation remained silent on the 
matter, Guyana maintains that an explanatory memorandum to its 1978 Act indicates 
acceptance of delimitation by the equidistance principle wherever possible.79  The 
Parties’ domestic laws regulating petroleum exploitation in 1980-1986 are also 
described by Guyana as reliant on such an understanding.80  Guyana maintains that its 
own initiatives to advertise petroleum exploration opportunities, manifest in its 1986 
Petroleum Act, were based on a delimitation following a N34°E azimuth and were not 
objected to by Suriname or Staatsolie.   
197. Referring to graphical depictions,81 Guyana states that the pattern of oil concessions 
granted by the Parties in the continental shelf area makes “abundantly clear” that a 
boundary situated along an azimuth of N34°E was generally respected.82  Guyana 
contends that it has pursued a consistent practice of allowing surveying activities and 
granting oil concessions in areas up to the Guyana Claim Line,83 referring in particular 
to the activities of Royal Dutch Shell in 1966-1975, the oil concession granted by 
Guyana to Seagull-Denison in 1979-1981, and its concession granted to LASMO/BHP 
in 1988, as well as what it sees as Surinamese complicity with this practice.84  Guyana 
argues, inter alia, that Royal Dutch Shell’s exploration activities under a Surinamese 
concession were to the east of the Guyana Claim Line, while its activities to its west 
                                                 
78  Guyana Memorial, paras. 4.2. 
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80  Guyana Memorial, paras. 4.15-4.20. 
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were conducted under a Guyanese concession.85  While both the licence issued by 
Staatsolie to Gulf in 1981 and the 1989 proposed concession to IPEL extended to 
territory to the west of the Guyana Claim Line, resulting in Guyanese protests, Guyana 
maintains that activities under Surinamese concessions in fact took place to the east of 
the Line.86 
198. Guyana maintains that Suriname did not object to two of Guyana’s concessions 
covering areas up to or approaching the Guyana Claim Line following the Joint 
Communiqué agreed between the Presidents of Guyana and Suriname in 198987 and 
continued to respect Guyana’s concessions west of the line despite failed negotiations in 
1991 and 1994.  As further evidence of its respect for the Guyana Claim Line, Suriname 
did not protest against activity under the eleven concessions issued in the maritime area 
subject to this arbitration before May 2000, including frequent requests for entry into 
Surinamese waters by seismic survey ships. 
199. Guyana submits that Staatsolie’s activities and public statements have an official and 
public character and “are to be treated as reflecting ... the views of Suriname”, due to its 
State ownership and regulatory remit.88  In Guyana’s view, Staatsolie’s concession 
agreements are also broadly consistent with a Guyana Claim Line delimitation89 and its 
activities, including materials used to promote oil concessions, also reflect such a 
delimitation.   
200. The exercise of fisheries jurisdiction by Guyana and Suriname between 1977 and 2004 
is said by Guyana to reflect a recognition or acquiescence in a boundary along the 
Guyana Claim Line.90  Guyana refers, inter alia, to Suriname’s alleged admission that it 
has not exercised fishing jurisdiction east of the line, to Guyana’s establishment of a 
fishery zone, to its grants of fishing licences, and to its practices regarding the seizure of 
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unlicensed fishing vessels as evidence of consistent conduct supporting its claim.91  
Guyana also refers to the activities of its coast guard, defence force, and Transport and 
Harbours Department in areas west of the line, and claims that Surinamese agencies 
have engaged in no such activities to the west of the line. 
201. Regarding the activity of CGX under its 1998 concession, Guyana maintains that 
Suriname did not protest against this activity and expressly consented to crossings into 
the Surinamese side of the Guyana Claim Line.92  Guyana contends that Suriname 
expressed no concern at CGX’s presence west of the line until May 2000, when anti-
Guyana rhetoric in the run-up to Surinamese parliamentary elections placed political 
pressure on its government to move against the CGX concession.93  According to 
Guyana, Surinamese demands for Guyana to cease oil exploration activities in areas 
west of the Guyana Claim Line, including its 31 May 2000 demand that CGX cease its 
activities, were also the product of political change in Suriname.94 
202. Guyana avers that on 2 and 3 June 2000 Suriname used its navy and air force to 
intimidate the CGX oilrig and drill ship, the C.E. Thornton, in defiance of Guyana’s 
immediate proposal for dialogue and complaints that the action was taking place while 
Guyana was calling for diplomatic negotiations regarding the matter.95  Guyana further 
contends that the 14 September 2000 apprehension of Guyanese-licensed fishing 
trawlers in an area previously understood to be Guyanese waters was Suriname’s first 
action of this type.96 
Suriname’s Position 
203. Suriname argues that to the extent that there was an agreement regarding the 1936 Point 
and the land boundary terminus, that agreement was established only with reference to 
the maritime boundary in the territorial sea along an azimuth of N10°E from that 
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point.97  Suriname reviews the genesis of the delimitation in the territorial seas and the 
1936 Point and asserts that the location of the latter was determined largely by the need 
for a stable location away from the shore and the former by the need to secure Dutch 
responsibility for shipping traffic in the approaches to the Corantijn River.98   
204. According to Suriname, there was little agreement between the Parties and their colonial 
predecessors as to the adoption of an equidistance line and Suriname and Guyana have 
never worked jointly to identify a line based upon this principle.99  Suriname maintains 
that The Netherlands’ policy on national resources from the end of the 1950s, as well as 
Suriname’s own since independence, have reflected the view that Suriname’s western 
limit of the continental shelf area was not bounded by an equidistance line.100  Suriname 
argues that its domestic law is consistent with its continental shelf claim and 
distinguishes the explanatory memorandum to its April 1978 law,101 contending that 
Suriname after independence did not become a party to the 1958 Conventions and, in its 
view, neither did Guyana.102 
205. It is Suriname’s contention that the United Kingdom relied on the N10°E azimuth 
territorial sea boundary following completion of the work of the Mixed Boundary 
Commission in attempts to delimit the maritime boundary as a whole during the 
1950s.103  Suriname argues that the Parties’ conduct shows acknowledgement of special 
circumstances justifying the territorial sea boundary, and disagrees that delimitations 
proposed in the 1950s were based on equidistance principles.104  Suriname suggests that 
the United Kingdom’s abandonment of the N10°E azimuth territorial sea boundary from 
1965 related to an aim to achieve an equidistance settlement similar to that achieved 
over the North Sea continental shelf.105  However, Suriname submits that following 
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1965, a need continued for Surinamese sovereignty over the western approach to the 
Corantijn River to allow for the regulation of lighter shipping vessels.106 
206. Suriname does not accept that the United Kingdom believed that The Netherlands was 
likely to agree to a territorial sea and continental shelf boundary based on 
equidistance.107  Suriname maintains, inter alia, that Guyana’s first proposal to delimit 
the continental shelf along an azimuth of N34°E was made at the Marlborough House 
talks in 1966108 and that Guyana’s practice regarding the eastern limit of its continental 
shelf has been inconsistent, with reference to the differing eastern boundaries of 
Guyanese oil concessions.109  Suriname submits that an inconsistency of approach is 
reflected in Guyanese legislation, such as its 1977 Maritime Boundaries Act and 
Guyana’s definition of its fishery zone pursuant to that Act, and Guyana’s activities in 
enforcing its fisheries jurisdiction.110  Suriname illustrates this variance graphically111 
and contends that the Guyana Claim Line is unrelated to the various equidistance lines 
Guyana argues the Parties have historically favoured.112   
207. Suriname agrees that the Dutch chart 217 and British chart 1801 were the most accurate 
available in the 1950s, but submits that the equidistance line set out in Guyana’s 
Memorial based on these charts and recent U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
(“NIMA”) charts is not calculated accurately and does not represent an historical 
equidistance line.113  Suriname disagrees that the Guyana Claim Line approximates 
modern equidistance lines and lines based on the principle of equidistance historically 
proposed by the Parties,114 and that the Parties’ conduct has been consistently based on 
such a line.115  Suriname disputes the allegation that The Netherlands and Suriname 
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made no objection to Guyana’s reliance on the Guyana Claim Line, referring in 
particular to the position taken at the 1966 Marlborough House talks that the maritime 
boundary followed a N10°E line from a land boundary terminus yet to be established.116 
208. Suriname argues that it has consistently maintained that the position of its maritime 
boundary with Guyana should follow the Suriname Claim Line with respect to the 
territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone117 and that only for a brief 
period was delimitation of the continental shelf by the equidistance method 
considered.118  Suriname cites, inter alia, the diplomatic record as evidence that from 
1954 onwards, Suriname advanced its own position within The Kingdom of The 
Netherlands and that The Netherlands acted only as its advisor.  Suriname further points 
out that the 1958 Dutch proposal based on Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention was not acted upon by the United Kingdom.119  According to Suriname, 
Guyana and the United Kingdom have not consistently proposed the Guyana Claim 
Line, as evidenced by a number of proposals that incorporated a delimitation of the 
territorial sea following an azimuth of N10°E and other equidistance lines not adopting 
a N34°E course. 
C. GUYANA’S DELIMITATION CLAIM 
1. Applicable Law and Approach to Delimitation 
Guyana’s Position 
209. Guyana refers to Article 293 of the Convention directing the Tribunal to apply the law 
embodied in the Convention and “other rules of international law not incompatible with 
this Convention”.  Guyana also submits that the conduct of the Parties must be seen in 
the context of international law relating to maritime boundaries as it has developed 
since the Parties and their predecessor colonial powers have sought to delimit the 
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boundary and that its evolution falls into the following periods: prior to 1958, 1958-
1982, and 1982 onwards.120   
210. Guyana’s view is that international law, as it developed from the period prior to 1958, 
has reflected the principle that delimitation between adjacent States should be carried 
out according to equidistance, as reflected in the 1956 ILC Draft Articles, embodied in 
the 1958 Conventions, including the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention now forming the basis of delimitation under the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.121   
211. Guyana reviews what it argues was the law applicable to maritime boundary 
delimitation during the periods prior to 1982 and asserts, referring to its account of the 
historical record, that the Parties and their colonial predecessors understood that the 
applicable law required an equidistance approach to be adopted.  Guyana refers, inter 
alia, to legislation passed by the Parties following independence, which it argues was 
enacted in response to the requirements of the 1958 Conventions, thereby demonstrating 
acceptance of the principles reflected in the 1958 Conventions in the years prior to 
1982.122  Such principles, Guyana argues, included an approach based on equidistance, 
such as that required under Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.123 
212. Guyana submits that the territorial sea should be delimited in accordance with 
Article 15 of the Convention to the distance specified in Article 3.124  Guyana contends 
that Part VI of the Convention is applicable to the Parties as to their rights over, and the 
delimitation of, the continental shelf as defined in Article 76(1) of the Convention.125  
Guyana refers to the provisions of Part VI of the Convention it considers relevant to the 
determination of the outer extent of the continental shelf, and asserts that the sovereign 
rights to exploration and exploitation of natural resources provided for under that Part 
                                                 
120  For Guyana’s submissions regarding the applicable law, see Guyana Memorial, paras. 7.1-7.37.  See also 
Transcript, pp. 237-305. 
121  Transcript, pp. 244-250. 
122  Guyana Memorial, paras. 7.18-7.19.  See Transcript, pp. 247-249. 
123  Guyana Memorial, para. 7.19, with reference in particular to the explanatory memorandum accompanying 
the Surinamese April 1978 law. 
124  Guyana Memorial, paras. 7.22-7.23. 
125  Transcript, p. 238. 
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are inherent rights.  Guyana submits that Part V of the Convention is applicable to the 
Parties as to their rights regarding the exclusive economic zone and its delimitation and 
refers to the provisions of Part V of the Convention it considers relevant to the 
determination of the outer extent of the exclusive economic zone.126 
213. Guyana requests that the Tribunal decide on the course of a single boundary line 
delimiting the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone so as to 
avoid the disadvantages inherent in a plurality of separate delimitations.127  Guyana 
maintains that this approach does not preclude the Tribunal from delimiting the 
territorial sea prior to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.128 
214. In Guyana’s view there is a difference in approach as to how the territorial sea and the 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf are to be delimited, stemming from the 
differences in accepted practice between the application of Article 15 of the Convention 
using the “equidistance/special circumstances rule” and the application of Articles 74 
and 83 of the Convention under which delimitation is effected in accordance with the 
“equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule”.129  Guyana argues that the approach 
adopted by the ICJ recognizes this distinction, but finds the approaches to be closely 
related.130 
215. Regarding each of the maritime zones in dispute, Guyana considers that the Tribunal 
should follow what it identifies as the delimitation practice of the ICJ and arbitral 
tribunals.  Pursuant to this practice, the Tribunal would draw a provisional equidistance 
line, consider whether there are any special circumstances that justify a shift in that 
equidistance line to achieve an equitable solution, and then decide whether historical 
special circumstances or the conduct of the Parties justify a shift in the equidistance line 
                                                 
126  Transcript, p. 238. 
127  Guyana Memorial, para. 7.30, citing Gulf of Maine, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246, at p. 327, 
para. 194. 
128  Guyana Memorial, para. 7.31, citing Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40, at pp. 93-94, paras. 174, 176 (“Qatar/Bahrain”). 
129  Transcript, pp. 260-261. 
130  Guyana Memorial, para. 7.32, citing Qatar/Bahrain and Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. 2002, p. 303, at 
para. 288 (“Cameroon/Nigeria”). 
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to achieve an equitable solution.131  In Guyana’s submission, equidistance should be 
calculated by identification of the relevant coasts of the Parties and the identification of 
relevant baselines and base points from which an equidistance line can be measured.132  
According to Guyana, the relevant coast of Guyana facing the region over which the 
delimitation is to be effected spans 255 kilometres along its low-water line and that of 
Suriname spans 224 kilometres along its low-water line on the same basis and it depicts 
these coastlines respectively on U.S. NIMA charts 24380 and 24370.133 
216. Guyana argues that the Tribunal should not apply an equidistance line derived from 
modern charts, as such a delimitation would ignore the conduct of the Parties since the 
1960s and lead to an inequitable result.134  Guyana points out that international tribunals 
have long taken into account the conduct of the parties, in particular their grant of oil 
and gas concessions, as circumstances to be taken into account in boundary 
delimitation.135  
217. Guyana’s position is that the Convention does not admit the approach advanced by 
Suriname calling for a delimitation of maritime areas by reference to general principles 
of equity.136  Guyana distinguishes Suriname’s approach, which it argues is aimed at the 
apportionment of maritime space de novo, from the delimitation of maritime areas that 
already appertain to the coast of a State.  Guyana argues that neither the Convention, 
nor the jurisprudence of the ICJ support the former approach or the concept that a State 
might be disadvantaged by its geography in the manner suggested by Suriname.137 
                                                 
131  Guyana Reply, para. 1.22.  Transcript, pp. 263-268. 
132  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.33. 
133  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.35. 
134  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.50. 
135  Guyana Memorial, paras. 7.34-7.35. 
136  Guyana Reply, paras. 5.24-5.28. 
137  Guyana Reply, paras. 5.29-5.32. 
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Suriname’s Position 
218. Subject to its preliminary objections on jurisdiction, Suriname agrees to the application 
of a single maritime boundary.138  Suriname submits, with reference to international 
jurisprudence relating to the use of single maritime boundaries, that such a maritime 
boundary may be applied notwithstanding oil concession or fisheries practice at 
variance with it.139  Suriname contends that such practice is not likely to be of legal 
relevance unless it demonstrates express or tacit agreement as to the location of a 
boundary.140   
219. Suriname maintains that delimitations based on the equidistance method are subject to 
adjustment or abandonment if an equitable solution is not achieved141 and that, as a 
matter of practice, any initial step of identifying a provisional equidistance line should 
be subordinate to that objective.142  In Suriname’s view the various equidistance lines 
presented by Guyana illustrate that changes to coastal geography over time have a 
disproportionate effect on the location of an equidistance line; therefore, this method 
does not lead to an equitable result with regard to the delimitation between Guyana and 
Suriname.143  
220. Suriname refers to the findings in the award of the arbitral tribunal constituted under 
Annex VII of the Convention in Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago144 in support of its 
position on the approach applicable to delimitation of a single maritime boundary.  
According to Suriname, this case illustrates that relevant circumstances taken into 
consideration in delimiting a single maritime boundary are geographic in nature.  
Suriname submits that the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago tribunal treated resource-
                                                 
138  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 4.3. 
139  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.4-4.17. 
140  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.54-4.55; Transcript, pp. 896-899. 
141  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 4.17-4.18. 
142  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 4.42, citing, inter alia, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, at p. 79, para. 109 (“Tunisia/Libya”). 
143  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 3.50-3.51. 
144  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.9-3.22, citing Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago, Award (11 April 2006), 45 I.L.M. p. 798 (2006), online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org> 
(“Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago”). 
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related considerations cautiously (distinguishing the Jan Mayen case),145 and accepted 
that the ratio of adjacent States’ relevant coastal lengths are relevant for an equitable 
delimitation.  Suriname further argues that the tribunal in Barbados/Trinidad and 
Tobago correctly regarded a provisional equidistance line as “hypothetical” only. 
221. Suriname’s position is that the present dispute can and should be resolved on the basis 
of the geographical characteristics of the coast and that the relationship between such 
characteristics and the maritime delimitation area should be the primary relevant special 
circumstance.146  For Suriname, the maritime boundary should divide the area of 
overlap created by the frontal projection of neighbouring States’ coastlines and the 
delimitation within this area should be based on equitable principles aimed at an equal 
division,147 avoiding a “cut-off” of the seaward projection of the coast of either 
neighbouring State.148  Suriname contends that this approach avoids distortions to the 
line of the boundary that are inherent in the equidistance method and allows for 
flexibility in achieving an equitable solution.149  Suriname finds precedent for use of 
bisector angles drawn between coastal fronts in the Gulf of Maine and the Tunisia/Libya 
cases and submits that the “angle bisector” method is the most appropriate in the current 
proceedings as it gives rise to a straight line boundary from the coast and reflects the 
overall geographic relationship between the Parties.150   
222. In disputing Guyana’s reliance on equidistance, Suriname argues that the two-step 
process advanced by Guyana is to be used only where appropriate, and that principles of 
non-encroachment and avoidance of a “cut-off” effect are also pertinent.151  Suriname 
                                                 
145  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.12-3.13; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
(Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38 (“Jan Mayen”). 
146  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.19-4.22. 
147  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.27-4.36. 
148  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.29-4.30, citing North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1969, p. 3, at p. 53. 
149  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.35-4.36, citing Gulf of Maine, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246. 
150  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.230-3.241; Transcript, pp. 976-982. 
151  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.26-3.44. 
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denies that there is a legal presumption in favour of equidistance delimitation, such a 
presumption having been rejected by the drafters of the Convention.152 
223. Suriname rejects the proposition that the Parties’ calculations of equidistance lines 
reflect agreement between them, citing the Parties’ disagreement as to the location of 
the starting point of the line, the charts used, and the effect of Vissers Bank on an 
equidistance projection.153  Suriname also contends that other South American 
delimitations depart in varying degrees from true equidistance lines, and questions the 
relevance of the Suriname/French Guiana maritime boundary in the absence of a 
binding agreement between those States.154 
2. The Role of Coastal Geography  
Guyana’s Position 
224. Guyana disputes Surinamese claims regarding the coastal geography of the Parties.155  
Guyana asserts that there are no configurations along the coastlines of the Parties that 
have a material prejudicial effect on the course of a provisional equidistance line, except 
for a protrusion in the coast of Suriname at Hermina Bank that Guyana argues causes 
the line to follow a northerly course to the prejudice of Guyana.156  In Guyana’s view, 
its relevant coastline is modestly concave157 and Suriname’s is convex158 (due to the 
protrusion of Hermina Bank) rather than vice versa, and Guyana’s relevant coastline is 
materially longer than Suriname’s rather than shorter, as Suriname claims.159  Guyana 
contends that the relevant coastal configurations and lengths presented by Suriname are 
inaccurate due to the exclusion of relevant basepoints further west on the Guyana coast 
(Devonshire Castle Flats), the inclusion of a new base point on the Surinamese coast 
(Vissers Bank) that, it argues, charts existing prior to the date of Guyana’s Memorial do 
                                                 
152  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.45-3.52. 
153  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.206-3.219; Transcript, pp. 958-963. 
154  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.220-3.229. 
155  Guyana Reply, paras. 1.24-1.27, Chapter 3, paras. 5.33-5.52. 
156  Transcript, pp. 157-158. 
157  Transcript, pp. 161, 194. 
158  Transcript, pp. 161-162, 195. 
159  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.10-3.24. 
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not support, and the inaccurate contention that the coastline west of the Essequibo River 
is disputed by Venezuela.160  In this connection Guyana made clear that its land 
boundary with Venezuela was fixed in 1899 by a competent international arbitral 
tribunal and as a member of CARICOM, Suriname itself has repeatedly confirmed its 
full support of Guyana’s sovereignty over this territory.161 
225. Guyana also disputes Suriname’s method of representing the facing coasts of the Parties 
by their approximation to single axis façades, which it argues are not representative, and 
by the use of perpendiculars to those axes to project the Parties’ appurtenant maritime 
areas.162  According to Guyana, the jurisprudence of the ICJ regarding maritime 
boundary delimitation does not support the approximation or “refashioning” of the 
geographical reality of coastlines, nor has the ICJ recognized a right to delimitation by 
coastal front projection, distinguishing situations where such a method has been used 
and where a “cut-off” has been avoided on the basis of disproportionate encroachment 
on a maritime area.163  Further, Guyana’s calculation of the maritime areas appurtenant 
to the Parties’ relevant coasts using the relevant coastal lengths presented by Guyana 
reveals Guyana to have a larger appurtenant maritime area than Suriname, rather than a 
smaller one as Suriname claims.164 
226. In Guyana’s view, both Suriname’s maritime claim line and its proposed provisional 
equidistance line would fail to divide the maritime areas appurtenant to the Parties’ 
relevant coasts equitably,165 in part because of the distorting effects of the coastal 
headland at Hermina Bank.166  Guyana rejects Suriname’s contention that its provisional 
equidistance line is prejudicial to Suriname and “cuts off” its coastal area, arguing, inter 
alia, that Suriname’s position is at odds with the equidistance delimitation achieved 
between Suriname and French Guiana and that the angle of the Corentyne River 
thalweg does not amount to a relevant special circumstance.  Guyana’s position is that 
                                                 
160  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.19-3.24. 
161  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.19-3.24; Transcript, pp. 170-172. 
162  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.28-3.34; Transcript, pp. 233-234. 
163  Guyana Reply, paras. 5.33-5.52; Transcript, p. 200. 
164  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.28-3.34. 
165  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.35-3.51; Transcript, p. 199. 
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the Guyana Claim Line divides these maritime areas equitably, representing a division 
of appurtenant maritime areas more closely reflecting the ratio of the relevant coastal 
lengths of the Parties.  Guyana also argues that equidistance delimitation reflects 
practice in South America generally.167   
Suriname’s Position 
227. Suriname asserts that, when plotting a boundary based on the equidistance method in 
the present case, micro-geography of the coastal configurations gives rise to unwanted 
distortions, which are caused by reliance on coastal baselines.168  For Suriname, the 
equidistance method is overly reliant on micro-geography, rather than dominant coastal 
features, and has been properly criticized for this reason.169  Suriname therefore prefers 
the determination of relevant coasts, in order to avoid what are asserted to be distortions 
caused by the use of coastal baselines.   
228. Disputing Guyana’s basis for determining the relevant coasts170 Suriname submits that 
between adjacent States, the relevant coast for calculation of an equidistance line is the 
part of the coast facing the area being delimited, rather than the outer extent of the 
baselines.171  Suriname contends that the relevant coasts identified by Guyana are 
excessive in length and that broader equitable principles can be taken into account in 
identifying them.  In Suriname’s view, the length and direction of the Parties’ coastlines 
are relevant factors as they illustrate whether a delimitation line is equitable.172  While 
the disparity is not as great as that found to be significant in Barbados/Trinidad and 
Tobago, Suriname argues that the disparity in relative relevant coastal lengths favours 
Suriname in this case.173  Suriname also disputes the basis on which Guyana calculates 
appurtenant maritime areas, asserting that the area of overlapping maritime entitlements 
                                                 
167  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.50, 3.51-3.58. 
168  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.44-4.49. 
169  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.44-4.53; Transcript, p. 976. 
170  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.160-3.170. 
171  Transcript, p. 935. 
172  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.171-3.182. 
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is to be determined using lines perpendicular to the angles of the States’ coastal 
fronts.174  
229. According to Suriname, the section of its provisional equidistance line nearer to the 
coast cuts across the coastal front of Suriname due to the effect of a coastal convexity 
on the western side of the mouth of the Corantijn River, and a concavity on the east side 
exaggerates this effect.175  For Suriname, this is an example of the undue influence of 
coastal irregularities that, with Guyana’s arguments regarding the same effect caused by 
Hermina Bank, make the case against equidistance delimitation.  Suriname, however, 
denies that Hermina Bank is an irregularity with reference to the overall aspect of its 
coast. 
3. Conduct of the Parties 
Guyana’s Position 
230. For Guyana, the conduct of the Parties is relevant in determining whether there has been 
a tacit agreement on the location of the boundary, but may also be evidence of whether 
the Parties have considered a boundary line to be equitable.176  Guyana maintains that 
there is no evidence that the Parties considered the Suriname Claim Line to be 
equitable,177 arguing, inter alia, that it was rejected by the United Kingdom from the 
early 1960s and that it was advanced merely as a negotiation tactic by Suriname in the 
context of the disputed land boundary.  With reference to certain contemporary sources,  
Guyana argues in particular that The Netherlands did not support the Suriname Claim 
Line. 
231. Guyana asserts that the Parties’ conduct shows that they considered delimitation using 
an equidistance method appropriate and therefore accepted the Guyana Claim Line as 
equitable.178  According to Guyana, the record demonstrates that The Netherlands found 
                                                 
174  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.195-3.199. 
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176  Guyana Reply, paras. 4.3-4.7. 
177  Guyana Reply, paras. 4.12-4.22. 
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it acceptable or desirable to approach delimitation using an equidistance method, 
referring in particular to negotiations in 1958 and to Suriname’s behaviour with regard 
to Guyana’s grant of oil concessions,179 and distinguishing the position taken by The 
Netherlands and Suriname in the 1966 negotiations in London.  Guyana maintains that 
Suriname overstates the geographical extent of Suriname’s oil concessions, and argues 
that those extending west of the Guyana Claim Line were inactive in that area or were 
material on paper only.180  Guyana argues that Suriname also misrepresents the status of 
the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding, which it did not implement.181  For Guyana, 
its adherence to an equidistance position, represented by the Guyana Claim Line, is 
manifest from its legislation, fisheries and oil practice; while oil concessions were not 
all granted up to a line of N34°E, their eastern limits were generally consistent with it. 
232. Guyana contends that it would be inequitable to ignore the existence of an historical 
equidistance line reflected by the Guyana Claim Line and the conduct of the Parties in 
respecting that line.182  Regarding oil concessions, Guyana maintains that its 
concessions were granted having regard to the Guyana Claim Line and that Suriname 
has offered or granted oil concessions respecting a similar delimitation; Guyana 
distinguishes from their habitual practice the occasions since independence when 
Suriname has granted concessions on the Guyanese side of the Guyana Claim Line.183  
Guyana further argues that fishing practice and the exercise of other forms of 
governmental authority show recognition of the line in question.184 
Suriname’s Position 
233. The conduct of the Parties is, in Suriname’s submission, of limited legal relevance, in 
the context of a single maritime boundary,185 as it must demonstrate the Parties’ mutual 
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180  Guyana Reply, paras. 3.31-3.39. 
181  Guyana Reply, para. 4.36. 
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intention to accept a specific delimitation.186  Suriname argues that international 
tribunals have only considered party conduct relevant where it is “mutual, sustained, 
consistent, and unequivocal” and that the conduct referred to by Guyana does not meet 
this standard,187 but in fact demonstrates the existence of a “notorious, long-lived, 
public and contentious” maritime boundary dispute.188 
234. Suriname contends that the approach to party conduct taken by the ICJ in the 
Tunisia/Libya case189 is not applicable in the present case.190  There, Suriname argues, 
the ICJ had reference to a modus vivendi only in respect of a part of the Tunisia/Libya 
maritime boundary and only by reason of the colonial powers’ (France and Italy) 
demonstration of consistent acceptance of a boundary191 as part of an intentional effort 
to avoid overlapping oil concessions over an extended period.192  Suriname also cites 
ICJ precedent rejecting similar arguments that States should be bound by acquiescence 
or estoppel by reason of its oil concession practices.193 
235. Suriname disputes Guyana’s reference to forty years of consistent oil concession 
practice as not grounded in fact.194  According to Suriname, the geographical extent of 
oil concessions from 1965 until 2000195 shows that both of the Parties had concessions 
in operation in the area of overlapping claims for the majority of the period since the 
1950s.  Suriname maintains that from 1957, with Suriname’s earliest offshore petroleum 
concession, a N10°E azimuth line bounded the western limit of the concession area 
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granted by Suriname196 and that Guyana’s oil concessions adopted various eastern limits 
not tending to demonstrate consistent use of the Guyana Claim Line.197   
236. Suriname’s position is that the concerns of concession holders and operators as to the 
overlapping nature of concessions gave rise to negotiations in 1989, the 1989 modus 
vivendi,198 and ultimately the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding.199  For Suriname, 
Staatsolie’s grant of concessions outside of the area of overlapping claims does not 
reflect Suriname’s acceptance of the Guyana Claim Line.200  Instead, Suriname 
maintains that its position regarding its claim to the Suriname Claim Line has 
historically been well known to Guyana, so no action of Staatsolie could be taken as a 
renunciation of Suriname’s claim.  Suriname submits that its oil concession practice 
demonstrates its consistent assertion of the Suriname Claim Line and rejects Guyana’s 
suggestion that its conduct demonstrated respect for the Guyana Claim Line, 
distinguishing its restraint from 1999 onwards as reflecting a wish not to exacerbate the 
dispute and a lack of interest by concessionaires in disputed areas.201  Regarding the 
legal significance of its restraint, Suriname asserts that the ICJ has not taken restraint 
pending the resolution of a dispute as prejudicing the position of a party exercising such 
restraint.202  As to Guyana’s fisheries conduct, Suriname disputes Guyana’s contention 
that it refrained from carrying out enforcement west of the Guyana Claim Line, 
maintaining the converse to be true and also citing its conduct of marine biology 
research as supportive of its own claim.203 
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4. Delimitation of the Territorial Seas 
Guyana’s Position 
237. The delimitation of the territorial seas should, in Guyana’s view, follow an “historical 
equidistance line” following an azimuth of N34°E from Point 61 for a distance of 12 nm 
to a point at the outer limit of the territorial sea204 (the “Guyana Territorial Sea 
Line”).205  Guyana maintains that there are no grounds admissible under Article 15 of 
the Convention for departing from the Guyana Territorial Sea Line. 
238. According to Guyana, an equidistance line delimiting the territorial sea along a line 
following the course of the Guyana Territorial Sea Line has historically been given 
effect by the Parties.206  Further or alternatively, Guyana submits that even if the 
Guyana Territorial Sea Line were not to be regarded as the relevant equidistance line, 
then the conduct of the Parties since 1966 in following it would be sufficient to 
constitute a “special circumstance” justifying an adjustment to the equidistance line.207  
239. Point 61 is Guyana’s starting point for maritime delimitation because, Guyana argues, 
the Parties’ conduct reflects a long-standing agreement that it should be treated as 
such208 and both Guyana’s and Suriname’s claims rely on this point.209   
240. Relying on Article 5 of the Convention, Guyana maintains that the low-water line along 
the coast marked on charts officially recognized by the coastal State provides the 
normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, and that no reason exists 
to depart from this approach.210  Guyana refers to various charts used by the Parties and 
cites the U.S. NIMA charts 24370 and 24380 as the most recent charts on which it 
relies. 
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241. With regard to the location of a provisional equidistance line in the territorial sea, 
Guyana states that both Parties’ calculations give rise to lines that “closely track the 
N34°E historical equidistance line”, at least with regard to the part of the line beyond 
the first 3 nm.211  
242. Guyana contends that both the United Kingdom’s delimitation of the equidistance line 
in 1957, based on Dutch chart 217 and British chart 1801, and equidistance lines 
extended to a distance of twelve miles from Point 61 on the recent U.S. NIMA charts, 
follow azimuths ranging from N34°E to N36°E; to Guyana there is no material 
difference between the equidistance lines based on these three charts.212 
243. In its analysis, Guyana finds no special circumstances that would justify an adjustment 
to an equidistance line delimiting the territorial seas.213  Guyana argues that neither 
Party has claimed historic title214 and disputes Suriname’s reliance on the navigational 
requirements giving rise to the use of a line following an azimuth of N10°E as a special 
circumstance justifying an adjustment.215  Guyana asserts that the Tribunal should be 
cautious in finding that navigational requirements could amount to a special 
circumstance, distinguishing the Beagle Channel case as precedent for the relevance of 
navigational requirements and maintaining that any such decision in the present case 
would be the first of its kind.216 
244. Guyana submits, in the alternative, that the accommodation of the potential need for 
navigational access to the Corentyne western channel was provisional in any event, had 
become irrelevant through lack of use by the early 1960s,217 and had been expressly 
rejected by the United Kingdom since that time.218  In Guyana’s view, such a 
                                                 
211  Guyana Reply, paras. 1.23, 6.13-6.22. 
212  Guyana Memorial, paras. 8.41-8.43. 
213  Guyana Reply, paras. 6.23-6.43. 
214  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.44; Guyana Reply, para. 6.23. 
215  Transcript, pp. 351-358. 
216  Guyana Reply, paras. 6.24-6.34, citing Controversy concerning The Beagle Channel Region 
(Argentina/Chile), Award of 18 February 1977, 17 I.L.M. p. 634, at p. 673, para. 108 (1978), R.I.A.A., 
Vol. 21, p. 53 (1997) (“Beagle Channel”). 
217  Guyana Reply, paras. 6.35-6.37; Transcript, p. 342. 
218  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.46; Transcript, p. 343. 
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circumstance could not require alteration to the course of the territorial sea boundary 
beyond 3 nm in any event.219  Guyana disputes that as a matter of law it is possible for 
the Parties to have inherited a delimitation of the territorial seas along the Suriname 
Claim Line, distinguishing the present case from one where the principle of uti 
possidetis or Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties might be 
applicable, or where colonial practice might constitute a special circumstance meriting 
adjustment to an equidistance line.220  
Suriname’s Position 
245. Suriname maintains that the territorial sea boundary has in fact been long established 
along the Suriname Claim Line.221  In Suriname’s view, the position of the 1936 Point 
and the direction of the N10°E Line to the limit of the territorial waters were established 
in combination and, should the Tribunal find that the 1936 Point is established, it must 
also find that the N10°E Line is binding on the Parties to the limit of the territorial 
sea.222  The navigational requirement for Surinamese control of the approaches to the 
Corantijn River would, for Suriname, remain a special circumstance requiring the 
adoption of such a boundary in any event.223 
5. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone 
Guyana’s Position 
246. Guyana invites the Tribunal to find that the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
exclusive economic zone should follow the Guyana Claim Line along an azimuth of 
N34°E up to 200 nm from coastal baselines from the terminus point of the boundary it 
                                                 
219  Guyana Reply, paras. 6.38-6.43. 
220  Guyana Reply, paras. 5.57-5.67. 
221  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.56-4.72. 
222  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 4.60-4.61; Transcript, p. 830. 
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proposes in the territorial sea.224  Guyana reserves its rights in respect of any 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond the 200 nm limit.225 
247. With respect to the continental shelf, Guyana submits that application of the “equitable 
principles/relevant circumstances rule” in accordance with the practice of international 
tribunals and States226 requires the Tribunal to calculate an equidistance line across the 
continental shelf by reference to coastal basepoints starting from the northern terminus 
of the agreed land boundary, in the same way as for delimitation of the territorial sea.227  
Guyana submits further that in the same way as for the line delimiting the territorial 
seas, the Tribunal should adjust the equidistance line to reflect any special 
circumstances that might exist in order to achieve an equitable outcome.228   
248. Guyana describes the Guyana Claim Line in the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zone as an “historical equidistance line” and argues that the Parties’ conduct 
is significant in this case as the Parties have sought to identify and agree upon an 
equidistance line for a period in excess of forty years, a period over which international 
law has been developing with respect to the delimitation of maritime boundaries.229  
Guyana reviews the attempts to agree on delimitation made by the colonial powers prior 
to independence, and subsequently by Guyana and Suriname, in support of its argument 
that the Guyana Claim Line reflects historical acceptance of a line based on principles 
of equidistance.230 
249. Guyana contends that the equidistance line drafted by the United Kingdom in 1957-
1958 reflected British efforts to ensure that the California Oil Company concession was 
granted on the basis of a unilateral delimitation that adhered as closely as possible to the 
                                                 
224  Guyana identifies two different coordinates for this point: 6° 13′ 49.0″N, 56° 59′ 21.2″W (Guyana Reply, 
para. 6.44) and 6° 13′ 46″N, 56° 59′ 32″W (Guyana Reply, paras. 7.1, 7.59). 
225  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.1. 
226  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.3-9.4. 
227  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.8. 
228  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.4. 
229  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.5. 
230  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.6-9.25. 
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principle of equidistance embodied in the ILC Draft Articles.231  Guyana refers to the 
reasoning of British officials on the matter to argue that the equidistance calculation, 
based on Dutch chart 217 of February 1939, was made to give as little ground for 
objection from The Netherlands as possible.232 
250. Guyana argues that the efforts of the United Kingdom in 1957-1958 later formed the 
basis of the British draft treaty proposals, which in turn were based on the principle of 
equidistance.233  According to Guyana, The Netherlands’ own projection, prepared in 
1959 on the basis of Dutch chart 222, was also charted on the basis of equidistance.234  
The British draft treaty proposal of 1961 is cited by Guyana as amounting to a 
simplification of the equidistance line, extending it from the limit of the 3 nm territorial 
sea to the 200-metre isobath.235  Guyana submits that the concession given in 1965 to 
Royal Dutch Shell, in an area extending up to the 200-metre isobath, was based on the 
United Kingdom delimitation and did not elicit an objection from The Netherlands.236  
Guyana also relies upon correspondence from the Dutch Prime Minister to the new 
Surinamese government in 1975, which in its view makes clear that The Netherlands 
did not support a claim delimiting the continental shelf along a N10°E azimuth.237 
251. In Guyana’s view, the Guyana Claim Line also emerged over time as an historical 
equidistance line by reason of its use as a basis for the grant of oil concessions by the 
United Kingdom and subsequently by Guyana until the present time.  To Guyana, this 
line was based on broad agreement and consistent practice between the United Kingdom 
and The Netherlands, also reflecting an understanding that delimitation would be 
effected by the application of the equidistance principle.238  Guyana submits that there 
has been no record of a formal objection to such a delimitation until the year 2000.239  
                                                 
231  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.9-9.17. 
232  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.9-9.17. 
233  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.18; Transcript, p. 400. 
234  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.19. 
235  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.18. 
236  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.20. 
237  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.21. 
238  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.22; Guyana Reply, paras. 7.38-7.44. 
239  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.24. 
74 
The Guyana Claim Line therefore reflects a reasonable and equitable delimitation that 
has served as a basis for a “de facto modus vivendi” between Guyana and Suriname, 
initially up to the 200-metre isobath and latterly up to a 200 nm limit.240  
252. Guyana maintains that there are no grounds for departing from the Guyana Claim Line, 
which it considers to be an “equitable solution” within the meaning of Article 83 of the 
Convention.241  For Guyana, contemporaneous and modern charts where relevant 
circumstances such as islands or other geographic features are absent provide no support 
for accepting the Suriname Claim Line as equidistance.242  As argued in the context of 
the delimitation of the territorial seas, Guyana again asserts that ease of navigation as 
the original justification for a N10°E azimuth line has disappeared, and, in any event, a 
N10°E line has never been followed beyond the historic 3 nm limit to the territorial 
seas. 
253. Guyana accepts that the Guyana Claim Line is at modest variance to an equidistance 
line calculated on the basis of modern U.S. NIMA charts, but submits that modern 
projections closely approximate historical equidistance lines.243  Guyana argues that 
while equidistance projections based on the most recent charts depart from the Guyana 
Claim Line between the 200-metre isobath and the 200 nm limit of the continental 
shelf,244 they would not achieve an equitable solution, as they would ignore the practice 
of the two States over a forty-year period.245  Guyana contends that international 
tribunals have long recognized the conduct of the parties as relevant in achieving an 
equitable solution246 and that the Guyana Claim Line reflects what the Parties have 
                                                 
240  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.25. 
241  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.29-9.31. 
242  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.32-9.33. 
243  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.26-9.28. 
244  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.34. 
245  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.34-9.37. 
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believed to represent equidistance since the 1950s247 and therefore constitutes, unlike 
the Suriname Claim Line, an equitable outcome.248   
254. As to the exclusive economic zone, Guyana’s position is that the approach to be taken 
in delimiting the zone is the same as that to be taken with respect to the continental 
shelf,249 with the aim of achieving an equitable solution.  Guyana submits that there is a 
representative body of practice supporting the determination of a single maritime 
boundary for both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.250 
255. Guyana rejects Suriname’s analysis melding the delimitation of the territorial sea, 
continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone into one.251  Guyana’s view is that, 
while the basepoints are not all agreed, the Parties are in fact in agreement as to the 
location of the provisional equidistance line for the continental shelf and exclusive 
economic zone.252  Guyana argues such agreement confirms acceptance of the coastal 
starting point of the delimitation and shows that the coastline creates no material 
complication to delimitation.   
256. In Guyana’s view, geographical circumstances justify an adjustment of the equidistance 
line in favour of the Guyana Claim Line.253  According to Guyana, the Parties’ coastal 
configurations are not unusual and, with the exception of Hermina Bank, the relevant 
coasts do not give rise to special circumstances accepted in international jurisprudence 
as warranting adjustment to an equidistance line. 
Suriname’s Position 
257. Suriname submits that the coastline of Guyana is characterized by coastal convexities 
between the Corantijn, Berbice, Essequibo rivers and beyond, while the Suriname coast 
                                                 
247  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.37. 
248  Guyana Reply, paras. 7.45-7.57. 
249  Guyana Memorial, paras. 9.43-9.45. 
250  Guyana Memorial, para. 9.45. 
251  Guyana Reply, paras. 7.6-7.14. 
252  Guyana Reply, paras. 7.15-7.22. 
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is characterized by concavities between its river estuaries.254  For purposes of an 
equidistant boundary, Suriname considers that its relevant coast runs east from the west 
bank of the mouth of the Corantijn River to the east end of the Warappa bank and the 
relevant coastline of Guyana is the coastline east of the Essequibo river.255 
258. Without prejudice to its overall claim, Suriname presents a graphical and descriptive 
representation of a provisional equidistance line using base points on what it submits are 
the relevant coasts of Guyana and Suriname.256  Suriname submits that the coastal fronts 
of Guyana and Suriname, which it contends face N34°E and 0° respectively, produce an 
overlapping area when projected seaward to a distance of 200 nm257 and that its 
provisional equidistance line fails to divide this area of overlap in an equitable 
manner.258  
259. Suriname argues that its provisional equidistance line excessively “cuts off” the 
maritime area abutting Suriname’s coast in breach of the “non-encroachment” principle, 
particularly with respect to the first section of the line (to shortly beyond the 200-metre 
isobath)259 due to the effect of convexities and concavities, a trend, Suriname states, that 
employing a river closing line would not totally alleviate.260  In Suriname’s analysis, the 
Guyana Claim Line cuts off a still greater area of Suriname’s coastal front projection 
than does its provisional equidistance line.261 
260. Suriname calculates that a line dividing the area of overlapping coastal projections 
calculated equally would adopt an azimuth of N17°E from the 1936 Point, but submits 
                                                 
254  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.4-6.7, citing North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1969, p. 3, at p. 17, para. 8; Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.8-6.9, 6.24-6.35. 
255  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.8-6.12. 
256  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.13-6.18, Figure 31. 
257  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.24-6.26, 6.41-6.44, Figure 33. 
258  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.27-6.30. 
259  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 6.20. 
260  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.20-6.21; Transcript, pp. 964-965. 
261  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 6.36. 
77 
that it is necessary to consider whether such a line should be adjusted in order to 
achieve an equitable delimitation.262     
261. The need to prolong the existing Suriname-Guyana boundary along what it sees as its 
current course is also pointed to by Suriname as a relevant circumstance in the 
establishment of a single maritime boundary beyond the territorial sea.263  According to 
Suriname, a N10°E azimuth extending the land boundary into the sea would reflect the 
“geographical reality” of the relationship between the two countries.264  Moreover, the 
relative length of the relevant coasts of Suriname and Guyana is also a relevant 
circumstance that has been taken into account by previous international tribunals.265  
Suriname holds out the Suriname Claim Line as an equitable division, asserting that it 
would be based on a method reliant on coastal fronts rather than the selection of isolated 
base points, would not be influenced by protruding incidental features, and would not 
project towards the coast of either Party.266 
262. Regarding the Guyana Claim Line, Suriname considers that Guyana’s position has not 
been consistent, that the line is not equidistant, and that it is not equitable.267  Suriname 
disagrees that the coastlines of Guyana and Suriname do not lend themselves to an 
approach using generalizations of the coastlines in straight segments268 and rejects 
Guyana’s view that the Suriname Claim Line is advanced for strategic reasons, arguing 
that the claim has been maintained since 1962.  Suriname further contends that the 
Guyana Claim Line is perpendicular to Guyana’s coast, does not divide the area of 
overlap and accordingly, cannot be regarded as equitable.   
                                                 
262  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.48-6.49. 
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D. GUYANA’S THIRD SUBMISSION: ALLEGED UNLAWFUL THREAT AND USE OF FORCE BY 
SURINAME 
Guyana’s Position 
263. Guyana claims that Suriname’s actions in June 2000 represented a breach of the 
requirement in Article 279 of the Convention to resolve disputes by peaceful means, a 
breach of Article 2(3) of the UN Charter requiring Member States to settle international 
disputes by peaceful means not endangering international peace and security, and 
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter requiring recourse to judicial settlement, negotiation 
and other forms of dispute resolution methods in such circumstances.269  Guyana also 
claims that Suriname has breached Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in using or 
threatening to use force in its international relations against the territorial integrity of 
Guyana, which it argues remains applicable in the context of territorial or maritime 
boundary disputes.270   
264. Guyana asserts that Suriname’s 11 May 2000 complaint was its first formal protest 
against exploratory activity by Guyanese licensees and that Suriname adopted a military 
option notwithstanding Guyana’s offers to negotiate made in response to Suriname’s 
initial demands for termination of exploration activity.271 
265. According to Guyana, the CGX rig operators were sufficiently threatened by 
Suriname’s actions that a return to the area was considered unsuitable272 and subsequent 
intimidation of the licensee Esso E & P Guyana similarly prevented its continued 
operations and caused it to terminate all exploration activities in its Guyanese 
concession area.273  Guyana also maintains that Suriname threatened its licensee Maxus 
with respect to operations in the disputed area and that this in turn caused Maxus not to 
carry out further exploration in the area of its concession.274 
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266. In the context of the small-scale military capabilities of Guyana and Suriname, Guyana 
sees Suriname’s threat or use of armed force as significant and amounting to an 
internationally wrongful act, engaging the international responsibility of Suriname.275  
Guyana claims to have suffered material injury in the form of loss of foreign investment 
in offshore exploration, loss of licensing fees, and other sources of income and foregone 
benefits in the development of Guyana’s offshore resources.276  In addition, Guyana 
claims an entitlement to compensation for losses occasioned by the adverse effect of 
Suriname’s action on Guyana’s standing as a nation.277 
267. Guyana rejects Suriname’s assertion that it took action against CGX, Esso E & P 
Guyana, and Maxus’ operations in order to maintain the status quo, as well as 
Suriname’s characterization of its operations as police action.278  Guyana contends that 
the activities it authorized in the disputed maritime area were in line with a status quo 
represented by 40 years of oil practice by the Parties, that it gave notice of the proposed 
activities, and that drilling was accelerated in response to positive geological findings 
rather than in order to change the status quo.  According to Guyana, force used in a 
disputed area of territory cannot be reconciled with the requirement to act with restraint 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention.  Guyana rejects Suriname’s 
contention that Surinamese actions were lawful countermeasures in response to an 
unlawful act, stating that there was no unlawful act on the part of Guyana, and that such 
countermeasures would be illegal in any case as violations of the obligation to refrain 
from threatening to use force.279  Guyana disputes that Suriname had “no choice” but to 
take the action, citing the possibility of requesting ITLOS to prescribe provisional 
measures,280 and submits that such action was at variance with the requirements under 
Article 279 of the Convention and Article 33(1) of the UN Charter to resort first to 
alternative means. 
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Suriname’s Position 
268. According to Suriname, Guyana’s claim that Suriname’s escort of the CGX vessel from 
its location in June 2000 was unlawful is based on the erroneous premise that Guyana 
has title to the disputed maritime area.281  Suriname posits that Guyana must wait for the 
establishment of legal title to the disputed area prior to seeking any judicial benefit from 
it.  Suriname also asserts that Guyana’s conduct in the disputed area constitutes an 
internationally wrongful act and that as a result Guyana lacks clean hands with respect 
to this submission.282  
269. In Suriname’s view, Guyana’s second claim must also fail because no breach of the 
Convention has occurred.  Suriname maintains that Article 279 of the Convention 
prohibits the use of force in the context of an attempt to resolve a “dispute ... concerning 
the interpretation or application of th[e] Convention” and that Article 301 of the 
Convention prohibits the use of force in the context of a party “exercising [its] rights 
and performing its duties under th[e] Convention”.  Suriname contends that neither 
circumstance applies and points to the requirement to exchange views under Article 283 
of the Convention283 as well as its view that Guyana did not consider there was a 
dispute until 2000.  Moreover, according to Suriname, the breach of the UN Charter 
pleaded by Guyana cannot form the basis of a claim under the Convention alone.284   
270. Suriname submits that Guyana exaggerates the nature of its naval operation285 and 
characterizes it as a law enforcement measure of no greater force than was strictly 
necessary to achieve legitimate objectives.286  Suriname further submits that the 
circumstances surrounding the action, including, inter alia, its instructions not to use or 
threaten force, are consistent with law enforcement under its domestic legislation and 
consistent with the type of force considered acceptable on arrest of a ship.287  Suriname 
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denies that a use or threat of force has been proven or that any action was directed at 
Guyana because of the foreign nationality of the flag and crew of the vessel, and takes 
the position that exercise of coastal jurisdiction does not amount to armed force.288  In 
the alternative, Suriname claims that its actions would constitute a lawful 
countermeasure against Guyana’s actions.289 
271. Suriname disputes that State responsibility was engaged by its acts and asserts that there 
has been no case in the context of a territorial dispute where a State found not to have 
title to territory has been held responsible for its actions in an area which had been the 
subject of dispute.290   
272. According to Suriname, a decision was taken, in a departure from the established CGX 
concession work program initially agreed upon, to accelerate the drilling of a well and 
to locate it deliberately in the disputed area.  This decision, it argues, was made in 
breach of the 1989 modus vivendi and 1991 Memorandum of Understanding.291  
Suriname submits that Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention create two 
obligations: to “make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature” and “not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement”, the latter 
specifically requiring restraint.292  Suriname distinguishes between transitory or 
occasional actions characterizing the status quo and those representing irreparable 
prejudice,293 and argues that exploratory drilling is an invasive exercise of sovereign 
rights over natural resources causing such prejudice.294  Suriname contends that Guyana 
authorized drilling without adequate notice, consent or acquiescence in disputed waters 
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in breach of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention, and that its own actions in 
response were necessary.295 
273. In Suriname’s estimation, Guyana has suffered no loss and alone bears the 
consequences of offering contracts concerning areas for which it does not have secure 
title.296  The calculation of Guyana’s claim297 and Guyana’s method of valuation of 
work to be performed under terminated concessions are disputed by Suriname.  
Suriname also disputes that the claims advanced relate to losses suffered by Guyana 
rather than its licensees and submits that the claim for loss of licensing fees is 
speculative.298  Regarding Esso’s invocation of a force majeure clause, Suriname argues 
that it may have been related to factors other than the dispute with Suriname299 and that 
the concession areas in question concerned maritime territory that was for the larger part 
outside of the disputed area in any event. 
E. GUYANA’S FOURTH SUBMISSION AND SURINAME’S SUBMISSIONS 2.C AND 2.D: 
BREACH OF ARTICLES 74(3) AND 83(3) OF THE CONVENTION 
Guyana’s Position 
274. Guyana claims that Suriname breached Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention by 
failing to seek resolution by resort to practical provisional arrangements and by 
conducting itself in a manner that jeopardized reaching a final agreement.300  Guyana 
submits that these breaches represent a serious threat to international peace and 
security301 and that a forcible expulsion of a licensee’s vessels from a disputed maritime 
area cannot be likened to the arrest of a ship on the high seas for law enforcement 
purposes.302 
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275. Guyana disagrees with Suriname’s account of the negotiations between the Parties 
following the 1989 modus vivendi, the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding, and the 
events of June 2000.303  Guyana maintains that Suriname rejected the 1991 
Memorandum of Understanding by disavowing it, failing to ratify it, and thwarting 
efforts to establish modalities of operation subsequently.  According to Guyana, 
Suriname similarly failed to cooperate following the action it took in June 2000, while 
Guyana did provide information regarding its oil concessions, but could not proceed 
further in the absence of agreement by Suriname on modalities for operation.  In 
response to Suriname’s claim that events prior to 1998 (the year of Suriname’s 
accession to the Convention) are irrelevant to the Tribunal’s determination as to a 
breach of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention, Guyana argues that those events 
are relevant to the interpretation of post-1998 conduct as they demonstrate a consistent 
pattern of negative conduct.304 
Suriname’s Position 
276. Suriname submits that only conduct after 8 August 1998, being the date on which the 
Convention came into force between the Parties, can be relevant to Guyana’s allegation 
of breach of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention.  Further, Suriname maintains 
that to the extent that the obligations to make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature pending a final agreement under those Articles are 
enforceable, these have been breached by Guyana, rather than Suriname, through its 
unyielding approach in negotiations following the events of early June 2000.305  
277. Regarding the negotiations attempted by the Parties, Suriname complains that Guyana’s 
proposals were unworkable and that disclosure as to the commercial arrangements 
under the Guyana-CGX concession was lacking.306  Suriname contends that Guyana’s 
approach was to avoid formal commitments relating to anything other than the 
recommencement of operations under its concession agreements.  Suriname submits 
that the 1989 modus vivendi and 1991 Memorandum of Understanding themselves 
                                                 
303  Guyana Reply, paras. 9.1-9.14. 
304  Transcript, pp. 607-609. 
305  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 5.6-5.14. 
306  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 8.2-8.10. 
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amounted to provisional arrangements of a practical nature pending resolution of the 
dispute, and that Guyana’s entry into contracts with oil companies covering much of the 
disputed area constituted an unreasonable departure from those agreements.307 
278. Suriname invites the Tribunal to find that Guyana lacks entitlement to a remedy in any 
event and, in the alternative, that Guyana has forfeited the right to bring this claim by 
acting in an obstructive manner.308 
                                                 
307  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 8.11-8.16. 
308  Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 5.15-5.21. 
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CHAPTER IV - JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE MARITIME BOUNDARY 
279. The Parties’ positions regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the maritime 
boundary are set out above in Chapter III(A) of this Award.  Pursuant to its Procedural 
Order No. 2 (supra), the Tribunal deferred its decision on Suriname’s Preliminary 
Objections to the Final Award. 
280. The Tribunal takes note of Suriname’s statement at the hearing that: 
If ... there is indeed an agreed boundary in the territorial sea ... then the terminus of 
the maritime boundary provides a perfectly adequate starting point, and every issue 
that this Tribunal would have to decide would be governed by the provisions of the 
Law of the Sea Convention.309 
In light of the Tribunal’s finding in Chapter V of the Award that the starting point of the 
maritime delimitation between the Parties is the intersection of the low water line of the 
west bank of the Corentyne River and the geodetic line of N10°E which passes through 
Marker “B” established in 1936, the Tribunal need not consider further Suriname’s 
jurisdictional objection with respect to Guyana’s maritime delimitation claim.  
Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction to delimit the maritime boundary 
in dispute between the Parties. 
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CHAPTER V - DELIMITATION IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA 
A. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS 
Suriname’s N10°E Line to 12 nm 
281. Suriname submits that the delimitation of the territorial sea should proceed along an 
azimuth of N10°E from the 1936 Point/Point 61 (the “10° Line”) and that this boundary 
delimits the twelve-mile territorial sea of Suriname.  Suriname posits that the 10° Line 
“began as an agreed boundary for the territorial sea”,310 and maintains that the Parties 
have never worked jointly to identify the equidistance line, much less agreed on its use 
to delimit their maritime boundary.311 
Special Circumstances and Historical Evidence of an Agreement 
282. According to Suriname the consistent and concerted behaviour of The Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom in their dealings with each other over many years established their 
mutual acceptance of that boundary through tacit or de facto agreement, acquiescence or 
estoppel.312  Suriname contends that the need to guarantee The Netherlands’ sole 
responsibility for the care for and supervision of all shipping traffic in the approaches to 
the Corentyne, a river under its sovereignty, constitutes a special circumstance under 
Article 15 of the Convention.313 
283. For Suriname, the meaning of Article 15, including its reference to special 
circumstances, is to be understood in the context of the regime in which it appears.  
Article 2 of the Convention provides that the sovereignty of a coastal State extends 
beyond its land territory to an adjacent belt of sea described as the territorial sea, so that 
all activities in the territorial sea are subject to control and regulation by the coastal 
State, except as expressly provided otherwise.314  Consequently, Suriname posits that 
                                                 
310  Suriname Rejoinder, para. 3.259. 
311  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 3.14. 
312  Transcript, p. 829. 
313  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 3.12, Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 3.263, 3.264. 
314  Transcript, p. 835. 
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“such navigational considerations”, namely the control of shipping by the coastal State, 
are special circumstances for the purposes of Article 15.315 
284. In 1936 the Mixed Boundary Commission established the location of what Suriname 
called the 1936 Point, on the ground near the mouth of the Corentyne.  Its purpose was 
“to indicate the direction of the boundary line in the territorial waters on a True bearing 
of N10°E, this direction being parallel to the mid-channel as indicated on the chart”.316  
The bearing of N10°E was a modification by the Mixed Boundary Commission to the 
proposals of the Governments of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands of a line 
following a bearing of N28°E.  Suriname notes that this modification was accepted by 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom by an exchange of notes of 22 November 
1937 and 25 July 1938.317 
285. Suriname maintains that, although they did not reach an agreement binding on the 
Parties, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands respected the 10° Line as the 
territorial sea boundary in their mutual relations from 1939 to 1965.  Support for this 
position is found in the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the 10° Line through its failure 
to protest when The Netherlands provided details of its territorial sea boundary between 
Suriname and British Guiana to the International Law Commission in 1953. Suriname 
argues that the determination of the 10° Line was, among other things, “motivated 
solely by considerations of administrative and navigational efficiencies”.318  The 1936 
Point in combination with the 10° Line guaranteed The Netherlands’ sole control over 
the territorial waters in the approach to the Corentyne River.319  Suriname contends that 
this navigational consideration still exists as a special circumstance under Article 15 of 
the Convention. 
                                                 
315  Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 6.51-6.52; Suriname Rejoinder, para. 3.265. 
316  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 3.8, citing Report on the Inauguration of the Mark at the Northern 
Terminal of the Boundary Between Surinam and British Guiana, Guyana Memorial, Annex II, at para. 4. 
317  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 3.9. 
318  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 3.12, citing Guyana Memorial, para. 3.16. 
319  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 3.13. 
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Evolution of Historical Territorial Sea Agreement from 3 to 12 nm 
286. The historical acceptance of the 10° Line as the boundary of the territorial sea was in 
Suriname’s view not altered by the extension of the breadth of the territorial sea to 
twelve miles.  Suriname argues that where a text specifies the location and direction of 
the territorial sea boundary without reference to geographic limit, the correct 
interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the text, so that the boundary applies to the 
entire territorial sea up to the limits claimed by the parties at any given time in 
accordance with international law.320  Suriname relies on the finding of the ICJ in the 
Aegean Sea case that an agreement “must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of 
international law as they exist today, not as they existed in 1931”.321  This is known as 
the inter-temporal law. 
Application of the Inter-temporal Law 
287. For Suriname, if the only reason for using the 10° Line in the present delimitation is that 
it was agreed in 1936, the Tribunal must apply the inter-temporal law in order to 
determine whether the 1936 agreement applies to the present-day extent of the territorial 
sea.322  Where the location and direction of a territorial sea boundary is specified in an 
agreement but its seaward boundary is not specified, Suriname maintains that the 
question of whether the territorial sea boundary established by the Parties applies to all 
or only part of the territorial sea depends on the agreement’s object and purpose.323  
Suriname’s position is that the object and purpose of the territorial sea boundary 
established by the Parties was “clearly to limit the extent of Guyana’s territorial sea”,324 
for reasons of Suriname’s having control over the approaches to the Corentyne. 
                                                 
320  Transcript, p. 850. 
321  Transcript, p. 851; Aegean Sea, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, at p. 33, para. 80. 
322  Transcript, p. 852. 
323  Transcript, p. 853. 
324  Transcript, p. 854. 
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Guyana’s N34°E Line to 12 nm 
288. Guyana’s position is that the delimitation of the territorial sea should follow an 
“historical equidistance line” along an azimuth of N34°E from Point 61 for a distance of 
12 nm to a point at the outer limit of the territorial sea  (being the Guyana Territorial 
Sea Line).325  Guyana considers Point 61 as the appropriate starting point for maritime 
delimitation because the Parties’ conduct reflects a long-standing agreement, over 
seventy years, that this point should be treated as such and both Guyana’s and 
Suriname’s claims rely on it.  Guyana contends that both the United Kingdom’s 
delimitation of the equidistance line in 1957, based on Dutch chart 217 and British chart 
1801, and equidistance lines extended to a distance of twelve miles from Point 61 on the 
recent U.S. NIMA charts follow azimuths ranging from N34°E to N36°E. 
Historical Evidence of an Agreement on an Equidistance Line 
289. Guyana argues that the Guyana Territorial Sea Line is an equidistance line which should 
be followed when delimiting the territorial sea under Article 15 of the Convention as 
this line has historically been given effect by the Parties.  Alternatively, Guyana submits 
that even if the Guyana Territorial Sea Line were not to be regarded as the relevant 
equidistance line, then the conduct of the Parties since 1966 in following it would be 
sufficient to constitute a special circumstance justifying an adjustment to the 
equidistance line. 
290. Guyana takes the view that the arrangement made by the Mixed Boundary Commission 
resulting in the adoption of a 10° Line in 1936 was provisional in nature.  Guyana 
accepts that during the period between 1936 and 1965, the conduct of the Parties 
generally followed a line of N10ºE, but submits this was limited to a distance falling 
within the three-mile territorial sea as permitted by international law.  Guyana notes that 
in 1965 the United Kingdom first proposed a draft treaty which departed from the 10° 
Line, and that this was due to the United Kingdom’s decision to implement the median 
line principle enshrined in Article 12(1) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.  
Further, explanatory documents prepared contemporaneously by officials from the 
                                                 
325  Guyana identifies two different coordinates for this point: 6° 13′ 49.0″N, 56° 59′ 21.2″W (Guyana Reply, 
para. 6.44) and 6° 13′ 46″N, 56° 59′ 32″W (Guyana Reply, paras. 7.1, 7.59). 
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United Kingdom and British Guiana indicate that the original navigational reasons put 
forward by The Netherlands for the 10° Line in the territorial sea were no longer 
applicable.326  Guyana maintains that in 1966 on achieving independence Guyana 
informed The Netherlands that it shared this view.  Guyana contends that thereafter its 
practice was predicated on the equidistance line as required by Article 12(1) of the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention.327  According to Guyana, after Suriname achieved 
independence in 1975, its conduct was generally consistent with that of Guyana rather 
than with the 10° Line.328  Guyana puts forward that the conduct of the parties in the 
grant of oil concessions respected the historical equidistance line of N34E within the 
territorial waters up to the three-mile limit and then up to the twelve-mile limit once that 
was established.329 
291. Guyana argues that “special circumstances” for the purposes of maritime delimitation 
include the conduct of the Parties, particularly the existence, if there is one, of a modus 
vivendi reflected in a pattern of oil and gas concessions, as well as the conduct of the 
former colonial powers.330  Guyana submits that: 
the special circumstances in the territorial sea or beyond do not include land mass 
and geographic and geological factors which pertain to the seabed.  Seabed special 
circumstances do not come within the Article 15 definition of special 
circumstances and that is long established, since at least 1985, and stated very 
clearly at paragraph 39 of the Libya-Malta case.  That case, of course, was dealing 
with the continental shelf but the principle enunciated by the Court applies equally 
to the territorial sea.331 
Absence of Navigation by Early 1960s 
292. Guyana contends that by the early 1960s any potential need for navigational access to 
the Corentyne western channel had disappeared, in view of the lack of actual usage by 
that time.  In that connection, Guyana cites the draft treaty proposed by the United 
                                                 
326  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.26. 
327  Guyana Reply, para. 8.20. 
328  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.30. 
329  Guyana Reply, para. 6.41. 
330  In support of this argument, Guyana cites Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, at paras. 84, 
94, 119. 
331  Transcript, p. 332. 
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Kingdom in 1965, which took Point 61 as the starting point, but in Draft Article VII(1) 
proposed the use of a line to be drawn “in accordance with the principle of equidistance 
from the nearest points of the base lines from which the territorial sea of British Guiana 
and Surinam respectively is measured”.332  Contemporaneous documents prepared by 
officials of the United Kingdom and British Guiana indicate that the original reasons 
given by The Netherlands no longer applied since the western channel of the Corentyne 
River was no longer navigable by commercial ships, which had become much larger 
and heavier than those operating in the 1930s. 
The N10°E Line, if it Governed Relations Between the Parties, Did Not Exist Beyond 
3 nm 
293. Guyana disputes that even if there were a navigational factor to be treated as a special 
circumstance, it could not require alteration to the course of the territorial sea boundary 
beyond 3 nm.  Guyana maintains that “the United Kingdom and The Netherlands agreed 
that any delimitation outside the territorial sea beyond three miles from Point 61 was to 
be carried out in accordance with the principle of equidistance”.333  The United 
Kingdom in 1957 calculated the methodology to be applied in establishing an 
equidistance line using Dutch chart 217 and British chart 1801, and proposed a 
segmented line with a general bearing of N34°E.  Guyana argues that The Netherlands 
did not object to this line or to its adoption by the United Kingdom and Guyana as an 
equidistance line in the territorial sea and eventually up to a limit of 12 nm.334  Thus, 
according to Guyana, as a matter of law it was impossible for the Parties to have 
inherited a delimitation of the territorial seas beyond three miles along the 10° Line.335 
No Justification for Departure from the Provisional Equidistance Line 
294. Guyana maintains that there is no justification admissible under Article 15 of the 
Convention for departing from the provisional equidistance line in Suriname’s favour, 
and notes that Suriname has never claimed that it has an historic title to any maritime 
                                                 
332  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.26. 
333  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.24. 
334  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.24. 
335  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.28. 
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territory east of the 10° Line.336  Guyana disputes that the arrangement made in 1936 
between the Parties’ colonial predecessors is a special circumstance.  Guyana argues 
that there is very limited judicial authority for the proposition that navigational 
requirements can be treated as a special circumstance “having so decisive an effect” as 
that argued for by Suriname337  and it distinguishes the Beagle Channel award on the 
grounds that the deviation accepted in that case was “relatively unimportant”.338  In the 
alternative, Guyana argues that navigational factors should not be treated as a special 
circumstance in the absence of an actual navigational need as opposed to a “purely 
hypothetical one”, as in the western channel of the Corentyne River.339   
B. THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS PERTAINING TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE 
TERRITORIAL SEA 
295. The Tribunal recalls Article 15 of the Convention, which is based on Article 12 of the 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention.  Article 15 of the Convention provides that: 
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the 
two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each 
of the two States is measured.  The above provision does not apply, however, 
where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith. 
296. Thus, Article 15 of the Convention places primacy on the median line as the 
delimitation line between the territorial seas of opposite or adjacent States. 
Special Circumstances and Historical Evidence of an Agreement 
297. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that some form of historic title to 
the territorial waters in dispute had inured to either Party, nor are there any geographical 
features such as low-tide elevations or islands that the Tribunal would have to consider 
in delimiting the territorial sea. 
                                                 
336  Guyana Reply, para. 6.23. 
337  Guyana Reply, para. 6.26. 
338  Guyana Reply, para. 6.30, Beagle Channel, 17 I.L.M. p. 634, Annex IV, para. 4, XXI R.I.A.A. p. 57. 
339  Guyana Reply, para. 6.33. 
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298. The question remaining before the Tribunal is whether there are any special 
circumstances which might justify a departure from the median line approach prescribed 
by Article 15 of the Convention.  
299. As has been recalled above, The Netherlands claimed control over the approaches to the 
Corentyne River by virtue of the fact that the waters of the River were under its 
exclusive sovereignty.  At the time, an additional motivation for the United Kingdom to 
accept the claim of The Netherlands was that the burden of administering the maritime 
area would fall upon Suriname.  Although the proposed treaty embodying this 
agreement was not signed, in large part because of the advent of the Second World War, 
the parties acted upon it for thirty years and, in their relations, regarded the 10° Line as 
the proper delimitation line in the territorial sea. 
300. There is disagreement between the Parties as to what constitutes a special circumstance, 
and in particular, whether navigational considerations, such as those cited by Suriname 
to support the N10ºE line in the territorial sea, can constitute a special circumstance.340  
Guyana reasons that the authorities for varying the median line to accommodate special 
circumstances of navigation are scarce and that where they do exist, for such a variation 
to take place there must be: 
a known navigational channel or an established practice of navigation, and not the 
situation (as arises in the present case) where the navigational interest identified in 
1936 was both hypothetical and recognised to be subject to change, and in respect 
of which for over 40 years there has been no evidence of any navigational use.341 
301. In the Commentary accompanying the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) 
proposals concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea, it was said that the presence 
of a navigable channel could make a boundary based on equidistance inequitable and 
could indicate the appropriateness of utilising the thalweg as the boundary.342  This is 
not the situation in the present case, where the thalweg is to the east of a line based on 
equidistance and where, indubitably, a binding agreement between the Parties places the 
boundary in the river on the western bank.  Moreover, the equidistance line is to the east 
                                                 
340  Guyana Reply, paras. 1.6, 3.51-3.53; Suriname Counter-Memorial, paras. 3.32-3.33, 6.51-6.53 
341  Guyana Reply, para. 6.30. 
342  YBILC, 1952, Vol. II, Doc.A/CN.4/53. 
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of the N10°E line.  The ILC Commentary is instructive, however, in that it broadly 
indicates that navigational interests may constitute special circumstances.343 
302. International courts and tribunals are not constrained by a finite list of special 
circumstances.  The arbitral tribunal in the UK – French Continental Shelf arbitration 
took the approach that the notion of special circumstances generally refers to equitable 
considerations rather than a notion of defined or limited categories of circumstances: 
The role of the ‘special circumstances’ condition in Article 6 is to ensure an 
equitable delimitation; and the combined ‘equidistance-special circumstances rule’, 
in effect, gives particular expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, the 
boundary between States abutting on the same continental shelf is to be determined 
on equitable principles.  In addition, Article 6 neither defines ‘special 
circumstances’ nor lays down the criterion by which it is to be assessed whether 
any given circumstances justify a boundary line other than the equidistance line.344 
303. The ICJ has followed a similar approach in its jurisprudence.  The Court in the 
Libya/Malta case found that there is “assuredly no closed list of considerations”.345  
Furthermore, in the Jan Mayen case, after having found that it was appropriate “to begin 
the process of delimitation by a median line provisionally drawn”,346 the ICJ stated that 
it was “now called upon to examine every particular factor of the case which might 
suggest an adjustment or shifting of [that] line” [emphasis added].347  The Court 
continued by stating that an adjudicative body called upon to effect a delimitation of a 
maritime boundary “will consult not only ‘the circumstances of the case’ but also 
previous decided cases and the practice of States”,348 and will be mindful of the need to 
achieve “consistency and a degree of predictability”.349  The Tribunal agrees that special 
                                                 
343  See also ibid., Doc. A/CN.4/61/Add.1/Annex. 
344 UK – French Continental Shelf, 54 I.L.R. p. 5 (1979), para. 70. 
345 Libya/Malta, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13, at p. 40, para. 48.  However, it should be noted that that 
statement was limited; the Court found in that case that “only [considerations] that are pertinent to the 
institution of the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of equitable 
principles to its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion.” 
346 Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 53. 
347 Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 54. 
348 Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 58. 
349 The Court in Jan Mayen (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 58) quoting the Libya/Malta Judgment (I.C.J. 
Reports 1985, p. 39, at para. 45). 
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circumstances that may affect a delimitation are to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
with reference to international jurisprudence and State practice. 
304. Navigational interests have been found to constitute such special circumstances.  
Indeed, at the first Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Commander Kennedy 
expressed the view that a special circumstance may consist in “the presence of a 
navigable channel.”350  Arbitral tribunals subsequently adhered to this view, notably in 
the Beagle Channel arbitration.  The tribunal in that case stated that it had been guided: 
in particular by mixed factors of appurtenance, coastal configuration, equidistance, 
and also of convenience, navigability, and the desirability of enabling each Party so 
far as possible to navigate in its own waters.  None of this has resulted in much 
deviation from the strict median line, except ... near Gable Island where the 
habitually used navigable track has been followed.351 
305. Guyana attempted to limit the relevance of the finding of the tribunal in that case.  
Guyana argued that there is no habitual use of the western channel, that the deviation 
from the median line would not be minor, and that there are no islands in the territorial 
sea of the Parties.352  The Tribunal does not agree with Guyana’s submission on the 
significance of the Beagle Channel award.  The Beagle Channel tribunal’s statement 
that there was little deviation from the strict median line was merely descriptive; it was 
not prescribing that any deviation from the median line based on navigational concerns 
need be minor.  On the contrary, the tribunal’s finding prescribes that factors such as 
“convenience, navigability, and the desirability of enabling each Party so far as possible 
to navigate in its own waters” [emphasis added], be taken into account.353 
                                                 
350 Proceedings of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Thirty-second meeting, 9 April 1958, in 
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea: Official Records (Buffalo: Hein, 1980), p. 93. 
351 Beagle Channel, 17 I.L.M. p. 634, at p. 673, para. 110 (1978). 
352 Guyana Reply, paras. 6.29-6.30. 
353 The arbitral tribunal in the UK – French Continental Shelf arbitration similarly considered the navigational, 
defence and security interests of both parties in its delimitation (54 I.L.R. p. 5, at para. 188 (1979)).  Those 
considerations included defence plans, sea rescue, control of navigation, and responsibility for lights and 
buoys (para. 163).  Although the arbitral tribunal considered those interests, it found that they did not 
exercise “a decisive influence on the delimitation of the boundary” in that case due to the “very particular 
character of the English Channel as a major route of international maritime navigation serving ports outside 
the territories of either of the Parties” (para. 188).  However, the tribunal did find that even in that case, they 
could “support and strengthen … any conclusions that are already indicated by the geographical, political and 
legal circumstances of the region” (para. 188). 
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306. The Tribunal concludes that special circumstances of navigation may justify deviation 
from the median line, and that the record amply supports the conclusion that the 
predecessors of the Parties agreed upon a N10°E delimitation line for the reason that all 
of the Corentyne River was to be Suriname’s territory and that the 10° Line provided 
appropriate access through Suriname’s territorial sea to the western channel of the 
Corentyne River.  Contrary to Guyana’s assessment above, Suriname has presented 
evidence of navigation in the western channel, albeit of small local craft, rather than 
large ocean-going vessels.  The fact is that there is an “established practice of 
navigation”354 in the western channel, not only a hypothetical one.  Furthermore, the 
Tribunal must take account of Guyana’s own admissions that there was recognition of a 
N10°E line for 3 nm: 
from the late 1930s to the late 1950s – when a ‘navigation channel’ was thought to 
be a ‘possibility’, it was understood by both colonial powers to extend no farther 
than 3 nm from the Guyana coast.  Thus, even if such a channel had existed, there 
is no basis for treating it as a special circumstance affecting maritime delimitation 
beyond 3 nm, let alone for a distance of 200 nm;355 and,  
To the extent that there ever was any agreement in relation to a 10-degree line, it 
was, in any event, limited to a distance of no more than 3 nautical miles.  At no 
point during which United Kingdom and the Dutch appeared to have followed the 
line did the territorial sea ever exceed 3 miles.  The 10-degree line was rejected by 
the United  Kingdom in the early 1960s, well before the extension of the breadth of 
the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles by Guyana in 1977 and by Suriname in 1978.  
There are no grounds for now claiming that a 10-degree line should automatically 
extend 12 nautical miles as a result of a change in the law.356  
307. The Tribunal holds that the 10° Line is established between the Parties from the starting 
point to the 3 nm limit.  As the Tribunal accepts the 10° Line to the 3 nm limit, it also 
accepts the 1936 Point/Point 61 as a reference point for drawing the maritime 
delimitation line.  Indeed, the Tribunal agrees with Suriname that the 1936 
Point/Point 61 is inextricably linked to the Parties’ agreement on a maritime boundary 
following the 10° Line.357   
                                                 
354  Guyana Reply, para. 6.30. 
355  Guyana Reply, para. 3.53. 
356  Transcript, p. 344. 
357 Suriname Preliminary Objections, para. 5.7. 
98 
308. An additional source of disagreement between the Parties has been the question of how 
to use the 1936 Point/Point 61 to determine the starting point of the maritime boundary.  
Guyana argued that the proper starting point was on the low water line at the shortest 
distance from the 1936 Point/Point 61,358 a proposition disputed by Suriname.359  As the 
1936 Point/Point 61 was the reference point for the 10° Line which the Tribunal has 
accepted up to the 3 nm limit, the Tribunal finds that the starting point of the boundary 
(“Point 1”) is the intersection of the low water line of the west bank of the Corentyne 
River and the geodetic line of N10°E which passes through Marker “B”, a marker 
placed by the 1936 Mixed Boundary Commission 220 metres distant on an azimuth of 
190° from Marker “A”, also known as the 1936 Point/Point 61.  The Tribunal recalls 
that Suriname argued that it does not have jurisdiction to determine any question 
relating to the land boundary between the Parties.360  The Tribunal’s findings have no 
consequence for any land boundary that might exist between the Parties, and therefore, 
in light of Suriname’s statement at the hearing discussed in Chapter IV,361 this 
jurisdictional objection does not arise. 
309. The Tribunal also recalls that the Parties were unable to agree on the coordinates of 
Marker “B”.  The Tribunal Hydrographer requested, on 20 December 2006, “that the 
Parties provide the position of Marker ‘B’.”362  In response, Guyana provided a set of 
WGS-84 coordinates which Suriname disputed,363 urging the Tribunal to refer to the 
astronomical coordinates previously used by both Parties.364  The Hydrographer 
therefore made a site visit to the location of Marker “B”, and determined its WGS-84 
coordinates to be 5° 59′ 46.21″N, 57° 08′ 50.48″W.365  The Parties accepted these 
coordinates as the location of Marker “B” and so does the Tribunal. 
                                                 
358 Transcript, pp. 179-180. 
359 Transcript, p. 691. 
360 Suriname Preliminary Objections, para. 4.14. 
361 “If … there is indeed an agreed boundary in the territorial sea … then the terminus of the maritime boundary 
provides a perfectly adequate starting point, and every issue that this Tribunal would have to decide would be 
governed by the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention.” (Transcript, pp. 795-796) 
362 Written Question to the Parties from the Tribunal Hydrographer, 20 December 2006. 
363 Letter from Guyana to the Tribunal, 10 January 2007. 
364 Letter from Suriname to the Tribunal, 12 January 2007. 
365 Tribunal Hydrographer Corrected Report on Site Visit, 30 July 2007, para. 42. 
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The Boundary Between 3 and 12 nm 
310. When Guyana and Suriname, as independent nations, extended the breadth of their 
territorial seas from 3 to 12 nm (in 1977 and 1978, respectively), neither addressed 
directly the question of the continuation of the 10° Line from the previous to the current 
limit of their territorial seas.  That question appeared to have been subsumed within the 
wider question of the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone 
and the difference in approach between the Parties on this question. 
311. Rather surprisingly, the question of whether and how, in the absence of an agreement to 
do so, a delimitation should be extended from the previous limit of territorial seas to a 
newly established limit, does not appear to have engaged the attention of States, courts, 
or commentators.  The Tribunal agrees with Guyana that the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 
case cited by Suriname does not support the view that there should be automatic 
extension of the territorial sea from the previously accepted limit of 3 nm, to the current 
limit of 12 nm.  Indeed, the difference between this case and Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 
is that there was a written agreement between the parties in the latter case, given effect 
by the tribunal in that case.  No authority was cited to the Tribunal of a comparable 
situation in any other case, although Suriname states: 
The object and purpose of choosing the 10° Line was that navigation entering the 
river would be regulated by The Netherlands/Suriname and would not be subject to 
regulation by the United Kingdom/Guyana.  Thus, the question is not just a 
technical issue of intertemporal law regarding the breadth of the territorial sea, but 
rather one of applying the contemporary law of the sea in light of the object and 
purpose of the agreement on the 10° Line.  In this connection, an examination of 
the broad unilateral regulatory and enforcement powers of the coastal state with 
respect to navigation in the territorial sea in the 1982 Convention, as set forth in 
articles 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 211(4) and 220(2)-(6), suggests that the application of 
the 10° Line to the full 12-nautical-mile territorial sea is required in order to 
achieve the object and purpose of the agreement.366  
312. In the above submission, Suriname raises the conduct of the Parties over some thirty 
years to the level of a perfected instrument, a notion that the Tribunal rejects.  
Uncompleted treaties, such as the 1939 or 1949 British draft treaty, do not create legal 
rights or obligations merely because they had been under consideration.  This point was 
                                                 
366  Suriname Rejoinder, para. 3.75. 
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decided by the ICJ in the Sovereignty over certain Frontier Lands case.367  There, the 
Court considered efforts in 1889 and 1892 “by the two States to achieve a regular and 
continuous frontier between them” which ended in the drafting of a convention, but not 
in its ratification.  The Court concluded that “[t]he unratified Convention of 1892 did 
not, of course, create any legal rights or obligations”.368 
313. However, the Tribunal accepts that it must apply the Convention to the entirety of the 
case before it, and Article 15 allows the Tribunal to consider historic title and special 
circumstances as reasons for varying the median line in conducting a delimitation of the 
territorial sea.  The Tribunal is also persuaded that coastal States need to exercise 
regulatory and enforcement powers with respect to navigation in the territorial sea under 
the Articles cited by Suriname.  These regulatory enforcement powers extend to both 
Parties, although Suriname’s control over the approaches to the Corentyne River further 
justify the line the Tribunal has taken in delimiting the territorial sea along the N10°E 
azimuth to the 3 nm limit. 
314. An automatic extension of the line, as it proceeds seaward, would however rapidly 
cease to have relevance to the special circumstances of navigation and control that 
brought it about. 
315. Beyond the 3 nm limit to the 12 nm limit it is necessary to find a principled method by 
which the 10° Line may be connected to the single maritime boundary line determined 
by the Tribunal to delimit the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the 
Parties.  
316. In a general sense, the extension of the territorial sea from its former limits to a distance 
of 12 nm from territorial sea baselines recognised by the Convention favours greater 
coastal State control over navigation, pollution, customs, and other coastal State laws, 
including its general criminal law.  Such was recognised, for example, in the United 
States when a report was issued by the 105th Congress on the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 1997.  Noting that Presidential Proclamation 5928 of December 
                                                 
367  Case concerning Sovereignty over certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1959, p. 209. 
368  Ibid. at p. 229. 
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27, 1988, had defined the territorial sea of the United States as extending to 12 nm, the 
Report stated:  
This will enable the Coast Guard to establish vessel operating requirements 
including vessel traffic systems, for all U.S. and foreign vessels within the 12-mile 
territorial sea.  This will also clarify the area in which the Captain of the Port can 
direct a vessel to operate or anchor, establish safety zones to protect the navigable 
waters, protect the nation from terrorism, and investigate vessel casualties.  In 
addition, the Coast Guard will be able to keep out of the expanded territorial sea 
vessels with a history of accidents, pollution incidents, or serious repair problems 
and vessels that discharge oil or hazardous substances or that are improperly 
manned.  Currently, these substandard vessels may approach as close as three 
nautical miles to our coast before they can be instructed not to enter our waters.  
This additional area of legislative jurisdiction will enable the Coast Guard, through 
its Port State Control Program, to deal more effectively with substandard foreign 
flag vessels seeking to enter our ports.369  
317. In an age of increased security and safety concerns regarding international boundaries, 
certainly navigational concerns have been imbued with greater significance.  As cited 
above, similar arguments were advanced by Suriname in support of its view that the 
10° Line had been accepted as the boundary between the two territories at a time when 
the territorial sea limit had been recognised by both The Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom as extending to 3 nm, and that the previous limit should automatically be 
regarded as extending on the same azimuth to the currently recognised territorial sea 
limit of 12 nm.370  In its view, the logic behind the choice of a 10° Line in place of an 
equidistance line applied as strongly to the currently claimed and permissible 12 nm 
limits in the territorial seas. 
318. Suriname also argued that not extending the 10° Line beyond the 3 nm limit would 
cause Guyana’s territorial sea to “wrap-around” the northern limit of Suriname’s 
territorial sea, thus defeating what it claimed was the “object and purpose” of the choice 
of the 10° Line in the first place, when the areas beyond were regarded by the 
international law of the time as high seas.  In that connection, appeal was also made by 
Suriname to the inter-temporal law principle, applying it in this case to submit that 
                                                 
369 United States Congress, From 1st Session, Report of the 105th Congress, 105-236, Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 1997. 
370 It should be noted that Guyana ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, on 
31 July 1993 and has declared a 12 nm territorial sea and a contiguous zone extending to 24 nm.  Suriname 
ratified the Convention on 9 July 1998 and has declared a 12 nm territorial sea.  It has not declared a 
contiguous zone.  
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references to the territorial sea in the earlier instruments and instances of conduct should 
be regarded as references to the “limits claimed by the parties at any given time in 
accordance with international law.”371  The Tribunal, however, cannot accept this 
submission in the present case, where the issue turns on conduct of the Parties justifying 
an adjustment based on special circumstances.  The portion of the decision in the 
Aegean Sea case quoted by Suriname to support its submission,372 where the ICJ 
regarded the definition of “territory”, appearing in an instrument dated 1931, as now 
including the continental shelf,373 is not relevant. 
319. The evidence in the case of the navigational and other interests of Suriname extending 
beyond 3 nm is, however, of some consequence.  These considerations appear to have 
been present in the mind of British government experts, such as Commander Kennedy 
and Mr. Scarlett, who raised the new issue of the contiguous zone in internal 
discussions of the boundary.374  It appears to have been a result of these discussions that 
the 1961 British draft treaty submitted to The Netherlands proposed that the N10°E line 
extend to 6 nm before turning to other directions beyond that point. 
320. It is to be noted that, at the time of the discussions leading up to the United Kingdom’s 
draft treaty of 1961, there was no stated outer limit to the territorial sea contained in the 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention.  The limit of 12 nm established for the outer limit of 
the contiguous zone, however, effectively put a cap on any claims to territorial waters 
beyond that limit, in which event the claiming State would forego a claim to a 
contiguous zone. 
321. It should also be noted that Article 24 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention specifies a 
median line in the delimitation of overlapping adjacent or opposite contiguous zones, in 
the absence of agreement, without regard to special circumstances.  This provision does 
not appear in Article 33 of the Convention which is modelled on Article 24 of the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention.   
                                                 
371  Transcript, p. 850. 
372  Transcript, p. 851. 
373 Aegean Sea, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, at pp. 35-36, para. 86. 
374 Commander Kennedy to Mr. Scarlett, 15 January 1959, Guyana Memorial, Annex 24; Mr. Scarlett to 
Commander Kennedy, 11 February 1959, Guyana Memorial, Annex 25.  
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322. Much attention was devoted at the hearing to the problem of the so-called wrap-around, 
or cut-off, effect of a delimitation of the territorial seas extending only to 3 nm.  Such a 
delimitation line along the N10°E azimuth would allow Guyana’s territorial sea to cut 
across the approaches to the river and thus defeat the purpose of that line to protect 
Suriname’s navigational interests.  A solution suggested by Suriname, based on the 
angle bisector method of delimitation, would be to extend the 10° Line to 12 nm and 
thereafter to proceed on a direction line of N17°E, the effect of which would be to 
divide equally the area of overlap.  However, Suriname did not urge this solution on the 
Tribunal since its central argument was to promote a single maritime boundary on an 
azimuth of N10°E to the 200 nm limit.  In its view, the N17°E line would have to be 
adjusted by reason of geographical circumstances and equitable criteria to a N10°E line 
for a distance of 200 nm.  This line would, of course, remove the overlap altogether.  
323. The Tribunal considers that, in determining a delimitation line dividing the Parties’ 
territorial seas from the point at which the N10°E line ends at 3 nm to the 12 nm limit, a 
special circumstance is constituted by the very need to determine such a line from a 
point at sea fixed by historical arrangements of an unusual nature.  Bearing this special 
circumstance in mind, the Tribunal arrives at a line continuing from the seaward 
terminus of the N10°E line at 3 nm, and drawn diagonally by the shortest distance to 
meet the line adopted later in this Award to delimit the Parties’ continental shelf and 
exclusive economic zone. 
324. In the judgment of the Tribunal, this line is in conformity with the relevant provisions of 
the Convention.  It avoids a sudden crossing of the area of access to the Corentyne 
River, and interposes a gradual transition from the 3 nm to the 12 nm point.  It also 
ensures that the line is convenient for navigational purposes. 
325. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the territorial sea delimitation must be drawn 
from the point at which the N10°E line intersects the 3 nm limit to the point at which 
the equidistance line drawn by the Tribunal in Chapter VI of this Award intersects the 
12 nm limit. 
326. For illustrative purposes only, Map 2 at the end of this Chapter shows the course of the 
delimitation line through the territorial sea. 
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327. The verbal description of the international maritime boundary through the territorial sea 
is as follows.  The delimitation line commences at Point 1, being the intersection of the 
low water line of the west bank of the Corentyne River and the geodetic line of N10°E 
which passes through Marker “B” established in 1936.  Marker “B” has a WGS-84 
position of 5º 59′ 46.21″N, 57º 08′ 50.48″W.375 
328. From Point 1, the delimitation line proceeds along geodetic lines to the following points 
in the order given: 
Point 2 6° 08.33′N, 57° 07.33′W 
Point 3 6° 13.47′N,  56° 59.87′W. 
 Geographic coordinates refer to the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84). 
329. From Point 3 onward, the delimitation line continues as described in Chapter VI. 
                                                 


































Page intentionally left blank 
107 
CHAPTER VI - DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES 
330. Both the Republic of Guyana and the Republic of Suriname are parties to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which they ratified on 31 July 1996 and 
9 July 1998 respectively.  They are therefore bound by the relevant provisions of the 
Convention and especially by the Articles concerning the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf between States.376  Neither Guyana nor 
Suriname has made declarations under Article 298 excluding maritime boundary 
disputes from the compulsory procedures specified in Part XV of the Convention.  
331. These Articles provide that the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts “shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution”.377 
332. Emphasis is placed in both of these Articles on the equitable result.378  The Court in the 
Tunisia/Libya case made this quite clear.  It stated that: 
In the new text (i.e. the official draft convention before the Conference the text of 
which has remained unchanged), any indication of a specific criterion which could 
give guidance to the interested States in their effort to achieve an equitable solution 
has been excluded.  Emphasis is placed on the equitable solution which has to be 
achieved.  The principles and rules applicable to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf areas are those which are appropriate to bring about an equitable result.379 
333. The tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago arbitration has cast some useful light 
on the significance of this text.  It remarked that: 
This apparently simple and imprecise formula allows in fact for a broad 
consideration of the legal rules embodied in treaties and customary law as pertinent 
to the delimitation between the parties, and allows as well for the consideration of 
                                                 
376  Articles 74 and 83.  
377  Articles 74(1) and 83(1). 
378  Eritrea/Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime 
Delimitation), 119 I.L.R. p. 417, at para. 116 (1999), The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration Awards of 1998 & 1999 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration Award Series 2005), online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org> 
(“Eritrea/Yemen II”). 
379  Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, at para. 50. 
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general principles of international law and the contributions that the decisions of 
international courts and tribunals and learned writers have made to the 
understanding and interpretation of this body of legal rules.380 
334. It is particularly important to note that this Tribunal has to determine a single maritime 
boundary delimiting both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.  These 
regimes are separate, but to avoid the difficult practical problems that could arise were 
one Party to have rights over the water column and the other rights over the seabed and 
subsoil below that water column, a single maritime boundary can be drawn.  It is 
generally acknowledged that the concept of the single maritime boundary does not have 
its origin in the Convention but is squarely based on State practice and the law as 
developed by international courts and tribunals.381  That is why the Tribunal has to be 
guided by the case law as developed by international courts and tribunals in this matter.  
This Tribunal has also taken into account the dictum of the Barbados/Trinidad and 
Tobago tribunal’s award in drawing a single maritime boundary where it states: 
Within those constraints imposed by law, the Tribunal considers that it has both the 
right and the duty to exercise judicial discretion in order to achieve an equitable 
result.  There will rarely, if ever, be a single line that is uniquely equitable.  The 
Tribunal must exercise its judgment in order to decide upon a line that is, in its 
view, both equitable and as practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same 
time in keeping with the requirement of achieving a stable legal outcome.  
Certainty, equity, and stability are thus integral parts of the process of 
delimitation.382 
335. In the course of the last two decades international courts and tribunals dealing with 
disputes concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic 
zone have come to embrace a clear role for equidistance.  The process of delimitation is 
divided into two stages.  First the court or tribunal posits a provisional equidistance line 
which may then be adjusted to reflect special or relevant circumstances.  It was in the 
Jan Mayen case that the ICJ clearly espoused this approach when it stated: 
Thus, in respect of the continental shelf boundary in the present case, even if it 
were appropriate to apply, not Article 6 of the 1958 Convention, but customary law 
concerning the continental shelf as developed in the decided cases, it is in accord 
                                                 
380  Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, 45 I.L.M. p. 798 (2006), at para. 222, online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
381  See Qatar/Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40, at para. 173; and Cameroon/Nigeria, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, at para. 286. 
382  Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, 45 I.L.M. p. 798 (2006), at para. 244, online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
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with precedents to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask 
whether “special circumstances” require any adjustment or shifting of that line.383  
336. With respect to the boundary of the fishery zone, it went on to add: 
It thus appears that, both for the continental shelf and for the fishery zones in this 
case, it is proper to begin the process of delimitation by a median line provisionally 
drawn.384  
337. The same approach was followed by the ICJ in the Qatar/Bahrain case.  It expressly 
stated that 
for the delimitation of the maritime zones beyond the 12-mile zone (i.e. the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf) it will first provisionally draw 
an equidistance line and then consider whether there are circumstances which must 
lead to an adjustment of that line.385  
338. It is important to note that recent decisions indicate that the presumption in favour of 
equidistance, established in the case law relating to States with opposite coasts, also 
applies in the case of States with adjacent coasts.  In the Cameroon/Nigeria case, the 
ICJ applied this method to determine a lateral boundary between States with adjacent 
coasts.386  It also should be recalled that this delimitation process was used in the 
northern sector of the boundary between Qatar and Bahrain “where the coasts of the two 
States are no longer opposite to each other but are rather comparable to adjacent 
coasts”.387  
339. Arbitral tribunals have also adhered to this approach.  In the maritime boundary dispute 
between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, the Tribunal stated: 
                                                 
383  Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 51. 
384  Ibid., at para. 53. 
385  Qatar/Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40, at para. 230. 
386  Cameroon/Nigeria, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, at para. 290. 
387  See Qatar/Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40, at para. 170. 
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In the context of opposite coasts and latterly adjacent coasts as well, it has become 
normal to begin by considering the equidistance line and possible adjustments and 
to adopt some other method of delimitation only if the circumstances justify it.388   
340. The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago tribunal described a two-step approach to 
delimitation: 
The determination of the line of delimitation thus normally follows a two-step 
approach.  First, a provisional line of equidistance is posited as a hypothesis and a 
practical starting point.  While a convenient starting point, equidistance alone will 
in many circumstances not ensure an equitable result in the light of the peculiarities 
of each specific case.  The second step accordingly requires the examination of this 
provisional line in the light of relevant circumstances, which are case specific, so 
as to determine whether it is necessary to adjust the provisional equidistance line in 
order to achieve an equitable result.  This approach is usually referred to as the 
“equidistance/relevant circumstances” principle.  Certainty is thus combined with 
the need for an equitable result.389 
341. As noted above, that tribunal went on to add “[c]ertainty, equity, and stability are thus 
integral parts of the process of delimitation”390 – a proposition which accords with the 
view of this Tribunal.  
342. Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention require that the Tribunal achieve an “equitable” 
solution.  The case law of the International Court of Justice and arbitral jurisprudence as 
well as State practice are at one in holding that the delimitation process should, in 
appropriate cases, begin by positing a provisional equidistance line which may be 
adjusted in the light of relevant circumstances in order to achieve an equitable solution.  
The Tribunal will follow this method in the present case. 
A. RELEVANT COASTS 
343. The Tribunal will now turn its attention to the coasts of the Parties which are relevant to 
this maritime boundary delimitation – the relevant coasts “from which will be 
                                                 
388  Award of the Tribunal in the Second Phase, 26 March 2002, para. 2.28.  See also Eritrea/Yemen II, 119 
I.L.R. p. 417 (1999), The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration Awards of 1998 & 1999 (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Award Series 2005), online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
389  Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, 45 I.L.M. p. 798 (2006), at para. 242, online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>.  
The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago tribunal refers to the ICJ decisions in Cameroon/Nigeria (Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303) and Qatar/Bahrain (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40), as well as Prosper 
Weil’s text Perspectives du droit de la délimitation maritime (p. 223 (1988)), in support of its two-step 
approach. 
390  Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, 45 I.L.M. p. 798 (2006), at para. 244, online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
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determined the location of the baselines and the pertinent basepoints which enable the 
equidistance line to be measured”.391 
The Parties’ Positions 
344. In its Memorial, Guyana contends that the determination of the relevant coasts involved 
the identification of the coastal fronts that generate legal entitlement to the maritime 
area in dispute based on the principle that “the land dominates the sea” citing the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases;392  the Aegean Sea case;393  and Qatar/Bahrain.394   
345. Guyana considered: 
the relevant coastline for each Party to be the length of coast that lies between the 
outermost points along the coastal baseline that control the direction of the 
provisional equidistance line to a distance of 200 nm.  These coastal basepoints 
define the limits of each Party’s area of legal entitlement.  No other portions of the 
coastline beyond either outer basepoints are relevant because they do not generate 
legal entitlement to any maritime areas subject to delimitation by the Tribunal.395  
346. Guyana explained that: 
[its] relevant coast – the portion responsible for ‘generating the complete course of 
the median line’ – lies between Point 61 (its easternmost basepoint) and 
Devonshire Castle Flats (its westernmost basepoint). ... Guyana and Suriname are 
in agreement on the locations of these outer basepoints, as confirmed by Figure 31 
in the Counter-Memorial.  The distance between them is 215 km.  In like manner, 
Suriname’s relevant coast extends from Point 61 in the west to the easternmost 
point along the Suriname coast that controls the direction of the provisional 
equidistance line.  In Guyana’s view, this point is located on Hermina Bank at 
55° 45’ 55.1”W; 6° 0’ 39.8”N.  Suriname refers to this basepoint as S13.  
Suriname’s coastline between Point 61 and basepoint S13 ... measures 153 km.  
The ratio of the lengths of the Parties’ relevant coastlines is thus 1.4 to 1 (215 km 
to 153 km) in Guyana’s favour.396 
                                                 
391  Qatar/Bahrain, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40, at para. 178. 
392  North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 96. 
393  Aegean Sea, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, at para. 86. 
394  Guyana Memorial, para. 8.35; Qatar/Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40, at para. 185. 
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396  Guyana Reply, para. 3.18. 
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347. Guyana’s contention is based on the dictum in the Jan Mayen case which treated certain 
sections of the coast as relevant, “in view of their role in generating the complete course 
of the median line provisionally drawn which is under examination”.397   
348. Suriname has argued that, since the area being delimited in the Jan Mayen case was the 
area between two opposite coasts, it was of little use in a case where the adjacent 
relevant coasts have somewhat different general directions and thus form an angle 
where they meet.398   
349. In the view of Suriname: 
the relevant coasts are coasts that face onto or abut the area to be delimited.  And 
this means that the relevant coasts are those that extend to a point where the coasts 
face away from the area to be delimited.  On the Suriname side, the relevant coast 
extends from the Corentyne River to the Warrapa Bank.  From there on, the coasts 
turn southeasterly, and since it no longer faces or abuts onto the area to be 
delimited, it is no longer relevant.399 
350. Suriname continues: 
On the Guyana side, the relevant coast extends from the Corentyne River to the 
Essequibo River, and ... after a short turn northwards, the coast returns to [a] 
northwesterly trend, but from Devonshire Castle Flats on, it no longer faces or 
abuts into the area to be delimited.400 
351. This criterion for determining the relevant coasts finds its basis in the Tunisia/Libya 
Judgment where the Court observed that: 
[i]t is clear from the map that there comes a point on the coast of each of the two 
Parties beyond which the coast in question no longer has a relationship with the 
coast of the other Party relevant for submarine delimitation.  The sea-bed areas off 
the coast beyond that point cannot therefore constitute an area of overlap of the 
extensions of the territories of the two Parties, and are therefore not relevant to the 
delimitation.401   
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400  Transcript, pp. 920-921. 
401  Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, at para. 75. 
113 
The Tribunal’s Findings 
352. As the Tribunal proposes to begin this delimitation process with a provisional 
equidistance line, it seems logical and appropriate to treat as relevant the coasts of the 
Parties which generate “the complete course” of the provisional equidistance line.402  
“The equidistance line is the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest 
points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two 
States is measured”,403 a definition which is itself based on article 15 of the 1982 
Convention.  In the view of the Tribunal, the relevant coast of Guyana extends from 
Devonshire Castle Flats to a point just seaward of Marker “B”, and the relevant coast 
for Suriname extends from Bluff Point, the point on the east bank of the Corentyne 
River used in 1936 as the mouth of the river, to a point on Vissers Bank. 
B. COASTAL GEOGRAPHY 
353. As noted above, both Parties have requested the Tribunal, if it finds that it has 
jurisdiction, to determine a single maritime boundary delimiting the territorial seas, 
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of Guyana and Suriname.404  The 
Tribunal was not invited to delimit maritime areas beyond 200 miles from the baselines 
of Guyana and Suriname.  Both Parties reserved their rights under Article 76(4) of the 
Convention.  Thus in the present case the Tribunal is not concerned with matters 
concerning the delimitation of the outer continental shelf of the Parties.  
354. It should be pointed out that the Parties themselves have agreed that geological or 
geophysical factors are of no relevance in this case.405 
355. The Chamber of the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine case was the first international judicial 
body to be faced with the delimitation of a single maritime boundary – establishing a 
                                                 
402  Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 67; Arbitration between Newfoundland and 
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line which in that case divided both the exclusive fishing zone and the continental shelf.  
The Chamber explained that: 
a delimitation which has to apply at one and the same time to the continental shelf 
and to the superjacent water column can only be carried out by the application of a 
criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to 
one of these two objects to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such 
as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them.  In that regard, moreover, 
it can be foreseen that with the gradual adoption by the majority of maritime States 
of an exclusive economic zone and, consequently, an increasingly general demand 
for single delimitation, so as to avoid as far as possible the disadvantages inherent 
in a plurality of separate delimitations, preference will henceforth inevitably be 
given to criteria that, because of their more neutral character, are best suited for use 
in a multi-purpose delimitation.406   
The Chamber proceeded to make clear what was meant by criteria of a “more neutral 
character”: 
it is, accordingly, towards an application to the present case of criteria more 
especially derived from geography that it feels bound to turn.  What is here 
understood by geography is, of course mainly the geography of the coasts which 
has primarily a physical aspect, to which may be added, in the second place, a 
political aspect.407   
356. Geography, in particular coastal geography, provided the Chamber with a neutral 
criterion which favoured neither one nor the other of the two realities – the seabed of the 
continental shelf and the water column of the exclusive economic zone.  “The quest for 
neutral criteria of a geographical character”, as was stated in the Barbados/Trinidad and 
Tobago arbitral award, “prevailed in the end over area-specific criteria such as 
geomorphological aspects or resource-specific criteria such as the distribution of fish 
stocks, with a very few exceptions (notably Jan Mayen, ICJ Reports 1993, p. 38)”.408   
357. Both Parties are in agreement that geography (coastal geography) is of “fundamental 
importance” in the delimitation of the maritime boundary.  In fact Suriname considers 
that the dispute should be resolved exclusively on the basis of the coastal geography of 
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the delimitation area.  Guyana relies not only on coastal geography but on history, 
including the conduct of activities by the Parties.409   
C. THE PROVISIONAL EQUIDISTANCE LINE 
358. The Tribunal will now begin its examination of the provisional equidistance line to 
determine whether the line needs to be adjusted or shifted in order to achieve an 
equitable result.  The Tribunal will first consider the arguments of the Parties with 
respect to the provisional equidistance line. 
The Parties’ Positions 
359. For its analysis of the provisional equidistance line, Suriname divides the line into three 
sections.  The first section starts from the coast up to the 200 metre isobath.  The second 
section commences shortly after the provisional equidistance line leaves the 200 metre 
isobath, and the third section starts just as the provisional equidistance line approaches 
the 200-nautical-mile limit. 
360. Suriname, in its Counter-Memorial, argues that: 
due to geographical circumstances, the first section of the provisional equidistance 
line thrust east northeast in front of the mouth of the Corantijn River and continues 
in a northeasterly direction across the coastal front of Suriname.410   
...  
The cut-off effect is caused by a combination of Suriname’s concavity pulling, and 
Guyana’s convex coastline west of the mouth of the Corantijn River pushing, the 
provisional equidistance line toward and in front of Suriname’s coast.  ...  The 
intense congregation of Guyana’s basepoints just west of the Corantijn River on the 
convex coast of Guyana direct the provisional equidistance line in segment after 
segment as it extends into the sea.  On the adjacent Suriname coast the controlling 
basepoints are spread out and indeed are largely absent from Suriname’s recessed 
coast reaching toward the Coppename River.  Thus, the coastal configuration of 
Guyana from the mouth of the Corantijn River west to the Berbice River pushed 
the first segment of the provisional equidistance line eastward.  At the same time, 
the concave coast of Suriname does not offer any countervailing protuberance, and 
thus there are no basepoints on Suriname’s coast to counter those of Guyana in 
order to turn the provisional equidistance line away from the front of the coast of 
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Suriname.  Out as far as the 200-meter depth contour, the relative position of the 
basepoints on the adjacent coasts continues to direct the provisional equidistance 
line in this way: the provisional equidistance line continues to be pushed by 
Guyana’s convex coast near the mouth of the Corantijn River and pulled by the 
concave nature of Suriname’s coast toward and in front of the coast of Suriname.411   
From this Suriname concludes that a line is created “that violates the principle of non-
encroachment.”412 
361. The provisional equidistance line changes direction in the second section and then veers 
towards the north, owing to the fact, according to Suriname, that the eastern headland of 
Suriname’s concavity (Hermina Banks) begins to take effect on the line.  Thus, in 
Suriname’s words: 
for the first time basepoints on Suriname’s coast counter the influence of the 
basepoints on Guyana’s protruding convex coast just west of the mouth of the 
Corantijn River and turn the provisional equidistance line so that it ceases its swing 
in front of Suriname’s coastal front.  While the northward direction of the 
provisional equidistance line in this second sector might suggest that it is a 
reasonable line, it is in fact not an equitable delimitation line in this sector since it 
starts from an eastward point that has been determined by the convex/concave 
relationship between the neighboring coasts.413   
362. It noted that the provisional equidistance line “begins in the wrong place too far to the 
east to mitigate the encroachment that is the result of the first segment of the provisional 
equidistance line”.414   
363. In the third sector, as the provisional equidistance line approaches the 200 nm limit, 
Suriname claims that the “basepoints on Guyana’s prominent convex coastline west of 
the Essequibo River cause the provisional equidistance line [to] change direction and 
veer to the east across Suriname’s coastal front” to Suriname’s disadvantage.415   
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364. Suriname concluded that the provisional equidistance line does not produce an equitable 
delimitation and that it must be adjusted, or another method employed, in order to 
achieve an equitable delimitation result.416   
365. Guyana, for its part, responded with its own analysis of the provisional equidistance 
line.  With respect to the first section of the line it agrees that: 
it is true that the provisional equidistance line heads out from Point 61 for a very 
short distance in a direction toward Suriname’s coast.  But this is not caused by any 
alleged “convexity” along Guyana’s coast.  Rather, it is due to the fact that Point 
61 is located on Guyana’s coast and not in the middle of the Corentyne River.  
Once the provisional equidistance line encounters the first basepoints along 
Suriname’s coast, it is pushed northward and away from Suriname.  Thereafter, the 
corresponding coastal basepoints on each side of the Corentyne River provide a 
countervailing effect.  Thus, after the first few km the provisional equidistance line 
is no longer affected by the fact that it starts from a point on Guyana’s coast, and it 
proceeds thereafter without any further effect from its starting point or from any 
localised convexities on either bank at the mouth of the Corentyne River to the end 
of its first segment.  Accordingly, the first segment of the provisional equidistance 
line does not produce a cut-off effect on Suriname any more than it produces on 
Guyana.417   
366. As to the second section, Guyana agreed with Suriname that this section of the line 
represented the “first pronounced change in direction of the provisional equidistance 
line” and that that change was caused “by the fact that the eastern headland of the 
Suriname concavity (Hermina Bank) begins to take effect on the line”.418  But it argues 
that Suriname “understates the pronounced effects produced by the headland or 
convexity at Hermina Bank”.419  In Guyana’s view, “the Suriname basepoints on 
Hermina Bank control the direction of the entire provisional equidistance line in its 
second section”.420   
367. Guyana argued that the first section of the provisional equidistance line: 
follows a relatively straight course for approximately 100 nm.  But for the coastal 
change from concavity to convexity at Hermina Bank, the relatively constant 
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course of the equidistance line would likely continue along the same course all the 
way to the 200 nm EEZ limit.421   
This coastal change as a consequence “gives Suriname more than 4,000 km² at 
Guyana’s expense.”422  Guyana considered itself “prejudiced by the purported 
hypersensitivity of the provisional equidistance line”.423 
368. In reply to Suriname’s claims that in the third section the provisional equidistance line 
“veers ‘to the east to Suriname’s disadvantage’ because ‘Guyana’s controlling 
basepoints are located on the protruding coast west of the Essequibo River’”, Guyana 
pointed out that its “basepoints at Devonshire Castle Flats are not located on a 
‘protruding coast’, but on the main body of the coastline where it changes to a more 
southeasterly direction”.424  It stated that “[t]he third segment of the provisional 
equidistance line cannot credibly be described as ‘inequitable’ to Suriname” and 
concluded that “none of the three segments of the line is in any way inequitable to 
Suriname”.425   
The Tribunal’s Findings 
369. The Tribunal will deal first with the following argument submitted by Suriname.  
Suriname contends that: 
the equidistance method does not produce an equitable result when employed in 
these geographic circumstances.  The reason it does not do so is that it responds to 
incidental coastal features of the geographical situation.  In doing so, as it often 
does in adjacent state situations, it cuts off the projection of the coastal front of one 
of the states – in this case it cuts off the projection of Suriname’s coastal front.  
Accordingly, another delimitation method is required to create an equitable 
solution.426 [emphasis added] 
and has put forward the argument: 
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that when the equidistance method is not suitable in a delimitation between 
adjacent states, a method that employs coastal fronts and methods such as bisectors 
of the angle formed by adjacent coastal fronts or perpendiculars to the general 
direction of the common coastal front will do so.427   
370. Suriname’s preferred method was the bisection of the angle formed by the adjacent 
coastal fronts of Suriname and Guyana which extends from the coast at N17°E.428  In 
support of its argument Suriname cited a number of cases which it claimed illustrated 
the utility of delimitation methods adopted to give effect to the relationship between 
neighbouring coastal fronts and thus taking into account the principle of non-
encroachment to avoid the cut-off effect.  These cases were Tunisia/Libya, Gulf of 
Maine, and St-Pierre et Miquelon (Canada v. France).429  Suriname contended that all 
these cases made use of simplified representation.  It chose the Gulf of Maine as the best 
example of angle bisectors which it considered appropriate when the neighbouring 
coastal fronts form an angle “as often occurs in the case of adjacent States where the 
land boundary meets the sea in a coastal indentation or cavity”:430  
The best example is the first segment of the single maritime boundary prescribed in 
Gulf of Maine.  In that situation, the adjacent neighboring coasts form an 
approximate right angle with an apex at the land boundary.  The Chamber 
established coastal fronts drawn from Cape Elizabeth to the land boundary 
terminus, representing the general direction of the Maine coast and from the land 
boundary terminus to Cape Sable, representing the general direction of the portion 
of the Canadian coast facing the Gulf of Maine.  The angle bisector between these 
two coastal front lines runs from the initial point of the maritime boundary 
established by the Chamber toward the central part of the Gulf.  The use of an 
angle bisector in that type of configuration achieves the objective of an 
approximately equal division of the offshore area, coupled with what the Chamber 
termed “the advantages of simplicity and clarity.431   
371. In its oral pleadings Guyana argued that: 
When the provisional equidistance line does not, on its own, create an equitable 
solution, the consequence of that is to make adjustments to the provisional 
equidistance line that are required to achieve an equitable solution[,] [n]ot to 
abandon the equidistance methodology or the provisional equidistance line 
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altogether, and certainly not to substitute an entirely unorthodox and highly 
subjective methodology in its place.432  
372. The Tribunal is bound to note that the coastlines at issue in these cited cases cannot be 
compared to the configuration of the relevant coastlines of Guyana and Suriname.  For 
instance, the Gulf of Maine case where the angle bisector was utilised in the maritime 
delimitation between Canada and the United States bears little resemblance to the 
maritime area which is of concern in this delimitation.  It seems to this Tribunal that the 
general configuration of the maritime area to be delimited does not present the type of 
geographical peculiarities which could lead the Tribunal to adopt a methodology at 
variance with that which has been practised by international courts and tribunals during 
the last two decades.  Such peculiarities may, however, be taken into account as relevant 
circumstances, for the purpose, if necessary, of adjusting or shifting the provisional 
delimitation line.433  The Tribunal is therefore not persuaded that it should adopt in the 
present case what may be called the “angle bisector methodology”. 
373. The Tribunal has noted that neither Guyana nor Suriname considers that the provisional 
equidistance line represents an equitable delimitation as required by international law, 
due to the geographical circumstances of the maritime area to be delimited.  Here, the 
Tribunal must recall the statement made by the International Court of Justice in 
Cameroon/Nigeria with respect to coastal geography which because of its relevance is 
quoted in full: 
The geographical configuration of the maritime areas that the Court is called upon 
to delimit is a given.  It is not an element open to modification by the Court but a 
fact on the basis of which the Court must effect the delimitation.  As the Court had 
occasion to state in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, “[e]quity does not 
necessarily imply equality”, and in a delimitation exercise “[t]here can never be 
any question of completely refashioning nature”.  Although certain geographical 
peculiarities of maritime areas to be delimited may be taken into account by the 
Court, this is solely as relevant circumstances, for the purpose, if necessary, of 
adjusting or shifting the provisional delimitation line.  Here again, as the Court 
decided in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Court is not required to take 
all such geographical peculiarities into account in order to adjust or shift the 
provisional delimitation line: “[i]t is therefore not a question of totally refashioning 
geography whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situation of 
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quasi-equality as between a number of States, of abating the effects of an incidental 
special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result”.434   
374. In short, international courts and tribunals dealing with maritime delimitation should be 
mindful of not remaking or wholly refashioning nature, but should in a sense respect 
nature. 
375. In their written and oral pleadings, both Parties agree that in the maritime delimitation 
area “there are no major promontories, islands, or other coastal features that render that 
coastline extraordinary”;435 and that the coastal geography is “unremarkable”.436  They 
both agree also that “there are no offshore islands and the coastlines on either side of the 
land boundary terminus are although not completely regular throughout their course, do 
not contain features such as peninsulas, major bays, island fringes or other such 
configurations.437  It is fair to point out that Suriname uses this representation of the 
coastline to support its bisector approach.  However, the Tribunal takes the view that the 
characterisation of the coastline as “unremarkable” only strengthens the methodology 
adopted by the Tribunal. 
376. Turning to the question of whether there are any features in the geographical 
configuration of the relevant coastlines which justify an adjustment of the equidistance 
line, the Tribunal must mention the following observation found in the report of the 
independent expert appointed by Guyana: 
An important geographic reality in this case is that there are no offshore features, 
such as islands or low-tide elevations that influence the drawing of an equidistant 
line.  Nor are there are large peninsulas or protrusions from one of the coastlines 
that dramatically skew the course of an equidistant line.438   
377. The Tribunal agrees with this assessment of the coastal geography.  In its view, the 
relevant coastlines do not present any marked concavity or convexity.  After careful 
examination the Tribunal accordingly concludes that the geographical configuration of 
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the relevant coastlines does not represent a circumstance that would justify any 
adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. 
D. CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES 
378. The Tribunal will now turn its attention to the question of the relevance of the conduct 
of the Parties with respect to the shifting or adjustment of the provisional equidistance 
line.  Guyana has stated that: 
in respect of the delimitation of the territorial sea and the continental shelf and 
exclusive economic zone, international courts and tribunals have long recognised 
that the conduct of the parties – and in particular the existence of a modus vivendi 
reflected in a pattern of oil and gas concessions – is an important circumstance to 
be taken into account in effecting a boundary delimitation.  In the present case, the 
parties’ oil concessions date back nearly 50 years and are based on a serious and 
good faith effort to identify a historical equidistance line which was plotted on the 
basis of the best British and Dutch charts available at the time (British chart 1801 
and Dutch chart 217).  The concessions reflect a de facto pattern of acceptance that 
the line extending from Point 61 on a bearing of approximately N34E has long 
been treated as reflecting an equidistance line which divides the parties’ maritime 
spaces.439   
379. Suriname, for its part, contended that:  
[t]he conduct of the parties to a maritime boundary dispute, and in particular one 
that concerns a single maritime boundary, is generally not relevant to the maritime 
delimitation.  Only if that conduct meets a very high legal standard may it be taken 
into account.  The alleged conduct must be consistent and sustained and it must 
display clearly an intention by both parties to accept a specific line as an equitable 
basis of delimitation.  The adopted line therefore must be the result of an express or 
tacit agreement.  Conduct that does not meet that legal standard is simply 
irrelevant.  Guyana has seriously misstated the law in this respect.  Guyana has 
elevated the ephemeral conduct of the parties to a level of controlling legal 
importance, which plainly is not correct.440 
380. This Arbitral Tribunal must first examine the case law of international courts and 
tribunals with respect to the conduct of activities, especially oil practice, in the relevant 
area. 
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381. The International Court of Justice examined for the first time the relevance of oil 
practice in the maritime boundary delimitation dispute between Tunisia and Libya.  The 
Court in that case noted that “it is evident that the Court must take into account 
whatever indicia are available of the line or lines which the parties themselves may have 
considered equitable or acted upon as such”.441  It was thus acknowledged that the 
conduct of the parties themselves with regard to oil concessions may determine the 
delimitation line. 
382. In the Gulf of Maine case, Canada had requested the Chamber to find that the conduct of 
the parties proved at least the existence of a “modus vivendi maritime limit” or a “de 
facto maritime limit” based on the coincidence between the Canadian equidistance line 
(the “strict equidistance” line) and the United States “BLM line” (U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management) which it claimed was respected by the two parties and by numerous oil 
companies from 1965 to 1972.  Canada relied on the findings of the Court in the 
Tunisia/Libya case.  The United States denied that oil practice respected any particular 
line, but also denied the very existence of the “BLM line”. 
383. The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case had this to say on the oil practice of the parties 
throwing into relief a distinctive feature of the Tunisia/Libya case: 
[T]he Chamber notes that, even supposing that there was a de facto demarcation 
between the areas for which each of the Parties issued permits (Canada from 1964 
and the United States from 1965 onwards), this cannot be recognized as a situation 
comparable to that on which the Court based its conclusions in the Tunisia/Libya 
case.  It is true that the Court relied upon the fact of the division between the 
petroleum concessions issued by the two States concerned.  But it took special 
account of the conduct of the Powers formerly responsible for the external affairs 
of Tunisia – France – and of Tripolitania – Italy –, which it found amounted to a 
modus vivendi, and which the two States continued to respect when, after becoming 
independent, they began to grant petroleum concessions.442   
384. In the Libya/Malta case, the ICJ expressly referred to “its duty to take into account 
whatever indicia are available of the (delimitation) line or lines which the Parties 
themselves may have considered equitable or acted upon as such”443 – which was of 
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course the criterion introduced by the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya case.  It, however, 
concluded that it was: 
unable to discern any pattern of conduct on either side sufficiently unequivocal to 
constitute either acquiescence or any helpful indication of any view of either Party 
as to what would be equitable differing in any way from the view advanced by that 
Party before the Court.  Its decision must accordingly be based upon the 
application to the submissions made before it of principles and rules of 
international law.444   
385. This Tribunal finds that, with respect to the role of oil practice in maritime delimitation 
disputes, the Judgment in the Cameroon/Nigeria case is of particular significance.  It 
should be noted that the delimitation line had to be determined “in an area of very 
highly concentrated petroleum exploration and exploitation activity”.445  Nigeria had 
contended that State practice with respect to oil concessions was “a decisive factor in 
the establishment of maritime boundaries” and added it was not the business of the 
Court to “redistribute such oil concessions between the States party to the 
delimitation”.446  On the other hand, Cameroon held the view that “the existence of oil 
concessions has never been accorded particular significance in matters of maritime 
delimitation in international law”.447   
386. The ICJ for its part having made an analysis of the case law relating to the role of oil 
practice in maritime delimitation declared that “although the existence of an express or 
tacit agreement between the parties on the siting of their respective oil concessions may 
indicate a consensus on the maritime areas to which they are entitled, oil concessions 
and oil wells are generally not in themselves to be considered as relevant circumstances 
justifying the adjustment or shifting of the provisional delimitation line.  Only if they 
are based on express or tacit agreement between the parties may they be taken into 
account.  In the present case there is no agreement between the Parties regarding oil 
concessions”.448   
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387. Arbitral tribunals have supported this approach.  The St-Pierre et Miquelon arbitration 
paid little regard to the oil practice of the parties.  In this case, permits for exploration 
had been issued by both parties in areas of overlapping claims but “after reciprocal 
protests no drilling was undertaken”.  The tribunal held that in the circumstances it had 
no reason “to consider the potential mineral resources as having a bearing on the 
delimitation”.449   
388. In the view of the tribunal in the arbitration between Newfoundland and Labrador and 
Nova Scotia, “in order to establish that a boundary (not settled or determined by 
agreement) has been established through conduct, it is necessary to show an 
unequivocal pattern of conduct as between the two parties concerned relating to the area 
and supporting the boundary, which is in dispute”, citing the dictum in the Libya/Malta 
case, already referred to.450   
389. The dictum that oil wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant 
circumstances unless based on express or tacit agreement between the parties was 
expressly applied in the award in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago arbitration.451  The 
award also made clear that the tribunal did “not consider the activities of either Party, or 
the responses of each Party to the activities of the other, themselves constitute a factor 
that must be taken into account in the drawing of an equitable delimitation line”.452   
390. The cases reveal a marked reluctance of international courts and tribunals to accord 
significance to the oil practice of the parties in the determination of the delimitation 
line.  In the words of the Court in the Cameroon/Nigeria case, “oil concessions and oil 
wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant circumstances justifying the 
adjustment or shifting of the provisional delimitation line.  Only if they are based on 
express or tacit agreement between the parties may they be taken into account”.453  The 
Tribunal is guided by this jurisprudence.  Having carefully examined the practice of the 
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Parties with regard to oil concessions and oil wells, the Tribunal has found no evidence 
of any agreement between the Parties regarding such practice.  The Tribunal takes the 
view that the oil practice of the Parties cannot be taken into account in the delimitation 
of the maritime boundary in this case. 
391. Guyana, in support of the use of the equidistance method, had argued that it was of 
“material significance” that the draft agreement between Suriname and France (French 
Guiana) on the maritime boundary applies the principle of equidistance and follows a 
line of N30°E.454  For its part, Suriname contended that its boundary negotiations with 
French Guiana had no relevance to this case.  It made clear that there was no maritime 
boundary agreement in force between Suriname and France with respect to French 
Guiana, and even if there were, Suriname averred such would be “totally irrelevant to 
these proceedings”.455  It held that the case between Guyana and Suriname took place in 
a different locale and the relevant considerations are notably different.456  Suriname 
found support for its argument that the draft agreement between Suriname and French 
Guiana had little to do with the present case in the Jan Mayen case between Norway and 
Denmark where the Court stated that: 
By invoking against Norway the Agreements of 1980 and 1981, Denmark is 
seeking to obtain by judicial means equality of treatment with Iceland.  It is 
understandable that Denmark should seek such equality of treatment.  But in the 
context of relations governed by treaties, it is always for the parties concerned to 
decide, by agreement, in what conditions their mutual relations can best be 
balanced.  In the particular case of maritime delimitation, international law does 
not prescribe, with a view to reaching an equitable solution, the adoption of a 
single method for the delimitation of the maritime spaces on all sides of an island, 
or for the whole of the coastal front of a particular State, rather than, if desired, 
varying systems of delimitation for the various parts of the coast.  The conduct of 
the parties will in many cases therefore have no influence on such a delimitation.  
The fact that the situation governed by the Agreements of 1980 and 1981 shares 
with the present dispute certain elements (identity of the island, participation of 
Norway) is of no more than formal weight.  For these reasons, the Court concludes 
that the conduct of the Parties does not constitute an element which could influence 
the operation of delimitation in the present case.457 
                                                 
454  Guyana Memorial, para. 3.50. 
455  Suriname Counter-Memorial, para. 2.20. 
456  Ibid. 
457  Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at para. 86. 
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This Tribunal accepts the contention of Suriname and therefore takes no account in the 
present case of the boundary negotiations which have been conducted between 
Suriname and France with respect to French Guiana.  In the view of the Tribunal, this 
conduct is not relevant to the present case. 
E. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIBUNAL 
392. In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal does not consider that there are any relevant 
circumstances in the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone which would require 
an adjustment to the provisional equidistance line.  There are no factors which would 
render the equidistance line determined by the Tribunal inequitable.  The Tribunal has 
checked the relevant coastal lengths for proportionality and comes up with nearly the 
same ratio of relevant areas (Guyana 51% : Suriname 49%) as it does for coastal 
frontages (Guyana 54% : Suriname 46%); likewise there are no distortions caused by 
coastal geography.  As the Parties have not chosen to argue the relative distribution of 
living and non-living natural resources throughout these zones, the Tribunal did not take 
these matters into account. 
393. The Tribunal accepts the basepoints for the low-water lines of Suriname and Guyana 
provided by the Parties that are relevant to the drawing of the equidistance line beyond 
the territorial sea.458  
394. Guyana has argued that Suriname’s location of basepoint S1 is “inconsistent with the 
requirements of the [Convention], Article 5 of which provides that the normal baseline 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is ‘the low-water line along the 
coast.’”459  The Tribunal accepts the equidistance line beyond the 12 nm limit.  As S1 
does not affect the equidistance line beyond 12 nm,460 the Tribunal does not need to 
consider point S1 further, nor any other basepoints that would affect only the 
equidistance line within the 12 nm limit. 
                                                 
458  See Suriname Counter-Memorial, Annex 69; Guyana Reply, Annex 26. 
459  Guyana Reply, para. 6.14. 
460  See Technical Report of the Tribunal’s Hydrographer in the Appendix to this Award. 
128 
395. Guyana also objected to Suriname’s basepoint S14, which Suriname had identified 
relying on what Guyana claimed to be an inaccurate chart.  The chart in question, NL 
2218, was produced by the Netherlands Hydrographic Office (with the assistance of the 
Maritime Authority Suriname) in June 2005 after the proceedings in this arbitration had 
commenced.461  In addition, Guyana claims that another Dutch chart, NL 2014, as well 
as satellite imagery, “disprov[e] the existence of a low-tide coast at Vissers Bank where 
Suriname placed its purported basepoint S14.”462   
396. The Tribunal is not convinced that the depiction of the low-water line on chart NL 
2218, a chart recognised as official by Suriname, is inaccurate.  As a result, the Tribunal 
accepts the basepoint on Vissers Bank, Suriname’s basepoint S14. 
397. Each Party provided its computed results of the provisional equidistance line based on 
the basepoints that it indicated.  As described in the Appendix to the Award analysing 
the data provided by both Parties, the turning points indicated by the Parties have been 
recomputed because certain of them were not equidistant from the supposed basepoints 
within the limits of the rounding-off of the positional values and because neither Party 
computed the equidistance line using all the basepoints accepted by the Tribunal.   
398. The Tribunal concludes that the single maritime boundary delimiting the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf between Guyana and Suriname shall be as shown 
for illustrative purposes only on Map 3 at the end of this Chapter.  The precise, 
governing coordinates are set forth below and are explicated in the Appendix to the 
Award. 
399. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf shall commence 
at Point 3, being the intersection of the 12 nm limit with the boundary delimiting the 
territorial sea. 
                                                 
461  Guyana  Reply, paras. 1.10, 3.19; Transcript, pp. 170-172; Suriname Rejoinder, Annex SR43. 
462  Guyana  Reply, para. 3.19. 
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400. The coordinates of the turning points of the delimitation line through the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf are as follows: 
a. The delimitation line is a series of geodetic lines joining the points in the order 
listed: 
Point # Latitude Longitude 
3. 6° 13.47′N,  56° 59.87′W 
4. 6° 16.19′N,  56° 58.63′W 
5. 6° 19.17′N,  56° 57.01′W 
6. 6° 28.01′N,  56° 51.70′W 
7. 6° 32.12′N,  56° 49.22′W 
8. 6° 35.13′N,  56° 46.92′W 
9. 6° 43.99′N,  56° 42.34′W 
10. 7° 24.45′N,  56° 21.74′W 
11. 7° 26.11′N,  56° 20.88′W 
12. 7° 28.98′N,  56° 19.69′W 
13. 7° 39.96′N,  56° 14.99′W 
14. 7° 53.48′N,  56° 12.31′W 
15. 8° 35.61′N,  56° 03.99′W 
16. 8° 36.76′N,  56° 03.75′W 
17. 9° 00.03′N,  55° 56.09′W 
18. 9° 06.27′N,  55° 52.88′W 
19. 9° 20.66′N,  55° 45.42′W 
 
 
b. From Point 19, the delimitation line proceeds on a geodetic azimuth of 
N23° 57′ 10″E to the 200 nautical mile limit of the exclusive economic zones of 
Guyana and Suriname, having an approximate position of: 
Point 20 9° 21.35′N,  55° 45.11′W. 
c. Geographic coordinates and azimuths refer to the World Geodetic System 1984 





CHAPTER VII - GUYANA’S THIRD SUBMISSION 
401. Guyana’s third submission seeks recovery for damages suffered as a result of 
Suriname’s allegedly unlawful actions in the 3 June 2000 incident concerning the C.E. 
Thornton drilling rig (the “CGX incident”) as well as action subsequently taken by 
Suriname with respect to two additional Guyanese concession holders: 
Suriname is internationally responsible for violating its obligations under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Charter of the United 
Nations, and general international law to settle disputes by peaceful means because 
of its use of armed force against the territorial integrity of Guyana and/or against its 
nationals, agents, and others lawfully present in maritime areas within the 
sovereign territory of Guyana or other maritime areas over which Guyana exercises 
lawful jurisdiction; and that Suriname is under an obligation to provide reparation, 
in a form and in an amount to be determined, but in any event no less than U.S. 
$33,851,776, for the injury caused by its internationally wrongful acts.463 
A. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY 
1. The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over Claims Relating to the UN Charter and 
General International Law 
402. Guyana stated in its third submission, inter alia, that Suriname was “internationally 
responsible for violating its obligations under the Convention, the Charter of the United 
Nations, and general international law to settle disputes by peaceful means because of 
its use of armed force”.464  Suriname is of the view that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction 
to adjudicate alleged violations of the UN Charter or customary international law and 
declared that “to the extent that Guyana’s claims are based on those violations, they 
must be dismissed”.465 
403. The law which this Tribunal is authorised to apply is contained in Article 293, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention, which reads as follows:  “A court or tribunal having 
jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of 
international law not incompatible with this Convention”. 
                                                 
463  Guyana Reply, para. 10.1. 
464  Guyana Reply, para. 10.1. 
465  Transcript,  p. 1092. 
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404. In addition, this Tribunal notes that the preamble of the Convention itself has preserved 
the applicability of general international law, when, in its ultimate paragraph, it affirmed 
“that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and 
principles of general international law”.466 
405. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) has interpreted Article 293 
as giving it competence to apply not only the Convention, but also the norms of 
customary international law (including, of course, those relating to the use of force).  It 
made this clear in its findings in the Saiga case: 
In considering the force used by Guinea in the arrest of the Saiga, the Tribunal 
must take into account the circumstances of the arrest in the context of the 
applicable rules of international law.  Although the Convention does not contain 
express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international law, 
which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use 
of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must 
not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.  
Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other 
areas of international law. [emphasis added]467 
406. In the view of this Tribunal this is a reasonable interpretation of Article 293 and 
therefore Suriname’s contention that this Tribunal had “no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
alleged violations of the United Nations Charter and general international law”468 
cannot be accepted.  Furthermore, as the Tribunal will find (see paragraph 486 infra), 
the conduct of Suriname in the disputed area constituted a breach of its obligations 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention over which the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 293, paragraph 1, of the Convention. 
2. The Obligation to Exchange Views 
407. Suriname has raised another jurisdictional issue.  It stated that:  
In the period from the time of the CGX incident, June 3rd, 2000, up until the point 
where the application was filed before this Tribunal in February 2004, Guyana 
never informed Suriname that Guyana believed that Suriname had violated Articles 
                                                 
466  The Convention, preamble. 
467  M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 7, 
at para. 155 (“Saiga”). 
468  Suriname Rejoinder, para. 4.7. 
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279 or 301, or even that it had violated the Law of the Sea Convention generally by 
Suriname’s conduct in June 2000.469 
408. Suriname contends that Guyana was under an obligation as specified in Article 283 of 
the Convention to inform Suriname of any alleged breach of the Convention, in 
particular Articles 279 and 301.  “By failing to fulfill that obligation, Guyana did not 
undertake recourse to the Section 1 Procedures, and because of that failure to take 
recourse to Section 1 procedures, Guyana cannot avail itself of the Section 2 
compulsory dispute jurisdiction”.470 
409. Suriname made reference to the case law of ITLOS to highlight the importance of the 
procedural requirements provided for in Article 283(1), that is the obligation to 
exchange views.  It cited in particular the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases,471 the MOX 
Plant case,472 and the Land Reclamation case.473  It will be recalled that in these cases 
ITLOS held that a party was under no obligation to exchange views when it concluded 
that the possibilities of reaching agreement had been exhausted. 
410. This dispute has as its principal concern the determination of the course of the maritime 
boundary between the two Parties – Guyana and Suriname.  The Parties have, as the 
history of the dispute testifies, sought for decades to reach agreement on their common 
maritime boundary.  The CGX incident of 3 June 2000, whether designated as a “border 
incident” or as “law enforcement activity”, may be considered incidental to the real 
dispute between the Parties.  The Tribunal, therefore, finds that in the particular 
circumstances, Guyana was not under any obligation to engage in a separate set of 
exchanges of views with Suriname on issues of threat or use of force.  These issues can 
be considered as being subsumed within the main dispute.   
                                                 
469  Transcript, pp. 1093-1094. 
470  Transcript, p. 1094. 
471  Southern Bluefin Tuna, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280. 
472  MOX Plant, Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95, at para. 60. 
473  Land Reclamation, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10, at para. 47. 
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3. Article 297 and the Characterisation of Guyana’s Claim 
411. Suriname in its oral pleadings has raised another jurisdictional objection.  It declared 
that since Guyana’s claims relate to a dispute concerning a coastal State’s enforcement 
of sovereign rights with respect to non-living resources, the claim falls outside this 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to Part XV, section 3 of the Convention.  Suriname 
explained that: 
Article 297 says that section 2, compulsory dispute settlement, is only available for 
certain kinds of disputes that relate to the exercise by a coastal state of its sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction.474   
412. Suriname further asserted that: 
Among the three kinds of disputes listed in Article 297, there is no reference to a 
dispute concerning a coastal state’s enforcement of its sovereign rights with respect 
to nonliving resources.  Since Guyana’s submission is a dispute concerning a 
coastal state’s enforcement of its sovereign rights with respect to nonliving 
resources, the dispute is not encompassed in Section 2 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention.475 
413. As noted above, Article 293 of the Convention gives this Arbitral Tribunal jurisdiction 
over any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.  This 
jurisdiction is subject to the automatic limitations set out in Article 297 and the optional 
exceptions specified in Article 298.  Article 286 reads as follows: 
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, 
be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction under this section. 
414. Thus, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention which 
is not excluded by the operation of Part XV, Section 3 (Articles 297 and 298) falls 
under the compulsory procedures in Section 2.  Article 297, paragraph 3(a), which is 
relevant here, reads as follows: 
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2, 
                                                 
474  Transcript, p. 1099. 
475  Transcript, p. 1099. 
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except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such 
settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its 
discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, 
the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established 
in its conservation and management laws and regulations. [emphasis added]  
415. Sovereign rights over non-living resources do not fall under this exception. 
416. This Tribunal is therefore unable to entertain Suriname’s argument that a dispute 
concerning a coastal State’s enforcement of its sovereign rights with respect to non-
living resources lies outside its jurisdiction. 
4. Good Faith and Clean Hands 
417. Suriname challenges the admissibility of Guyana’s Third Submission on the grounds of 
lack of good faith and clean hands.  It also argues in the alternative that the clean hands 
doctrine must be considered in deciding the merits of Guyana’s Third Submission. 
418. The doctrine of clean hands, as far as it has been adopted by international courts and 
tribunals, does not apply in the present case.  No generally accepted definition of the 
clean hands doctrine has been elaborated in international law.  Indeed, the 
Commentaries to the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility acknowledge that the 
doctrine has been applied rarely476 and, when it has been invoked, its expression has 
come in many forms.  The ICJ has on numerous occasions declined to consider the 
application of the doctrine,477 and has never relied on it to bar admissibility of a claim or 
recovery.  However, some support for the doctrine can be found in dissenting opinions 
in certain ICJ cases, as well as in opinions in cases of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (the “PCIJ”).  For example, Judge Anzilotti’s 1933 dissenting 
opinion in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case states that “an unlawful act 
                                                 
476  James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries, p. 162 (2002). 
477  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136 at para. 63; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161, at para. 100; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 279: in this case Belgium raised the 
question of clean hands in its preliminary objections (Preliminary Objections of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), (5 July 2000), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/105/8340.pdf), but the Court did not address the argument in its judgment. 
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cannot serve as the basis of an action at law”.478  In the United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran case, in which the ICJ declined to consider the issue of clean 
hands, Judge Morozov wrote in his dissent that the United States had “forfeited the legal 
right as well as the moral right to expect the Court to uphold any claim for reparation”.  
However, Judge Morozov went to great lengths to stress that “[t]he situation in which 
the Court has carried on its judicial deliberation in the current case has no precedent in 
the whole history of the administration of international justice either before this Court, 
or before any international judicial institution”,479 citing the United State’s coercive and 
military measures against Iran which were carried out simultaneously with its 
application to the ICJ.480  In the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert states 
that the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) did not come to the ICJ with clean 
hands, citing its violation of the Geneva Conventions in failing to prosecute a 
Government Minister suspected of breaching humanitarian law.481  The finding with 
respect to clean hands was not however dispositive; it was merely included in Judge 
Van den Wyngaert’s discussion of immunity under international law and her conclusion 
that a Minister’s immunity does not extend to war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
The doctrine was therefore neither used as a bar to the admissibility of the DRC’s claim, 
nor as a ground to deny recovery.  These cases indicate that the use of the clean hands 
doctrine has been sparse, and its application in the instances in which it has been 
invoked has been inconsistent. 
419. Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, which Suriname characterises as “the strongest 
affirmation of the clean hands doctrine”,482 has also been relied on in support of the 
                                                 
478  Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 53, p. 95 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Anzilotti). 
479 Diplomatic and Consular Staff, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 53 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Morozov) [emphasis in original]. 
480  Diplomatic and Consular Staff, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 54 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Morozov). 
481 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, 
p. 3, at para. 35 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert). 
482  Suriname Rejoinder, para. 2.102. 
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application of the clean hands doctrine.483  In his dissent, Judge Schwebel reasoned that 
Nicaragua “had deprived itself of the necessary locus standi” to bring its claims, as it 
was itself guilty of illegal conduct resulting in deaths and widespread destruction.484  In 
doing so, he relied heavily on Judge Hudson’s individual opinion in the Diversion of 
Water from the Meuse case,485 which states: 
It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two parties have 
assumed an identical or reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a 
continuing non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take 
advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by the other party.486 
[emphasis added] 
420. An important aspect of Judge Hudson’s expression of the doctrine is the continuing 
nature of the non-performance of an obligation.  In the Diversion of Water from the 
Meuse case, The Netherlands was seeking an order for Belgium to discontinue its 
violation of a treaty between the two countries while The Netherlands itself was 
engaging in “precisely similar action, similar in fact and similar in law” at the time its 
claim was brought before the PCIJ.487  The fact that a violation must be ongoing for the 
clean hands doctrine to apply is consistent with the doctrine’s origins in the laws of 
equity and its limited application to situations where equitable remedies, such as 
specific performance, are sought.  Indeed, Judge Hudson reminds us that it is a principle 
of international law that any breach leads to an obligation to make reparation, and that 
only special circumstances may call for the consideration of equitable principles.488  
Such circumstances arise, in his opinion, where a claimant is seeking not reparation for 
a past violation, but protection against a continuance of that violation in the future, in 
other words a “kind of specific performance of a reciprocal obligation which the 
                                                 
483  See e.g. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 
n. 82 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert). 
484  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 272 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel) 
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485  Nicaragua, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras. 269-270 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Schwebel). 
486  Diversion of Water from the Meuse, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 70, p. 22, at p. 77 (Individual Opinion by Judge 
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487  Diversion of Water from the Meuse, p. 78 (Individual Opinion by Judge Hudson). 
488  Ibid. 
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demandant itself is not performing”.489  Judge Hudson also stresses the limited 
applicability of the doctrine in more general terms: 
The general principle is one of which an international tribunal should make a very 
sparing application.  It is certainly not to be thought that a complete fulfillment of 
all its obligations under a treaty must be proved as a condition precedent to a 
State’s appearing before an international tribunal to seek an interpretation of that 
treaty.  Yet, in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard for the limitations which 
are necessary, a tribunal bound by international law ought not to shrink from 
applying a principle of such obvious fairness.490  [emphasis added] 
421. The Tribunal holds that Guyana’s conduct does not satisfy the requirements for the 
application of the doctrine of clean hands, to the extent that such a doctrine may exist in 
international law.  First, Guyana is seeking, with respect to its Third Submission, 
reparations for an alleged past violation by Suriname.  Guyana is therefore not seeking a 
remedy of the type to which the clean hands doctrine would apply, even if it were 
recognised as a rule of international law.  Secondly, the facts on which Suriname bases 
its assertion that Guyana has unclean hands do not amount to an ongoing violation of 
Guyana’s obligations under international law,491 as in the Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000, the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
case, and the Water from the Meuse case.  Guyana had not authorised any drilling 
activities subsequent to the CGX incident and was as a result not in violation of the 
Convention as alleged at the time it made its Third Submission to the Tribunal.  Finally, 
Guyana’s Third Submission claims that Suriname violated its obligation not to resort to 
the use or threat of force, while Suriname bases its clean hands argument on Guyana’s 
alleged violation of a different obligation relating to its authorisation of drilling 
activities in disputed waters.  Therefore, there is no question of Guyana itself violating a 
reciprocal obligation on which it then seeks to rely.   
422. The Tribunal’s ruling on this issue extends both to Suriname’s admissibility argument 
based on clean hands and to its argument that clean hands should be considered on the 
merits of Guyana’s Third Submission to bar recovery. 
                                                 
489  Ibid. 
490  Ibid., at p. 77. 
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5. The Admissibility of a State Responsibility Claim in a Maritime Delimitation 
Case 
423. The Tribunal does not accept Suriname’s argument that in a maritime delimitation case, 
an incident engaging State responsibility in a disputed area renders a claim for 
reparations for the violation of an obligation provided for by the Convention and 
international law inadmissible.  A claim relating to the threat or use of force arising 
from a dispute under the Convention does not, by virtue of Article 2(3) of the UN 
Charter, have to be “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of a State 
to constitute a compensable violation.  Moreover, the Convention makes no mention of 
the incompatibility of claims relating to the use of force in a disputed area and a claim 
for maritime delimitation of that area.  As the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
explained, if the law recognised such an incompatibility, it would significantly weaken 
the fundamental rule of international law prohibiting the use of force: 
border disputes between States are so frequent that any exception to the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force for territory that is allegedly occupied unlawfully 
would create a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of international 
law.492 
424. In Cameroon/Nigeria,493 a case in which the International Court of Justice was called on 
to delimit a boundary between the two parties, the Court entertained several claims 
engaging Nigeria and Cameroon’s State responsibility for the use of force within the 
disputed area.  The Court found however that for all but one of these claims, insufficient 
evidence had been adduced to prove them.494  With respect to the final claim by which 
Cameroon requested an end to Nigerian presence in a disputed area, the Court found 
that the injury suffered by Cameroon would be sufficiently addressed by Nigeria’s 
subsequent pull-out as a result of the delimitation decision, rendering it unnecessary to 
delve into the question of whether Nigeria’s State responsibility was engaged.495  Even 
so, the Court clearly considered questions of State responsibility relating to use of force, 
                                                 
492 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus ad Bellum: Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (19 Dec. 2005), 
45 I.L.M. p. 430 (2006), at para. 10, online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
493 Cameroon/Nigeria, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303. 
494 Ibid., at paras. 323-324.   
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and the admissibility of Cameroon or Nigeria’s claims was never put into question on 
the grounds submitted here by Suriname.496 
B. THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE 
425. Guyana’s claims, as formulated in its Third Submission, seek reparations for 
Suriname’s alleged violation of its obligations under the Convention, the UN Charter, 
and general international law because of its use of armed force against the territorial 
integrity of Guyana and against its nationals, agents and others lawfully present in 
maritime areas within the sovereign territory of Guyana or other maritime areas over 
which Guyana exercises lawful jurisdiction.  Guyana’s claims in this respect arise from 
the CGX incident. 
426. Guyana’s position on the question of the threat or use of force can be summarized as 
follows.  Guyana has claimed that Suriname has rejected Guyana’s repeated offers of 
immediate high level negotiations concerning offshore exploratory activities by 
Guyana’s licensee CGX.  Instead it resorted to the use of force on 3 June 2000 to expel 
Guyana’s licensee – the CGX exploratory rig and drill ship C.E. Thornton – and 
threatened similar action against other licensees, namely Esso E & P Guyana and 
Maxus.  According to Guyana, Suriname’s conduct has resulted in both material and 
non-material injury to Guyana, including the considerable loss of foreign investment 
and licensing fees.  This has blocked the development of Guyana’s offshore 
hydrocarbon resources, for which injuries Guyana is entitled to full reparation in 
accordance with international law.497 
427. For Guyana the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means is not subsumed under 
the prohibition of the use of force but “possesses a specific substance of its own”.498  
Guyana declared that “the Tribunal need not conclude that Suriname’s conduct 
                                                 
496 In the jurisdiction and admissibility phase, Nigeria had argued that the State responsibility claims were 
inadmissible, but only on the grounds that Cameroon did not adduce enough evidence to support them.  That 
challenge was rejected by the Court:  Cameroon/Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1998, p. 275. 
497  Guyana Memorial, Chapter 10. 
498  Transcript, pp. 573-574, citing Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, p. 587 
(2nd ed., 2002). 
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amounted to use of force in order to find that it has violated its obligation to settle this 
dispute by peaceful means”.499   
428. In this respect Guyana has called attention to the various international instruments 
which have imposed upon States the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means.  It 
cites Article 279 of the Convention as embodying the central purpose of Part XV of the 
Convention which reads as follows: 
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, 
paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a 
solution by the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter. 
429. Guyana invokes the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, citing in particular the provision which reads: 
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing 
international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving international 
disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of 
States.500  [emphasis added] 
430. For Guyana this reflects an authoritative interpretation of the United Nations Charter 
falling within the ambit of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
431. In its oral pleadings, Guyana found further support for its argument in the 1982 Manila 
declaration on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, Article VII of which 
stated that “neither the existence of a dispute nor the failure of a procedure of peaceful 
settlement of disputes shall permit the use of force or threat of force by any of the 
states’ parties to the dispute”.501 
432. With respect to the question of whether the CGX incident constituted a threat of force, 
the Tribunal considers it helpful to examine the statements of some of the main 
participants in that incident. 
                                                 
499  Transcript, pp. 575-576. 
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433. Mr Edward Netterville, the Rig Supervisor on the C.E. Thornton, described the incident 
in these terms in his witness statement: 
Shortly after midnight on 4 June 2000, while this coring process (drilling for core 
samples) was underway, gunboats from the Surinamese Navy arrived at our 
location.  The gunboats established radio contact with the C.E. Thornton and its 
service vessels, and ordered us to “leave the area in 12 hours,” warning that if we 
did not comply “the consequences will be yours.”  The Surinamese Navy repeated 
this order several times.  I understood this to mean that if the C.E. Thornton and its 
support vessels did not leave the area within twelve hours, the gunboats would be 
unconstrained to use armed force against the rig and its service vessels.502 
434. Mr. Netterville made the following observations on this incident: 
In my experience, Suriname’s threat to use force against the C.E. Thornton is 
unprecedented.  I have been employed for over forty years in the marine and oil 
industry during which time I have served aboard oil rigs throughout the world.  I 
have never experienced, nor heard of, any similar instance in which a rig has been 
evicted from its worksite by the threat of armed force.  Nor, in discussions with 
others in the industry after June 2000, has anyone told me of a similar incident.503 
435. Mr. Graham Barber, who served as Reading & Bates Area Manager for the project and 
had overall responsibility for its rig and shore-based operations, gave similar testimony.  
He stated that: 
After midnight on 3 June 2000, during the jacking-up process, two gunboats from 
the Surinamese Navy approached us and shined their search lights on the rig.  A 
Surinamese naval officer informed us by radio that we “were in Surinamese 
waters” and that we had 12 hours to leave the area or “face the consequences.”  He 
repeated this phrase, or variations of it, several times.  ... Faced with these threats 
from the Surinamese Navy, in the early morning hours of 4 June 2003, I convened 
a meeting with other persons in authority aboard the C.E. Thornton.  We decided 
that we had no alternative other than to evacuate the rig from the Eagle location.504 
436. Major J.P. Jones, Commander Staff Support of the LUMAR (the Suriname Air Force 
and Navy), recorded this exchange between himself and the drilling platform: 
This is the Suriname navy.  You are in Suriname waters without authority of the 
Suriname Government to conduct economic activities here.  I order you to stop 
immediately with these activities and leave the Suriname waters. 
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The answer to this from the platform was: “we are unaware of being in Suriname 
waters”.  I persisted saying that they were in Suriname waters and that they had to 
leave these waters within 12 hours.  And if they would not do so, the consequences 
would be theirs.  They then asked where they should move to.  I said that they 
should retreat to Guyanese waters.  He reacted by saying that they needed time to 
start up their departure.  I then allowed them 24 hours to leave the Suriname 
waters.  We then hung around for some time and after about one hour we left for 
New Nickerie.505 
437. Major Jones added: 
If the platform had not left our waters voluntarily, I would definitely not have used 
force.  I had no instructions to that effect and anyhow I did not have the suitable 
weapons to do so.  I even had no instructions to board the drilling platform and also 
I did not consider that.506 
438. The captains of the two Surinamese patrol boats, Mr. M. Galong and Mr. R.S. Bhola, 
both confirmed that the drilling platform was ordered to leave Suriname waters within 
12 hours and if this order was not complied with, the consequences would be theirs.  
With respect to what the consequences would be, both Captain Galong and Captain 
Bhola noted that they had no instructions with regard to the use of force.  Captain Bhola 
stated that: 
In the periods May 1989-1990 and 1997 up to now I have performed at least 30 
patrol missions off the coast of Suriname.  These patrol missions also involved the 
sea area between 10° and 30° North which is disputed between Suriname and 
Guyana.  The patrols had mainly to do with expelling fishermen without a licence 
from Suriname waters.  This has always been achieved by issuing summons.  In 
such cases the commander of the vessel is in command of the operation.  My 
instructions never imply that I may use force  And I have never used force.  All 
things considered the course of the removal of the drilling platform, as far as I am 
concerned, does not differ essentially from the course taken during other patrols.507 
439. The testimony of those involved in the incident clearly reveals that the rig was ordered 
to leave the area and if this demand was not fulfilled, responsibility for unspecified 
consequences would be theirs.  There was no unanimity as to what these 
“consequences” might have been.  The Tribunal is of the view that the order given by 
Major Jones to the rig constituted an explicit threat that force might be used if the order 
was not complied with.  The question now arises whether this threat of the use of force 
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breaches the terms of the Convention, the UN Charter and general international law.  
The ICJ has thrown some light on the circumstances, where a threat of force can be 
considered illegal.  It has declared that: 
Whether a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is not a 
“threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon various factors.  
If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would 
be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4.  Thus it would be illegal for a 
State to threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to follow 
or not follow certain political or economic paths.  The notions of “threat” and “use” 
of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand together in the sense that 
if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal – for whatever reason – the threat 
to use such force will likewise be illegal.  In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared 
readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with 
the Charter.508 
440. The Tribunal also takes into consideration the findings of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case 
where it had occasion to refer to the application of the “customary international law of 
the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter of the United Nations”509 to what the Court termed “less grave forms of the 
use of force”.510  The Court stated that: 
As regards certain particular aspects of the principle in question, it will be 
necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting 
an armed attack) from other less grave forms.  In determining the legal rule which 
applies to these latter forms, the Court can again draw on the formulations 
contained in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) ...).  As already 
observed, the adoption by States of this text affords an indication of their opinio 
juris as to customary international law on the question.  Alongside certain 
descriptions which may refer to aggression, this text includes others which refer 
only to less grave forms of the use of force.511 
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C. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
441. Suriname has maintained that the measures it undertook on 3 June 2000 were of the 
nature of reasonable and proportionate law enforcement measures to preclude 
unauthorized drilling in a disputed area of the continental shelf.  It asserted that it was 
quite normal for coastal States to undertake law enforcement activities in disputed areas 
(usually in relation to fisheries) and also to do so against vessels under foreign flags 
including the flag of the other party to the dispute, unless specific arrangements exist.  
Suriname’s practice in respect of fisheries enforcement in the disputed area is evidence 
of this.  Suriname noted that it has drawn the Tribunal’s attention to Article 2, 
paragraph 6, of its mining decree which provides that “he who undertakes mining 
activities without a licence can be punished by imprisonment for a maximum of two 
years, and/or fine of a maximum of 100,000 Suriname guilders.”512  The fact that the 
Attorney General was consulted before the 3 June 2000 action indicated that that action 
was a law enforcement measure. 
442. Suriname has made much use of the case law of international courts and tribunals to 
support its claim.  It has significantly relied on the judgment of the ICJ in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada).513  Suriname, in its Rejoinder, recalled that: 
Spain contends that an exercise of jurisdiction by Canada over a Spanish vessel on 
the high seas entailing the use of force falls outside of Canada’s reservation to the 
Court’s jurisdiction.  Spain advances several related arguments in support of this 
thesis.  First, Spain says that the use of force by one State against a fishing vessel 
of another State on the high seas is necessarily contrary to international law; and as 
Canada’s reservation must be interpreted consistently with legality, it may not be 
interpreted to subsume such use of force within the phrase “the enforcement of 
such measures”.  Spain further asserts that the particular use of force directed 
against the Estai was in any event unlawful and amounted to a violation of Article 
2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, giving rise to a separate cause of action not caught 
by the reservation. 
In rejecting Spain’s argument, the Court stated that the “Court finds that the use of 
force authorized by the Canadian legislation and regulation falls within the ambit 
of what is commonly understood as enforcement of conservation and management 
measures and thus falls under the provisions of paragraph 2(d) of Canada’s 
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declaration.  This is so notwithstanding that the reservation does not in terms 
mention the use of force.  Boarding, inspection, arrest and minimum use of force 
for those purposes are all contained within the concept of enforcement of 
conservation and management measures according to a ‘natural and reasonable’ 
interpretation of the concept.” 
The Court’s reasoning squarely supports Suriname’s position that a coastal state’s 
instruction to an oil rig that it not conduct drilling on the continental shelf claimed 
by the coastal state, and that the oil rig depart the area, is an exercise of the law 
enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal state, not a violation of the prohibition on 
the international use of force.514 
443. Suriname also relied on the judgment of ITLOS in the Saiga case to show that stopping 
and communicating with a vessel did not in themselves constitute “a use of force or 
threat to use force”.  It cited the Tribunal’s views on the use of force in law enforcement 
activities:515 
The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to give an auditory or visual 
signal to stop, using internationally recognized signals.  Where this does not 
succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, including the firing of shots across the 
bows of the ship.  It is only after the appropriate actions fail that the pursuing 
vessel may, as a last resort, use force.  Even then, appropriate warning must be 
issued to the ship and all efforts should be made to ensure that life is not 
endangered.516 
444. Guyana for its part considered the Fisheries Jurisdiction case as wholly irrelevant as a 
precedent to the present case.  Guyana contended, inter alia, that that case concerned 
enforcement measures against fishing vessels on the high seas and not the use of force 
directly arising from a maritime dispute between two sovereign States.  In addition the 
case solely concerned the interpretation of Canada’s reservation to the Court’s 
jurisdiction with respect to disputes arising out of or concerning management measures 
taken by Canada and the enforcement of such measures.  Guyana affirmed that it was 
very clear that this precedent is irrelevant because the Court was not purporting to 
define the meaning of the term armed force, but was simply attempting to define the 
scope of Canada’s reservation to the Court’s jurisdiction.517 
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445. The Tribunal accepts the argument that in international law force may be used in law 
enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and 
necessary.518  However in the circumstances of the present case, this Tribunal is of the 
view that the action mounted by Suriname on 3 June 2000 seemed more akin to a threat 
of military action rather than a mere law enforcement activity.  This Tribunal has based 
this finding primarily on the testimony of witnesses to the incident, in particular the 
testimony of Messrs Netterville and Barber.  Suriname’s action therefore constituted a 
threat of the use of force in contravention of the Convention, the UN Charter and 
general international law. 
446. Suriname also argued that “should the Tribunal regard [its 3 June 2000] measures as 
contrary to international obligations owed by Suriname to Guyana, the measures were 
nevertheless lawful countermeasures since they were taken in response to an 
internationally wrongful act by Guyana in order to achieve cessation of that act”.519  It is 
a well established principle of international law that countermeasures may not involve 
the use of force.  This is reflected in the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility at 
Article 50(1)(a), which states that countermeasures shall not affect “the obligation to 
refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations”.  As the Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles mentions,520 this principle is 
consistent with the jurisprudence emanating from international judicial bodies.521  It is 
also contained in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations,522 the adoption of which, according to the ICJ, is an indication of 
State’s opinio juris as to customary international law on the question.523  Peaceful 
means of addressing Guyana’s alleged breach of international law with respect to 
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exploratory drilling were available to Suriname under the Convention.  A State faced 
with a such a dispute should resort to the compulsory procedures provided for in 
Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, which provide among other things that, where 
the urgency of the situation so requires, a State may request that ITLOS prescribe 
provisional measures.524  As it involved the threat of force, Suriname’s action against 
the C.E. Thornton cannot have been a lawful countermeasure.  
447. Having reached this conclusion the Tribunal must now deal with the question of 
whether Suriname’s action has raised an issue of State responsibility. 
D. STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
448. In addressing Suriname’s State responsibility and Guyana’s request that this Tribunal 
grant compensation and an order precluding Suriname from resorting to further threats 
of force against Guyana or its licensees, the Tribunal considers it useful to look at the 
Nigeria/Cameroon case.  In that case, the Court entertained several claims engaging 
Nigeria and Cameroon’s State responsibility for the use of force within the disputed 
area.  Although the claims were deemed to be admissible, in the same way this Tribunal 
has found Guyana’s Third Submission to be admissible, the Court did not assess 
Nigeria’s State responsibility.  In its Rejoinder, Suriname argued the relevance of the 
Cameroon/Nigeria judgment: 
In the Cameroon v. Nigeria case before the International Court of Justice, 
Cameroon alleged that Nigeria used force, in violation of UN Charter Article 2(4) 
and customary international law, by militarily occupying parcels of Cameroonian 
territory in the area of Lake Chad and the Peninsula of Bakassi.  Even though the 
Court ultimately awarded to Cameroon certain areas along the border that were 
occupied by Nigerian military forces, the Court decided that its delimitation 
judgment (along with the anticipated evacuation of the Cameroonian territory by 
Nigeria) sufficiently addressed the injury allegedly suffered by Cameroon.  
Consequently, the Court did not further determine whether and to what extent 
Nigeria’s responsibility to Cameroon had been engaged as a result of the 
occupation.  On similar reasoning, even if the Tribunal in this case concludes that 
the incident occurred in waters that are now determined to be under Guyana’s 
jurisdiction, the Tribunal should decline to pass upon Guyana’s claim for alleged 
unlawful activities by Suriname.525 
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449. Guyana for its part contended that Suriname has disregarded the rule set forth in Article 
1 of the ILC Draft Articles that every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
responsibility of that State.  It was, in Guyana’s view, very clear that Article 279 of the 
Convention imposed an obligation on States parties that is independent of the laws 
applicable to maritime boundary delimitation and the obligations under the Convention.  
“To argue otherwise”, it said “would mean that a boundary dispute, ipso facto, justifies 
recourse to armed force”.  It maintained that Suriname’s reliance on the 
Cameroon/Nigeria case was misplaced.  In that case, it held, the Court did not 
enumerate a general principle that State responsibility is irrelevant to boundary disputes 
but limited itself solely to the relief sought by Cameroon. 
450. The Tribunal agrees with Guyana’s characterisation of the ICJ’s judgment in 
Cameroon/Nigeria, but considers that, as was the case in Cameroon/Nigeria, Guyana’s 
request for an order precluding Suriname from resorting to further threats of force is 
sufficiently addressed by this Tribunal’s delimitation decision.  The findings in the 
Cameroon/Nigeria case may be recalled: 
In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers moreover that, by the very 
fact of the present Judgment and of the evacuation of the Cameroonian territory 
occupied by Nigeria, the injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the occupation 
of its territory will in all events have been sufficiently addressed.  The Court will 
not therefore seek to ascertain whether and to what extent Nigeria’s responsibility 
to Cameroon has been engaged as a result of that occupation.526 
451. In a like manner this Tribunal will not seek to ascertain whether and to what extent 
Suriname’s responsibility to Guyana has been engaged as a result of the CGX incident 
of 3 June 2000.  This dictum of the ICJ is all the more relevant in that as a result of this 
Award, Guyana now has undisputed title to the area where the incident occurred – the 
injury done to Guyana has thus been “sufficiently addressed”. 
452. This Tribunal will now deal with Guyana’s claim for compensation.  It is to be noted 
that the Cameroon/Nigeria judgment held that a declaratory judgment sufficed to satisfy 
the claim for compensation advanced by Cameroon.  The circumstances of the claims in 
that case, however, are not entirely congruent with the claim made by Guyana with 
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respect to the CGX incident.  The Tribunal is of the view that the damages, in these 
proceedings, have not been proved to the satisfaction of this Tribunal and the claim for 
compensation, accordingly, is rejected on that ground. 
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CHAPTER VIII - GUYANA’S FOURTH SUBMISSION AND SURINAME’S 
SUBMISSIONS 2.C AND 2.D 
453. Guyana and Suriname have both made claims regarding breaches of Articles 74(3) and 
83(3) of the Convention.  Each Party alleges that the other breached its obligation to 
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements.  Guyana also claims that 
Suriname hampered or jeopardised the reaching of a final agreement by its conduct 
relating to the CGX incident.  Suriname makes the same claim in respect of Guyana 
authorising its concession holder CGX to undertake exploratory drilling in the disputed 
area. 
454. Guyana’s Fourth Submission is set out as follows:  
Suriname is internationally responsible for violating its obligations under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature pending agreement on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in Guyana and 
Suriname, and by jeopardising or hampering the reaching of the final agreement; 
and that Suriname is under an obligation to provide reparation, in a form and in an 
amount to be determined, for the injury caused by its internationally wrongful 
acts.527 
455. The Tribunal notes that Guyana withdrew its claim for reparation in respect of its 
Fourth Submission during the hearings. 
456. Suriname’s Submissions 2.C. and 2.D. are set out as follows: 
2.C.  To find and declare that Guyana breached its legal obligations to Suriname 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, by 
authorizing its concession holder to drill an exploratory well in a known disputed 
maritime area thereby jeopardizing and hampering the reaching of a maritime 
boundary agreement. 
2.D.  To find and declare that Guyana breached its legal obligations to Suriname 
under Article 74(3) and 83(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, by not 
making every effort to enter into a provisional arrangement of a practical nature.528 
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A. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY 
457. Suriname challenges the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over Guyana’s Fourth Submission as 
well as its admissibility.  It argues, as it did for Guyana’s Third Submission, that 
Article 283(1) constitutes a bar to jurisdiction.  For the same reasons that the Tribunal 
rejected the notion that Article 283(1) could bar its jurisdiction to hear Guyana’s Third 
Submission, the Tribunal rules that it cannot bar its jurisdiction to hear Guyana’s Fourth 
Submission.  Suriname also contends that the claim is inadmissible as Guyana lacks 
clean hands.529  The Tribunal rejects this argument for the same reasons the Tribunal 
rejected it in relation to Guyana’s Third Submission. 
458. Furthermore, Suriname claims that only conduct of the Parties after 8 August 1998, 
being the date of entry into force of the Convention between Guyana and Suriname,530 
is relevant to Guyana’s Fourth Submission.531  In this respect, the Tribunal recalls that 
an act of a State can constitute a breach of an international obligation only if the State is 
bound by that obligation at the time of the act.  However, although acts prior to 8 
August 1998 cannot form the basis of a finding by the Tribunal that Suriname violated 
an obligation under the Convention, such acts are relevant to the Tribunal’s 
consideration of Suriname’s subsequent conduct to the extent that they provide the 
background for that conduct and inform the Tribunal’s interpretation of it. 
B. THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLES 74(3) AND 83(3) 
459. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention impose two obligations upon States Parties 
in the context of a boundary dispute concerning the continental shelf and exclusive 
economic zone respectively.  The two obligations simultaneously attempt to promote 
and limit activities in a disputed maritime area.  The first obligation is that, pending a 
final delimitation, States Parties are required to make “every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature.”  The second is that the States Parties 
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must, during that period, make “every effort ... not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching 
of the final agreement.” 
1. Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature 
460. The first obligation contained in Articles 74(3) and 83(3) is designed to promote interim 
regimes and practical measures that could pave the way for provisional utilization of 
disputed areas pending delimitation.532  In the view of the Tribunal, this obligation 
constitutes an implicit acknowledgment of the importance of avoiding the suspension of 
economic development in a disputed maritime area, as long as such activities do not 
affect the reaching of a final agreement.  Such arrangements promote the realisation of 
one of the objectives of the Convention, the equitable and efficient utilisation of the 
resources of the seas and oceans.533   
461. Although the language “every effort” leaves “some room for interpretation by the States 
concerned, or by any dispute settlement body”,534  it is the opinion of the Tribunal that 
the language in which the obligation is framed imposes on the Parties a duty to 
negotiate in good faith.  Indeed, the inclusion of the phrase “in a spirit of understanding 
and cooperation” indicates the drafters’ intent to require of the parties a conciliatory 
approach to negotiations, pursuant to which they would be prepared to make 
concessions in the pursuit of a provisional arrangement.  Such an approach is 
particularly to be expected of the parties in view of the fact that any provisional 
arrangements arrived at are by definition temporary and will be without prejudice to the 
final delimitation.535 
462. There have been a number of examples of arrangements for the joint exploration and 
exploitation of maritime resources, often referred to as joint development agreements.  
Joint development has been defined as “the cooperation between States with regard to 
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exploration for and exploitation of certain deposits, fields or accumulations of non-
living resources which either extend across a boundary or lie in an area of overlapping 
claims”.536   
463. Joint exploitation of resources that straddle maritime boundaries has been particularly 
encouraged by international courts and tribunals.  In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the 
arbitral tribunal, although no mineral resources had yet been discovered in the disputed 
waters, wrote that the parties “should give every consideration to the shared or joint or 
unitised exploitation of any such resources.”537  The ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, in addressing the question of the unity of deposits as it relates to 
delimitation, noted that State practice in dealing with deposits straddling a boundary 
line has been to enter into undertakings with a view to ensuring the most efficient 
exploitation or apportionment of the products extracted.538  Furthermore, the Court 
stated that agreements for joint exploitation were particularly appropriate where areas of 
overlapping claims result from the method of delimitation chosen and there is a question 
of preserving the unity of deposits.539 
464. Provisional arrangements of a practical nature have been recognised as important tools 
in achieving the objectives of the Convention, and it is for this reason that the 
Convention imposes an obligation on parties to a dispute to “make every effort” to 
reach such arrangements. 
2. Hampering or Jeopardising the Final Agreement 
465. The second obligation imposed by Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention, the duty 
to make every effort ... not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final agreement”, 
is an important aspect of the Convention’s objective of strengthening peace and friendly 
relations between nations and of settling disputes peacefully.  However, it is important 
                                                 
536 Rainer Lagoni, Report on Joint Development of Non-living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, I.L.A. 
Report of the Sixty-Third Conference, p. 509, at pp. 511-512 (1988), quoted in Mensah, Joint Development 
Zones as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Approach in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in Rainer Lagoni 
and Daniel Vignes, Maritime Delimitation, p. 143, at p. 146 (Nijhoff, 2006). 
537 Eritrea/Yemen II, 119 I.L.R. p. 417 (1999), The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration Awards of 1998 & 1999 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration Award Series 2005), online: <http://www.pca-cpa.org>. 
538 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3 at para. 97. 
539 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3 at para. 99. 
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to note that this obligation was not intended to preclude all activities in a disputed 
maritime area.  The Virginia Commentary for example states that the obligation “does 
not exclude the conduct of some activities by the States concerned within the disputed 
area, so long as those activities would not have the effect of prejudicing the final 
agreement.”540 
466. In the context of activities surrounding hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, two 
classes of activities in disputed waters are therefore permissible.  The first comprises 
activities undertaken by the parties pursuant to provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature.  The second class is composed of acts which, although unilateral, would not 
have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a final agreement on the 
delimitation of the maritime boundary. 
467. The Tribunal is of the view that unilateral acts which do not cause a physical change to 
the marine environment would generally fall into the second class.  However, acts that 
do cause physical change would have to be undertaken pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties to be permissible, as they may hamper or jeopardise the reaching of 
a final agreement on delimitation.  A distinction is therefore to be made between 
activities of the kind that lead to a permanent physical change, such as exploitation of 
oil and gas reserves, and those that do not, such as seismic exploration. 
468. The distinction adopted by this Tribunal is consistent with the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals on interim measures.  The ICJ’s decision in the 
Aegean Sea case between Greece and Turkey distinguishes between activities of a 
transitory character and activities that risk irreparable prejudice to the position of the 
other party.  Greece had requested that Turkey be ordered to refrain from all exploratory 
activity or scientific research without its consent pending a final judgment.  In 
particular, Greece requested that Turkey be ordered to cease its seismic exploration in 
disputed waters, an activity involving the detonation of small explosions aimed at 
sending sound waves through the seabed.  The Court declined to indicate interim 
measures, citing three factors: (1) the fact that seismic exploration does not involve any 
risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil, (2) that the activities are of a transitory 
                                                 
540 Virginia Commentary, Vol. II, p. 815. 
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character and do not involve the establishment of installations, and (3) that no 
operations involving the actual appropriation or other use of the natural resources were 
embarked upon.541  In the circumstances, the Court found that Turkey’s conduct did not 
pose the risk of irreparable prejudice to Greece’s rights in issue in the proceedings.542   
469. It should be noted that the regime of interim measures is far more circumscribed than 
that surrounding activities in disputed waters generally.  As the Court in the Aegean Sea 
case noted, the power to indicate interim measures is an exceptional one,543 and it 
applies only to activities that can cause irreparable prejudice.  The cases dealing with 
such measures are nevertheless informative as to the type of activities that should be 
permissible in disputed waters in the absence of a provisional arrangement.  Activities 
that would meet the standard required for the indication of interim measures, in other 
words, activities that would justify the use of an exceptional power due to their potential 
to cause irreparable prejudice, would easily meet the lower threshold of hampering or 
jeopardising the reaching of a final agreement.  The criteria used by international courts 
and tribunals in assessing a request for interim measures, notably the risk of physical 
damage to the seabed or subsoil, therefore appropriately guide this Tribunal’s analysis 
of an alleged violation of a party’s obligations under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 
Convention. 
470. It should not be permissible for a party to a dispute to undertake any unilateral activity 
that might affect the other party’s rights in a permanent manner.  However, international 
courts and tribunals should also be careful not to stifle the parties’ ability to pursue 
economic development in a disputed area during a boundary dispute, as the resolution 
of such disputes will typically be a time-consuming process.  This Tribunal’s 
interpretation of the obligation to make every effort not to hamper or jeopardise the 
reaching of a final agreement must reflect this delicate balance.  It is the Tribunal’s 
opinion that drawing a distinction between activities having a permanent physical 
impact on the marine environment and those that do not, accomplishes this and is 
consistent with other aspects of the law of the sea and international law. 
                                                 
541 Aegean Sea, Interim Protection, Order, I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 3, at para. 30. 
542 Ibid. at para. 31. 
543 Ibid. 
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C. THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS ON THE DUTY TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENTER INTO 
PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF A PRACTICAL NATURE 
471. Suriname claims that Guyana violated its duty to make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements as it persistently demanded that Suriname permit CGX to 
resume exploratory drilling and that Suriname accept Guyana’s concessions in the 
disputed area.544  Guyana, on its side, claims that Suriname, both before and after the 
CGX incident, failed to make serious efforts to negotiate provisional arrangements.545 
472. The efforts by Guyana and Suriname to arrive at provisional arrangements appear to 
have started in 1989.  The Joint Communiqué of 25 August 1989 between the President 
of Guyana and the President of Suriname recorded that the two Presidents expressed 
concern over the potential for disputes “with respect to petroleum development within 
the area of the North Eastern and North Western Seaward boundaries of Guyana and 
Suriname respectively”.546  They agreed that pending settlement of the boundary 
question, representatives of the Agencies responsible for petroleum development within 
the two countries should agree on modalities which would ensure that the opportunities 
available within the disputed area could be jointly utilised.  Moreover, the Presidents 
agreed that concessions already granted in the disputed area would not be disturbed.547 
473. The 1989 agreement led to the 1991 “Memorandum of Understanding – Modalities for 
Treatment of the Offshore Area of Overlap between Guyana and Suriname” (the 
“MOU”).  The Staatsolie representatives negotiating the MOU however claimed that 
they lacked the authority to negotiate an agreement on the actual utilisation of resources 
in the disputed area.  The MOU was therefore limited in scope: it applied only to one 
Guyanese oil concession, the 1988 concession to Lasmo/BHP, and provided that further 
discussions would have to occur if the concession holder made any discoveries.548  The 
MOU provided further that representatives of both governments would meet within 
                                                 
544 Suriname Rejoinder, paras. 5.12-5.14. 
545 Guyana Reply, paras. 9.1-9.14. 
546 Joint Communiqué Signed at the Conclusion of the State Visit to Suriname by Hugh Desmond Hoyte, 
President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and Ramsewak Shankar, President of the Republic of 
Suriname (25 December 1989): Guyana Memorial, Annex 72. 
547 Guyana Memorial, para. 4.32. 
548 Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 6.26-6.28. 
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thirty days to conclude discussions on modalities for joint utilisation of the disputed 
area awaiting a final boundary agreement.  Suriname, however, never sent a delegation 
or representative to conclude discussions, as contemplated by the MOU.549  In 1994, 
Guyana submitted a new draft of proposed “Modalities for Treatment of the Offshore 
Area of Overlap between Guyana and Suriname”; however Suriname failed to respond 
to it.550  Over the following years, Suriname did not engage in further discussions on the 
topic despite certain efforts by Guyana.  There are also indications that the already 
limited MOU was disavowed by Suriname during that time.551 
474. For the Tribunal, the evidence demonstrates that Suriname did not make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements before 8 August 1998.  Although this alone cannot 
form the basis of a finding that Suriname violated the Convention, Suriname’s 
subsequent conduct, which was consistent with its pre-1998 conduct, did constitute a 
failure to meet its obligations under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) and constituted a violation 
of the Convention. 
475. Indeed, in the build-up to the CGX incident of 3 June 2000, Suriname did not fulfil its 
obligation to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements relating to the 
exploratory activities of Guyana’s concession holder CGX.  While it was conducting 
seismic testing in the disputed area in 1999, CGX announced publicly that it had 
received approval from Guyana for its drilling programme,552 and later the company 
announced a drilling schedule.553  Less than three weeks after the latter announcement, 
which occurred on 10 April 2000, “the drilling plans had become known in Suriname 
via the ‘grapevine’.”554  Suriname’s first reaction came in the form of a diplomatic note 
dated 10 May 2000, in which it cautioned Guyana against its proposed course of 
conduct.555  Following Guyana’s response on 17 May 2000, asserting that all activities 
                                                 
549 Suriname Preliminary Objections, para. 6.28. 
550 Guyana Memorial, paras. 4.36-4.37. 
551 Cable 94 Georgetown 2405 from the United States Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana to the United States 
Secretary of State (21 July 1994), Guyana Reply, Annex R11: “Mungra responded that the MOU had no 
validity because it had never been approved by the Surinamese Parliament.” 
552 CGX Press Releases, 29 September 1999, reproduced in Guyana Memorial, Annex 158. 
553 Guyana Memorial, Annex 158. 
554 Suriname Preliminary Objections, paras. 6.34-6.35. 
555 Guyana Memorial, Annex 48. 
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were taking place within Guyanese territory,556 Suriname again issued a note verbale 
objecting to the planned drilling, insisting on termination of all activities in the disputed 
waters, and informing Guyana of its intention to “protect its territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty”.557  On 2 June 2000, hours before the CGX incident occurred, 
Guyana invited Suriname to “send a high level delegation to Georgetown within 
twenty-four (24) hours to commence dialogue” on matters relating to the maritime 
boundary.558 
476. At all times Suriname was under an obligation to make every effort to reach a 
provisional arrangement.  However, this obligation became particularly pressing and 
relevant when Suriname became aware of Guyana’s concession holder’s planned 
exploratory drilling in disputed waters.  Instead of attempting to engage Guyana in a 
spirit of understanding and cooperation as required by the Convention, Suriname opted 
for a harder stance.  Even though Guyana attempted to engage it in a dialogue which 
may have led to a satisfactory solution for both Parties, Suriname resorted to self-help in 
threatening the CGX rig, in violation of the Convention.  In order to satisfy its 
obligation to make every effort to reach provisional arrangements, Suriname would 
have actively had to attempt to bring Guyana to the negotiating table, or, at a minimum, 
have accepted Guyana’s last minute 2 June 2000 invitation and negotiated in good faith.  
It notably could have insisted on the immediate cessation of CGX’s exploratory drilling 
as a condition to participating in further talks.  However, as Suriname did not opt for 
either of these courses of action, it failed, in the build-up to the CGX incident, in its 
duties under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention. 
477. The Tribunal rules that Guyana also violated its obligation to make every effort to enter 
into provisional arrangements by its conduct leading up to the CGX incident.  Guyana 
had been preparing exploratory drilling for some time before the incident,559 and should 
have, in a spirit of cooperation, informed Suriname directly of its plans.  Indeed, 
notification in the press by way of CGX’s public announcements was not sufficient for 
                                                 
556 Guyana Memorial, Annex 77. 
557 Guyana Memorial, Annex 78. 
558 Guyana Memorial, Annex 79. 
559 Guyana appears to have authorised CGX to drill in the disputed area on 10 August 1999, almost  a full year 
before the CGX incident: Press Releases, Guyana Memorial, Annex 158. 
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Guyana to meet its obligation under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention.  
Guyana should have sought to engage Suriname in discussions concerning the drilling 
at a much earlier stage.  Its 2 June 2000 invitation to Suriname to discuss the modalities 
of any drilling operations, although an attempt to defuse a tense situation, was also not 
sufficient in itself to discharge Guyana’s obligation under the Convention.  Steps 
Guyana could have taken consistent with efforts to enter into provisional arrangements 
include (1) giving Suriname official and detailed notice of the planned activities, (2) 
seeking cooperation of Suriname in undertaking the activities, (3) offering to share the 
results of the exploration and giving Suriname an opportunity to observe the activities, 
and (4) offering to share all the financial benefits received from the exploratory 
activities. 
478. Following the CGX incident in June of 2000, numerous meetings and communications 
between the Parties took place in which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, they both 
engaged in good faith negotiations relating to provisional arrangements.  Already on 
6 June 2000 the Parties expressed their determination to “put in place arrangements to 
end the current dispute over the oil exploration concessions”.560  Further discussions 
then took place, including on 13 June 2000 at a meeting of the Joint Technical 
Committee,561 as well as on 17-18 June 2000562 and 28-30 January 2002.563  A meeting 
of the Subcommittee of the Guyana-Suriname Border Commission was held on 31 May 
2002, at which modalities for negotiating a provisional arrangement were discussed.564  
Subsequently, two joint meetings of the Suriname and Guyana Border Commissions 
were held (on 25-26 October 2002 and 10 March 2003).565  Although they were 
ultimately unsuccessful in reaching a provisional arrangement, both Parties 
demonstrated a willingness to negotiate in good faith in relatively extensive meetings 
                                                 
560 Guyana Memorial, Annex 81. 
561 Guyana Memorial, Annex 82. 
562 Guyana Memorial, Annex 83. 
563 Suriname Counter-Memorial, Annex 8, p. 6. 
564 Guyana Memorial, Annex 85. 
565 Guyana Memorial, Annexes 87-88. 
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and communications.566  As a result, the Tribunal is satisfied that both Parties respected 
their obligation relating to provisional arrangements after the CGX incident. 
D. THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS ON THE DUTY NOT TO HAMPER OR JEOPARDISE THE 
REACHING OF A FINAL AGREEMENT 
1. Suriname’s Submission 2.C 
479. Suriname claims that Guyana violated its obligation to make every effort not to hamper 
or jeopardise the reaching of a final agreement by allowing its concession holder to 
undertake exploratory drilling in the disputed waters.567  With respect to this claim, the 
Tribunal finds that there is a substantive legal difference between certain oil exploration 
activities, notably seismic testing, and exploratory drilling. 
480. The question that the Tribunal has to address here is whether a party engaging in 
unilateral exploratory drilling in a disputed area falls short of its obligation to make 
every effort, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, not to jeopardise or hamper 
the reaching of the final agreement on delimitation.  As set out above, unilateral acts 
that cause a physical change to the marine environment will generally be comprised in a 
class of activities that can be undertaken only jointly or by agreement between the 
parties.  This is due to the fact that these activities may jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of a final delimitation agreement as a result of the perceived change to the 
status quo that they would engender.  Indeed, such activities could be perceived to, or 
may genuinely, prejudice the position of the other party in the delimitation dispute, 
thereby both hampering and jeopardising the reaching of a final agreement.   
481. That however is not to say that all exploratory activity should be frozen in a disputed 
area in the absence of a provisional arrangement.  Some exploratory drilling might 
cause permanent damage to the marine environment.  Seismic activity on the other hand 
should be permissible in a disputed area.  In the present case, both Parties authorised 
concession holders to undertake seismic testing in disputed waters, and these activities 
                                                 
566 See Suriname Daily Judge’s Folder, Vol. II, Tab H5 for a list of diplomatic post-August 1998 exchanges 
between Suriname and Guyana concerning a provisional arrangement or final delimitation of the maritime 
boundary. 
567 Suriname Rejoinder, Chapter 6, Submission 2.C. 
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did not give rise to objections from either side.  In the circumstances at hand, the 
Tribunal does not consider that unilateral seismic testing is inconsistent with a party’s 
obligation to make every effort not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final 
agreement. 
482. To the extent that Suriname believed that Guyana’s authorisation of its concession 
holder to undertake exploratory drilling in disputed waters constituted a violation of its 
obligation to make every effort not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final 
agreement on delimitation, and if bilateral negotiations failed to resolve the issue, a 
remedy is set out in the options for peaceful settlement envisaged by Part XV and 
Annex VII of the Convention.  The obligation to have recourse to these options is 
binding on both Guyana and Suriname. 
2. Guyana’s Fourth Submission 
483. Guyana claims Suriname violated its obligations under Article 74(3) and 83(3) to make 
every effort not to hamper or jeopardise the reaching of a final agreement by its use of a 
threat of force to respond to Guyana’s exploratory drilling.568   
484. Suriname had a number of peaceful options to address Guyana’s authorisation of 
exploratory drilling.  The first, in keeping with its other obligation under Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3), was to enter into discussions with Guyana regarding provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature to establish the modalities of oil exploration and 
potentially of exploitation.  In the event of failure of the negotiations, Suriname could 
have invoked compulsory dispute resolution under Part XV, Section 2 of the 
Convention.  That course of action would also then have given Suriname the possibility 
to request provisional measures “to preserve [its] rights ... or to prevent serious harm to 
the marine environment, pending the final decision.”569  The Tribunal finds that 
Surname’s threat of force in a disputed area, while also threatening international peace 
and security, jeopardised the reaching of a final delimitation agreement.   
                                                 
568 Guyana Reply, para. 8.1. 
569 The Convention, Article 290. 
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E. DECLARATORY RELIEF 
485. Both Parties have requested the Tribunal to declare that violations of the Convention 
have taken place.  The Tribunal notes that in certain circumstances, “reparation in the 
form of satisfaction may be provided by a judicial declaration that there has been a 
violation of a right” or an obligation.570 
486. The Tribunal therefore declares that both Guyana and Suriname violated their 
obligations under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention to make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature.  Furthermore, both Guyana 
and Suriname violated their obligations, also under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 
Convention, to make every effort not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final 
delimitation agreement. 
                                                 





CHAPTER IX - DISPOSITIF 
487. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 280, 406, 410, and 457 of this Award, the Tribunal 
holds that: 
(i) it has jurisdiction to delimit, by the drawing of a single maritime boundary, the 
territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone appertaining to each 
of the Parties in the waters where their claims to these maritime zones overlap; 
(ii) it has jurisdiction to consider and rule on Guyana’s allegation that Suriname has 
engaged in the unlawful use or threat of force contrary to the Convention, the UN 
Charter, and general international law; and 
(iii) it has jurisdiction to consider and rule on the Parties’ respective claims under 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention relating to the obligation to make 
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and the 
obligation not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final agreement. 
488. Accordingly, taking into account the foregoing considerations and reasons, 
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY FINDS THAT 
1.  The International Maritime Boundary between Guyana and Suriname is a series of 
geodetic lines joining the points in the order listed as set forth in paragraphs 328 
and 400 of this Award and shown for illustrative purposes only in Map 4 on the 
preceding page; 
2.  The expulsion from the disputed area of the CGX oil rig and drill ship C.E. 
Thornton by Suriname on 3 June 2000 constituted a threat of the use of force in 
breach of the Convention, the UN Charter, and general international law;  
however, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 450 and 452 of this Award, 
Guyana’s request for an order precluding Suriname from making further threats of 
force and Guyana’s claim for compensation are rejected;  
166 
3.  Both Guyana and Suriname violated their obligations under Articles 74(3) and 
83(3) of the Convention to make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and to make every effort not to jeopardise or 
hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement; and 
4.   The claims of the Parties inconsistent with this Award are rejected. 
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Technical Report of the Tribunal’s Hydrographer 
 
David H. Gray 
M.A.Sc., P.Eng., C.L.S. 
 
1. The full description of the line of delimitation, together with the necessary 
geographical coordinates, is given in the Award.  All computations have been made on 
the Geodetic Reference System (1980) ellipsoid and all geographical coordinates are 
referenced to the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84).  The International Nautical 
Mile of 1852 metres has been used. 
 
2. In compliance with the Tribunal’s Procedural Orders No. 7 and 8, I obtained Global 
Positioning System (GPS) data at Marker “B” of the 1936 Mixed Commission 
Boundary Survey over a period of 4 ½ hours.  These data resulted in a World Geodetic 
System 1984 (WGS-84 ITRF051) position of: 
Latitude = 5° 59′ 46.2059″N  (± 0.077 metres) 
Longitude = 57° 08′ 50.4824″W (± 0.101 metres) 
Ellipsoid Height  = -24.022 metres (± 0.180 metres) 
    
Given the indicated accuracy of the results, it would be appropriate to round off the 
results to: 
Latitude = 5° 59′ 46.21″N 
Longitude = 57° 08′ 50.48″W 
   
 These values were computed using the Geodetic Survey of Canada’s on-line Precise 
Point Positioning software and are based on the GPS satellite orbital parameters as 
derived from actual observations taken at tracking stations world-wide.  The final 
values for the orbital parameters became available 21 days after the day on which the 
observations were taken. 
 
The GPS survey data, in the form of RINEX files, have been provided to the Registry 
for permanent storage. 
 
3. The location of Point 1 of the Award is the intersection of Low Water Line (LWL) 
along the west bank of the Corentyne River and a geodetic line through Marker “B” 
which has an initial azimuth of N10°E.  Since this point moves with any movement of 
the Low Water Line, no geographical coordinates can be provided. 
 
4. The geographic coordinates of base points along the Low Water Line of the coast of 
Suriname are: 
 
Source and Number Renumber Latitude Longitude 
Annex CM69 S-1 S1 6° 01′ 34.0″ 57° 08′ 22.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-2 S2 6° 01′ 19.0″ 56° 59′ 02.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-3 S3 6° 01′ 40.0″ 56° 57′ 24.0″ 
                                                 
1  Specifically, the International Terrestrial Reference Frame – 2005 version of WGS-84. 
A-2 
Annex CM69 S-4 S4 6° 01′ 41.0″ 56° 57′ 21.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-5 S5 6° 01′ 41.0″ 56° 57′ 15.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-6 S6 6° 00′ 10.0″ 56° 45′ 10.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-7 S7 6° 00′ 09.0″ 56° 44′ 48.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-8 S8 6° 00′ 08.0″ 56° 44′ 29.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-9 S9 5° 57′ 25.0″ 56° 29′ 57.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-10 S10 5° 57′ 21.0″ 56° 29′ 18.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-11 S11 6° 00′ 17.0″ 55° 46′ 44.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-12 S12 6° 00′ 22.0″ 55° 46′ 22.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-13 S13 6° 00′ 22.0″ 55° 45′ 56.0″ 
Annex CM69 S-14 S14 6° 01′ 35.0″ 55° 23′ 19.0″ 
    
These geographic coordinates were provided by Suriname in Counter Memorial 
Annex 69, and were stated to be related to World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84). 
 
5. The geographic coordinates of the pertinent turning points along the Low Water Line 
of the coast of Guyana are: 
 
Source and Number Renumber Latitude Longitude 
Annex R26 G-1 G3 6° 00′ 27.9″ 57° 08′ 21.1″ 
Annex R26 G-2 G9 6° 02′ 42.9″ 57° 08′ 51.6″ 
Annex R26 G-3 G12 6° 03′ 07.6″ 57° 08′ 54.0″ 
Annex R26 G-4 G13 6° 04′ 26.3″ 57° 09′ 13.8″ 
Annex R26 G-5 G16 6° 05′ 26.8″ 57° 09′ 26.6″ 
Annex R26 G-6 G18 6° 06′ 12.9″ 57° 09′ 43.3″ 
Annex R26 G-7 G19 6° 06′ 43.2″ 57° 09′ 52.8″ 
Annex R26 G-8 G21 6° 07′ 42.8″ 57° 10′ 27.3″ 
Annex R26 G-9 G23 6° 09′ 21.1″ 57° 11′ 28.2″ 
Annex R26 G-10 G25 6° 10′ 45.0″ 57° 12′ 31.8″ 
Annex R26 G-11 G28 6° 16′ 22.3″ 57° 16′ 28.0″ 
Annex R26 G-12 G30 6° 17′ 12.7″ 57° 17′ 30.4″ 
Annex R26 G-13 G32 6° 18′ 32.1″ 57° 19′ 06.4″ 
Annex R26 G-14 G33 6° 20′ 12.8″ 57° 22′ 06.3″ 
Annex R26 G-15 G35 6° 40′ 44.1″ 57° 50′ 17.7″ 
Annex R26 G-16 G38 7° 22′ 53.8″ 58° 28′ 08.2″ 
    
These geographic coordinates were provided by Guyana in Reply Annex 26, and were 
stated to be related to World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84). 
 
6. The geographic coordinates of the pertinent turning points along the Low Water Line 
of the coast of Guyana are: 
 
Source and Number Renumber Latitude Longitude 
Annex CM69 G-1 G6 6° 01′ 36.0″ 57° 08′ 33.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-2 G7 6° 02′ 35.0″ 57° 09′ 06.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-3 G8 6° 02′ 45.0″ 57° 09′ 04.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-4 G10 6° 02′ 52.0″ 57° 09′ 04.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-5 G11 6° 02′ 58.0″ 57° 09′ 05.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-6 G14 6° 05′ 00.0″ 57° 09′ 35.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-7 G15 6° 05′ 14.0″ 57° 09′ 37.0″ 
A-3 
Annex CM69 G-8 G17 6° 06′ 05.0″ 57° 09′ 54.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-9 G20 6° 07′ 33.0″ 57° 10′ 32.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-10 G22 6° 07′ 48.0″ 57° 10′ 41.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-11 G24 6° 10′ 44.0″ 57° 12′ 19.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-12 G26 6° 10′ 50.0″ 57° 12′ 24.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-13 G27 6° 16′ 20.0″ 57° 16′ 31.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-14 G29 6° 17′ 12.0″ 57° 17′ 29.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-15 G31 6° 18′ 28.0″ 57° 19′ 06.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-16 G34 6° 20′ 15.0″ 57° 22′ 11.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-17 G36 6° 40′ 44.0″ 57° 50′ 21.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-18 G37 7° 22′ 02.0″ 58° 27′ 32.0″ 
Annex CM69 G-19 G39 7° 23′ 04.0″ 58° 28′ 14.0″ 
 
 These geographic coordinates were provided by Suriname in Counter Memorial 
Annex 69, and were stated to be related to World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84). 
 
7. Both Parties provided the geographical coordinates of the base points for determining 
the provisional equidistance line.  Guyana objected to Suriname’s points S1 and S14.  
Since the Tribunal has ruled that the delimitation within the territorial sea will be 
based on special circumstances, there is no need for the Tribunal to rule on the validity 
of Points S1 to S3 inclusive, and on the validity of Points G1 to G18 inclusive and 
Point G20.  The Tribunal has ruled on the validity of point S14 in its Award.  The 
Tribunal accepted the other base points provided by the Parties. 
 
8. The turning points along the equidistance line between Guyana and Suriname from the 
outer limit of the Territorial Sea (12 nm) to the outer limit of Exclusive Economic 
Zone (200 nm) are: 
 
Number Controlling Points Latitude   Longitude 
Point 3 G21, S4 6° 13′ 28.45161″N, 56° 59′ 52.26218″W, 
DHG-13 G21, S4, G23 6° 16′ 11.10279″N, 56° 58′ 37.51896″W 
DHG-14 G23, S4, S5 6° 18′ 37.68430″N, 56° 57′ 17.99996″W 
DHG-15 G23, S5, G24 6° 19′ 10.47780″N, 56° 57′ 00.33300″W 
DHG-16 G24, S5, G26 6° 28′ 00.46428″N, 56° 51′ 42.18096″W 
DHG-17 G26, S5, G28 6° 32′ 07.38098″N, 56° 49′ 13.06749″W 
DHG-18 G28, S5, S6 6° 35′ 07.68334″N, 56° 46′ 55.20724″W 
DHG-19 G28, S6, S7 6° 42′ 35.21247″N, 56° 43′ 03.39402″W 
DHG-20 G28, S7, S8 6° 43′ 59.56866″N, 56° 42′ 20.14577″W 
DHG-21 G28, S8, G29 7° 24′ 27.15434″N, 56° 21′ 44.54451″W 
DHG-22 G29, S8, S9 7° 26′ 06.50731″N, 56° 20′ 52.94196″W 
DHG-23 G29, S9, S10 7° 27′ 15.41697″N, 56° 20′ 24.14252″W 
DHG-24 G29, S10, G32 7° 28′ 59.03779″N, 56° 19′ 41.27176″W 
DHG-25 G32, S10, S11 7° 39′ 57.89461″N, 56° 14′ 59.67507″W 
DHG-26 G32, S11, S12 7° 53′ 28.79027″N, 56° 12′ 18.58596″W 
DHG-27 G32, S12, G33 8° 35′ 36.59110″N, 56° 03′ 59.52666″W 
DHG-28 G33, S12, G35 8° 36′ 45.54470″N, 56° 03′ 45.09377″W 
DHG-29 G35, S12, G37 9° 00′ 01.60724″N, 55° 56′ 05.23673″W 
DHG-30 G37, S12, G39 9° 06′ 16.33399″N, 55° 52′ 52.78138″W 
DHG-31 G39, S12, S13 9° 19′ 15.26503″N, 55° 46′ 08.99996″W 
DHG-32 G39, S13, S14 9° 20′ 39.70398″N, 55° 45′ 25.31202″W 
A-4 
DHG-33 G39, S14 9° 21′ 21.26226″N, 55° 45′ 06.72306″W 
   
 
9. A line N10°E (geodetic azimuth) through Marker “B” intersects the envelope of 3 
nautical mile arcs about the Guyanese controlling points (see paragraphs 5 and 6 
above) –  specifically point G19 – at: 
 Point 2     6° 08′ 19.76727″N, 57° 07′ 20.00890″W. 
 
10. Points DHG-14, DHG-19, DHG-23 and DHG-31 are all less than 11 metres from the 
geodetic line between DHG-13-15, DHG-18-20, DHG-22-24, and DHG-30-32, 
respectively, and can be excluded as turning points of the delimitation line because of 
the rounding off of all geographical coordinates to the nearest 0.01 minutes of arc. 
 
11. Because the coordinates used in the Award are to be expressed in 0.01 minutes of arc 
of Latitude and Longitude, and because selected points have now been omitted, the 
correlation of points in this Technical Report and the Award are interrelated in the 
following table: 
 
Award Pt. Technical Report Pt. Latitude Longitude 
1. 1. Intersection of LWL and 
N10°E line through 
Marker “B” 
 
2. 2. 6° 08.33′N,  57° 07.33′W 
3. 3. 6° 13.47′N,  56° 59.87′W 
4. DHG-13 6° 16.19′N,  56° 58.63′W 
5. DHG-15 6° 19.17′N,  56° 57.01′W 
6. DHG-16 6° 28.01′N,  56° 51.70′W 
7. DHG-17 6° 32.12′N,  56° 49.22′W 
8. DHG-18 6° 35.13′N,  56° 46.92′W 
9. DHG-20 6° 43.99′N,  56° 42.34′W 
10. DHG-21 7° 24.45′N,  56° 21.74′W 
11. DHG-22 7° 26.11′N,  56° 20.88′W 
12. DHG-24 7° 28.98′N,  56° 19.69′W 
13. DHG-25 7° 39.96′N,  56° 14.99′W 
14. DHG-26 7° 53.48′N,  56° 12.31′W 
15. DHG-27 8° 35.61′N,  56° 03.99′W 
16. DHG-28 8° 36.76′N,  56° 03.75′W 
17. DHG-29 9° 00.03′N,  55° 56.09′W 
18. DHG-30 9° 06.27′N,  55° 52.88′W 
19. DHG-32 9° 20.66′N,  55° 45.42′W 
20. DHG-33 9° 21.35′N,  
Approximate value 
55° 45.11′W 
Approximate value 
 
A-5 
Map 5 
 
